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Summary 
This thesis analyses the situation of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina that arrived in 
Britain as part of an organised programme. It represents a contribution towards the 
theoretical understanding of refugees, and develops and refines the theories of other 
authors. 
The author used field research methods based on techniques developed in ethnographic 
studies to generate empirical evidence on the social organisation of Bosnian refugees in 
Britain. Throughout the thesis it is argued that the situation of the refugees can only be 
understood through an examination of the influences affecting the refugees, before, 
during, and after their arrival in Britain. 
At every stage of the refugees' experience, control over the course of their lives has been 
taken away from the refugees. The war that took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina became 
constructed as an ethnic conflict, although there was no strong Muslim identification 
before the war. The programme removed options over country and place of residence, 
and created a measure of dependency. Longer term policies of community development, 
originally designed to meet the perceived needs of labour migrants, have been directed 
towards the refugees and imposed a model of organisation. Combined with temporary 
protected status, this has removed control from the refugees and prevented the formation 
of a new collective or individual positive life project. 
Refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina represent a new type of refugee in Joly's typology. 
This is a type of refugee that had no collective project in the country of origin, and also 
no collective project in the country of exile, and that is unable to make a decision on 
return because of the constraints around them. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992 produced the largest flow of 
refugees and displaced persons in Europe since the Second World 'Var. Thousands of 
people fled outwards and sought safety in other European countries, but although there 
was some public sympathy for their plight, the large numbers involved were a matter of 
concern for many European governments. In a pattern which has emerged with other 
refugee flows, the reaction of many governments, including the British government, was 
to impose visa restrictions in order to make it more difficult for persons from Bosnia- 
Herzegovina to travel to those countries and seek asylum. 
The discovery by journalists of concentration camps eventually led to the closure of those 
camps, which in turn created a new humanitarian emergency. Some of the ex-detainees 
were able to join family members in safer parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but many were 
brought to camps in Croatia, as there was nowhere else for them to go. UNHCR appealed 
for governments to accept some of these ex-detainees, and suggested that offering 
temporary protection would be a humanitarian solution. Many countries did accept some 
of the refugees, and set quotas for the number of ex-detainees they would admit. Britain 
was reluctant to accept a quota at first, but eventually on November 5th 1992, the same 
day that visa restrictions were introduced, an announcement was made that a quota of ex- 
detainees would be admitted to Britain under temporary protected status. 
In Britain a programme was quickly established for the reception of this quota, organised 
by voluntary organisations and funded by the Home Office. This programme became 
known as the Bosnia Project, and was responsible for the reception and housing of all 
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those that came as part of the programme. The refugees on the programme were housed 
in various parts of the country in what were called cluster areas after a stay in a reception 
centre, and were given support and advice by Bosnia Project workers. However, many of 
the cluster areas had not seen significant refugee arrivals before, and there were few other 
sources of support. In one area, there were concerns raised with the city council that the 
Bosnia Project workers were unable to cope with the volume of work, and local advice 
agencies and volunteers were struggling with the extra demand this created for them. In 
response, the council agreed to establish a post for a special worker whose role was to 
assist and support all refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina that were housed in that city. 
Thus began my involvement with refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, as I was appointed 
to the post of Bosnian Refugee Resettlement Officer between July 1994 and June 1996. 
No other local authority made such an appointment, making it a unique post. The work 
involved considerable overlap with the work of the Bosnia Project, and required a degree 
of co-ordination and agreement between myself and Bosnia Project workers. This gave 
me a unique perspective, being among the workers of the Bosnia Project but not actually 
a member of the Project, from which to view the workings of the various organisations 
within the project and the interaction with the refugees. 
During the time I held this post, I began to formulate ideas about the strengths and 
weaknesses of the programme as it applied to the refugees. This is an important topic, 
since it is only by fully evaluating the programme and its effect on the people it was 
supposed to help that we can understand the refugees' situation. It also seemed to me at 
the time that although the refugees were arriving in the city and not moving on elsewhere, 
they could not be described as settled. They appeared to be waiting for something, though 
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whether that something was the end of the war, the arrival of a relative, or an 
employment opportunity was not clear. Both the refugees and others that came 
into 
contact with them frequently asked how long they would be in Britain for, a question to 
which I was unable to give an answer. Through interaction with the refugees, I became 
aware that they were a diverse group, with widely different views on the 
future for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and displaying a wide range of attitudes towards each other. 
However, the main focus of support for refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina seemed to be 
encouraging the formation of community groups, and assumed that there was some form 
of `community' of refugees. 
This apparent contradiction between my experiences of the refugees and the expectations 
of those working with them provided the starting point for this research. I originally 
intended to focus upon the Bosnia Project, and address whether it had empowered or 
disempowered the refugees.. However, it soon became apparent that a hypothesis based 
upon notions of empowerment or disempowerment by the Project would have little value. 
Firstly, empowerment is too nebulous a concept, and has been so widely interpreted that 
it has become almost meaningless (Ward & Mullender 1991). Secondly, the deeper I 
investigated the more apparent it became that the focus of this research could not be 
solely the Project and its effects on the refugees. 
Using a grounded theory approach and utilising theories from sociology and social 
policy, it emerged that for a full understanding of the situation of the refugees, their 
interaction with British society, and not just the Project, was a more meaningful topic of 
research. It was also apparent that the situation of the refugees was dependent to a large 
extent on their situation in Britain, and the policies surrounding refugees and minorities 
in Britain, but also on the background of the refugees themselves, as suggested by the 
theories developed by Kunz (1973,1981) Zolberg (1989) and Joly (1996b). 
This thesis therefore begins with an examination of existing theories on refugees. These 
suggest that in order to understand the situation of refugees in the country of exile, 
consideration must be made of the situation of the refugees in their home country and 
their attitudes towards it in exile. I suggest, though, that in addition a consideration needs 
to be made of the relationship between the refugees and the country of exile. Although 
refugees and labour migrants are different in law, and have different backgrounds and 
reasons for entering a country, they are often considered together when issues of 
settlement are discussed. Policies of community formation and encouragement of 
community associations and self-help organisations were originally intended to assist 
labour migrants and later minority ethnic groups in Britain, in line with the model of 
multi-culturalism developed in Britain. As the number of refugees in Britain increased, 
there was little discussion of settlement issues, and these policies were repeated for 
refugees groups. In this chapter 1 question the applicability of these policies for refugee 
groups, and the ability of refugee groups to form communities. However, refugee groups 
do form community associations, and I suggest that among refugee groups this can lead 
to the formation of `contingent communities', which are consciously constructed as a 
response to policies and practices in British society. 
Chapter three sets out the methodological basis for this study and the methods used. As 
will become clear from this chapter, I have drawn on my experiences working with 
refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina in this study. I have also used field work methods 
including interviews and participant observation, and the processes are described. In 
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order that this research goes beyond the actors' own accounts I have analysed the 
empirical evidence using a grounded theory approach. Together with the theoretical basis 
of this research, this pointed to an analysis that includes the situation of the refugees 
before and during the conflict, the policies of the Bosnia Project, and the policies of 
settlement that pertain in Britain, in order to understand the way that the refugees interact 
with British society. 
The history of Bosnia-Herzegovina is described in chapter four. This includes an 
examination of the history of the country from the time of the invasion by the Ottoman 
Empire until the present day. This shows that the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina is 
one of 
repeated domination by outside powers, and also of co-existence of members of different 
religious beliefs. The circumstances leading to the war are briefly outlined, and an 
analysis of the causes of the war is made. 
This is followed by an examination of the Bosnia Project in chapter five, including both 
the policies and the way those policies were implemented. The operation of the 
programme is described, and an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses is made. 
Chapters six and seven focus on the refugees themselves. Chapter six looks at the 
refugees as individuals, and the way that their attitudes towards themselves and others 
has been affected by their experiences. Where possible, comparisons are made between 
refugees that came on the programme and those that came on relief convoys and 
remained outside the programme. The extent to which the refugees were able to control 
their own destiny is discussed, and the way that this has affected their attitude towards 
employment, language learning, and return. Chapter seven looks at the refugees as a 
group, and the linkages between the individual refugees. I begin by examining the 
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question of whether they form a community, and what kind of networks exist if there is 
no real community. I then go on to look at the community associations formed by 
Bosnian refugees, including their origins and their functioning. I discuss the difficulties 
that refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina have in forming community associations, and 
suggest that these might be better understood as being contingent communities, a theory 
developed in chapter two. 
Chapter eight summarises the results of this research and the conclusions that can be 
drawn about the interaction of Bosnian refugees with British society. 
Finally, I need to explain some of the terminology and spellings used in this thesis. First 
of all, I am examining refugees from the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is the full 
name of the state, but as can be seen from the bibliography it is sometimes referred to as 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, the hyphen may be absent, or the Bosnian name of `Bosna i 
Hercegovina' is used. I have used Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout, although the others 
are also correct. Yugoslavia refers to the whole of the state of Yugoslavia when referring 
to the situation before 1992. The exception to this is where informants have used Bosnia 
instead of the full title and I have used a direct quotation. I refer to those from Bosnia- 
Herzegovina as `Bosnians', since the term Bosnia-Herzegovinian is both rarely used and 
clumsy. 
The phrase `former Yugoslavia' refers to all that territory which used to be part of 
Yugoslavia. When the situation post-1992 is discussed, Yugoslavia refers only to that 
part of the former Yugoslavia which remained within the federation, that is Serbia, 
Kosovo, Montenegro and throughout the war in Bosnia also included Macedonia. 
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The language which those from Bosnia-Herzegovina professed to speak when they first 
began arriving in Britain was called Serbo-Croat. Later it became known as Bosnian, and 
I refer to it within this thesis as Bosnian. The language utilises accents and letters that are 
not used in English, and for ease of writing these have been omitted or anglicised as 
appropriate. 
I refer throughout to refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and by this I mean all those that 
sought or were given international protection, including those on the programme. 
Although they were given temporary protection and did not enter the asylum 
determination procedures, and so do not strictly qualify as refugees, they refer to 
themselves as refugees and were assisted by refugee organisations. 
Some authors writing of Bosnian Muslims use the term `Bosniacs'. This came into 
common usage around 1995, and is the term preferred by many international 
organisations. However, I have preferred to use the terms used by the refugees 
themselves, and none of the people that I had contact with used the word `Bosniac' to 
describe themselves. I therefore refer to those from Bosnia-Herzegovina that describe 
themselves as Muslim as being Bosnian Muslims. Those that consider themselves 
Catholic or Orthodox Christians who are Bosnian are referred to as Bosnian Croats and 
Bosnian Serbs respectively, which are the terms they use themselves. Where Croat or 
Serb is used without Bosnia at the beginning, it is referring to someone from either 
Croatia or Serbia, and not from Bosnia. 
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Chapter 2: Theory and literature review 
Introduction 
This chapter sets out the concepts and theories used in this thesis. The central question of 
this thesis was the nature of the interaction between refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and British society, and this required an approach which was broad and encompasses the 
diverse nature of the refugee experience. 
I begin by examining the need to distinguish between labour migrants and refugees, since 
refugees have a different legal status in the host country, and have different motivations 
for migration. I then examine the situation in Europe for refugees at the time of the 
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the origin of the temporary protection policies that 
were developed in response to the refugee flow. These policies were predicated on the 
notion that refugees would return at the end of the crisis, and so did not require the 
evolution of policies towards their settlement and integration. However, many of those 
given temporary protection remain in Western Europe, and so questions of settlement and 
integration have become relevant. 
In Britain refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina were met by policies originally designed to 
meet the perceived needs of labour migrants, which focussed on communities and self- 
help. As I establish in this chapter, refugees are different from economic migrants, but 
policies on their settlement have not developed separately. The effectiveness of these 
policies for refugees depends to a large extent on the formation of communities by 
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refugee groups, and their abilities to form effective community associations which reflect 
the needs of the group. 
The need to distinguish between refugees and labour migrants 
The settlement of in-migrants to a country is affected by many factors, but one significant 
factor is the background of the migrant (Joly 1996b, Kunz 1973). Since refugees and 
labour migrants may have different motivations and backgrounds, it is important that the 
differences are understood and defined theoretically in order that their settlement can also 
be understood. 
Most states use the United Nations definition to define what is meant by a `refugee', 
although this is not the only definition in use. This legal differentiation between refugees 
and other migrants is based on the belief held by the international community that there is 
a fundamental difference between the two, and a facet of this difference is that refugees 
are given privileged access to a country on the grounds of their need for protection. 
Understanding the difference between refugees and other migrants is important, not just 
as an academic exercise but to the individual, since their classification as one or the other 
may determine whether they gain entry to a country and once there determines their 
access to benefits, settlement rights and future family reunification. (Kay & Miles 1992). 
The difference between refugees and labour migrants has been overlooked by many 
authors (Joly 1997). Eisenstadt (1954), for example, in analysing the settlement of in 
migrants in Israel, fails to make a distinction between the two. Kovacs and Cropley's 
(1975) work on immigrants to Australia draws on psychological theories to study the 
relation between immigrants and the receiving society, but although it claims to be a 
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study of immigrants it states in the preface that the persons studied were receiving 
assistance from the International Refugee Organisation. The dearth of theoretical work 
differentiating between refugees and labour migrants has been noted by Joly and Cohen 
(1989). Some attempts have been made, however, and these shall be discussed. 
Most Marxist theories of migration focus on economic pressures and their impact on 
migration. Within an economic analysis, however, it is difficult to locate refugees except 
as an extreme form of economic migrant. Marxist theories, and non- Marxist theories 
focusing on economics, therefore tend to neglect the difference between refugees and 
other migrants (Kay & Miles 1992). 
UNHCR recognises that as far as migrants are concerned there are a multitude of reasons 
why people migrate, but that what separates refugees from other migrants is the need for 
international protection. They recognise that there may be a variety of reasons behind 
departures, and economic, political ethnic, environmental or human rights pressures may 
he important factors, but that the specific cause for departure may be difficult to discern. 
Spencer (1994) suggests that migration flows into and out of Britain can be divided into 
three types, settlement, temporary labour, and asylum seekers, but that these are often 
difficult to distinguish. Understanding the difference between asylum seekers / refugees 
and other in migrants is also important if the settlement process of those refugees is to be 
considered, since it has been accepted by many writers that an individual's future as a 
settler is affected by their background prior to arrival, and the difference in background 
and circumstances leading to arrival in a third country is the distinction between refugees 
and immigrants (Kunz 1973,1981). This difference in settlement according to 
background is hardly surprising, since though we may be tabula rasa at birth subsequent 
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events are carried around with us, and cannot simply be left like luggage at international 
borders. 
Refugee status 
A major difference between refugees and economic migrants is in their immigration 
status. A refugee in international law is someone who: 
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to return to it. " (UNI-1CR 1951) 
International laws have been developed over time which regulate and control the 
movement of refugees, and whilst individual states can refuse to admit economic 
migrants if they wish, those that are signatories to the UN Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (the Convention) must provide protection to refugees on their territory 
(Smyser 1987, Tuitt 1996). The Convention was initially intended to address the refugee 
problems that arose after the Second World War, although later Protocols removed its 
geographical and temporal limits. As well as providing a definition of a refugee, the 
Convention contains provisions to prevent `refoulement'. States may not expel or return 
(refouler) a refugee to the frontiers of territories where their life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion. However, despite the existence of UNHCR guidance on 
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the interpretation of the Convention (UN1-1CR 1979,1992), which is generally considered 
to be authoritative (Sztucki 1999), the procedures for applying for asylum and the 
decisions on individual cases are the responsibility of individual states. The institution of 
asylum is therefore partly dependant on the willingness of states to accept responsibility 
(Rudge 1998). 
The Convention is being continually analysed and interpreted in the courts, and the exact 
meaning of the terms used and the circumstances to which they apply are the subject of 
much legal and academic discussion (Goodwin-Gill 1996, Goulbourne 2000, Hathaway 
1991). It has been argued that the way the Convention is interpreted in Britain, and in 
Western Europe as a whole, restricts the refugee definition to a small section of asylum 
seekers, and does not provide protection in all circumstances (Harvey 2000). According 
to Tuitt (1996), the 1951 Convention was not formulated solely for humanitarian 
purposes. She interprets its overriding aim as being the reduction of the costs to third 
countries of refugee producing phenomena such as civil wars. Tuitt argues that asylum 
law restricts the recognition of refugees to the Convention definition, and that this denies 
them their individual identity. Developing this criticism, she argues (Tuitt 1999) that one 
of the problems with the Convention is that it seeks to impose a single identity on a 
diverse range of experiences, while in reality there are a large number of people who 
might consider themselves as refugees but who do not meet the strict Convention 
definition. 
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Refugees in Western Europe 
Since the mid 1980s there have been significant changes in the asylum regimes of 
European countries, with increases in restrictive measures (Berkowitz 1999, Shah & 
Doebbler 1999). At the same time that these changes have been occurring, there has been 
pressure for harmonisation of laws and policies from European Union institutions (Bloch 
et al. 2000). This has led to the introduction of some European measures on aspects of 
asylum, such as procedures for dealing with manifestly unfounded claims and asylum 
seekers who have travelled through safe third countries (Care 1995, de Jong 1999, Joly et 
al. 1997). Some authors argue that the asylum regime in Europe has fundamentally 
changed, and it is now marked by restrictionism, non-integration, selective harmonisation 
and temporary protection (Bunyan & Webber 1995, Joly 2001 forthcoming, Levy 1999). 
European states wished to severely restrict immigration, and to retain sovereignty over 
their own borders, and this could only be achieved through harmonisation (Joly 1999, 
2002 forthcoming-b). Although these were initially directed towards the restriction of 
immigration and thus should not in theory have affected asylum seekers and refugees, 
governments and parts of the media have portrayed asylum seekers as economic migrants 
seeking to avoid immigration restrictions (Ferris 1993). Immigration restrictions have 
made it more difficult for economic migrants to enter the European Union, but the 
number of asylum seekers entering the EU increased dramatically throughout the 1980s 
and early 1990s (Joly et al. 1997). Whilst this has been interpreted by governments as 
resulting from an inflow of economic migrants in disguise, this overlooks the fact that in 
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the past some economic migrants could have been refugees, but had no need to make a 
claim for asylum because they were able to enter without making a claim (Joly et al. 
1997). However, the perception that asylum seekers were subverting immigration 
controls led to measures which also affect asylum seekers. European states were unable 
to prevent the admittance of all asylum seekers and refugees because they had signed the 
Convention, but instead they could limit its scope through restrictive interpretations and a 
combination of national and European measures which restrict or regulate entry (Boswell 
2000, Collinson 1995, de Wenden 1994,1997, Fernhout 1999, Joly 1999). It has been 
argued that the liberal approach to asylum that the Convention represents is under threat 
in Europe, and the rising number of asylum applications in Europe has been met by a 
retreat from liberal universalism by governments (Boswell 2000). Although many of the 
measures proposed at a European level have been broadly in line with British government 
policy, the government in Britain has been reluctant to co-operate fully with European 
proposals, and instead has continued to develop its own policies and regulations on 
immigration and asylum (Marshall 1996). 
Refugees in Britain 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Britain introduced measures which reduced the 
numbers of primary immigrants arriving in the UK, and by the beginning of the 1990s 
primary immigration had virtually ended (Layton-Henry 1992). Politicians in Britain 
have claimed that Britain has a history of favourable treatment of asylum seekers and 
refugees (Ghose 1996, Stevens 1998). In fact, several researchers have argued that a close 
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examination of the history of asylum in Britain shows that this is not true. Asylum policy 
has been based on the needs of the state rather than the interests of the refugees, with 
humanitarian protection being given a lesser priority than tight border controls and the 
deterrence of asylum seekers (Stevens 1998). Policy on asylum tends to be restrictive 
(Kaye 1995, Schuster & Solomos 1999), and also reactive, responding to flows of asylum 
seekers as they happen and developing ad hoc responses (Bloch 2000, Bloch et at. 2000, 
Joly 1996b, Spencer 1994). 
In 1987 Britain introduced the Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Act, which introduced 
fines on commercial carriers for each passenger arriving without the correct 
documentation. It imposed a statutory duty on carriers to inspect the documentation of all 
passengers, and made no distinction between ordinary passenger and those that might 
seek asylum on arrival in Britain. In effect it limited the admission of asylum seekers, 
since many who flee genuine persecution are not in possession of the necessary 
documentation (Cruz 1995, Nicholson 1997, Shah 2000). 
Visa restrictions, especially when combined with carriers' liability legislation, also can 
limit the number of asylum seekers gaining entry to Britain (Harvey 2000). A 
requirement for entry visas for nationals of a particular country may be introduced 
whenever the government considers them necessary, but research has shown that they 
tend to be introduced in response to an increase in asylum applications (Guild 2000, Shah 
2000). For example, the number of asylum seekers from Sri Lanka increased in 1984, and 
continued to rise in 1985. In response, the government introduced visa restrictions for all 
Sri Lankans seeking to enter Britain (Shah 2000). 
-23- 
Numbers of asylum applications in Britain continued to rise, however, and although the 
years 1984 to 1988 saw around 4,000 applications annually, in 1989 the number jumped 
to over 11,000 and in 1991 there were almost 45,000 applications for asylum in Britain 
(Home Office 1996, Joly et al. 1997). A bill was introduced in 1991 which aimed to 
address this rise in applications, which the government considered to be fuelled mainly 
by a large increase in the proportion of `bogus' or unfounded applications. The bill had to 
be dropped when a general election was called, but the measures in the bill were 
reintroduced after the government was re-elected and formed the basis of the 1993 
Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act. This Act can therefore be considered as setting 
out the government's opinion on asylum and asylum seekers in 1991 and 1992. The 1993 
Act was not entirely negative, since it introduced the 1951 Convention into British law 
for the first time and introduced an in-country right of appeal for all refused asylum 
seekers. However, it also contained measures which made it more difficult for asylum 
seekers to gain access to the asylum determination procedures. The safe third country 
principle was introduced, which allows the removal of an asylum seeker without 
consideration of their claim if they had travelled through a safe country prior to arriving 
in Britain. Cases could also be classed as manifestly unfounded by the Home Secretary, 
and appeals would then be via a fast track procedure. Several authors have commented 
that the intentions of the 1993 Act were based upon a restrictive ideology and were an 
attempt to limit the number of asylum applications made in Britain, regardless of the 
genuine or `bogus' nature of the claim (Grenier 1996, Justice 1997, McKee 1999, Randall 
1994). Tuitt (1996) argues that the 1993 Act was part of a general process whereby 
refugees became reclassified as the lowest form of migrant, and whilst their refugee 
-24- 
situation should give them privileged access to countries in order to escape persecution, 
this reclassification means that those genuinely in need of protection find that protection 
much harder to obtain. 
Refugees from former Yugoslavia 
At the same time that attitudes towards refugees were hardening in Britain and the other 
Western European states, the nature of asylum applications in Europe was changed by the 
conflict in former Yugoslavia. For the first time since the Second World War, there was a 
massive movement of refugees in Europe who were of European origin. The break-up of 
Yugoslavia, which began with the secession of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, created a 
flow of refugees from Yugoslavia towards the rest of Europe, who made a major 
contribution to the increase in asylum applications for Europe as a whole in 1991 and 
1992. Those fleeing former Yugoslavia arrived in Western Europe at a time when, as 
discussed above, the attitude of governments was hardening towards asylum seekers. By 
the end of 1992, almost two million people had been displaced from their homes in 
Yugoslavia, and whilst most remained within the territory of former Yugoslavia, rising 
numbers were seeking asylum in the rest of Europe. In Britain, the government claimed 
that it was responding effectively to the `Yugoslav problem' (Hansard 1992a), although it 
was reluctant to accept proposals from Germany for sharing the burden of asylum 
applications (Marshall 1996). Britain's reluctance to accept refugees from former 
Yugoslavia became more apparent on November 5`h 1992, when visa restrictions were 
announced, to become effective the next day. This effectively ended legal entry to Britain 
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for refugees from former Yugoslavia (Kushner & Knox 1999, Shah 2000). Under 
pressure from UNHCR, the government agreed that it would accept a quota of refugees, 
but instead of entering the normal asylum determination procedures, these refugees were 
given a new status, temporary protection. 
The emergence of temporary protection 
Although the concept of temporary protection had been discussed in the 1980s as a 
possible response to mass refugee outflows (Smyser 1987, UNHCR 1980,1981), it did 
not appear as a specific policy proposal until the crisis in Yugoslavia (Goodwin-Gill 
1996, Kalin 1996). It emerged as a formal proposal from UNHCR in the context of a call 
by UNHCR for a response which was both humanitarian and comprehensive (Joly 1998b, 
Koser & Black 1999). UNHCR had to respond to the refugee emergency which was 
developing, whilst remaining aware that governments within Europe were unwilling to 
accept large numbers of refugees, and temporary protection offered the `least worst' 
solution (Joly 1998b). In the case of former Yugoslavia, it was also presented as an 
opportunity for states to admit people in need of protection without increasing the burden 
on their determination procedures, since in many states including Britain the recent 
increase in asylum applications had led to increases in delays and backlogs of 
applications (Luca 1994). UNHCR and some states argued that giving temporary 
protection instead of a permanent status would avoid accusations that they were 
contributing to ethnic cleansing (de Wenden 1997, UNHCR 1993). 
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Many states responded to the request from UNHCR, and although many utilised the 
concept of temporary protection (Thorburn 1995), it came to have a different meaning in 
each state. The rights it afforded, the length of time for which protection was offered, and 
the options at the end of the temporary period varied widely (Albert 1996, Joly et at. 
1997, "Survey on the Implementation of Temporary Protection" 1994). 
Temporary protection has been described as the cornerstone of a new asylum regime in 
Europe (Joly 1999), since it brings with it the right of states to repatriate refugees when a 
crisis is over, unlike refugee status, and so enables governments to meet their 
humanitarian responsibilities whilst obviating the need for development of integration 
and settlement policies (Goodwin-Gill 1996, Hathaway 1997, Joly 1999). In the context 
of states that are unwilling to differentiate between economic migrants and those in need 
of protection, temporary protection enabled a few to receive protection. However, it also 
enabled states to avoid confronting the way that they had begun to label all asylum 
seekers as economic migrants, when a distinction between refugees and economic 
migrants remained both in law and in practice. It also avoided the need to discuss issues 
of integration and settlement, since those given temporary protection were supposed to 
remain only whilst the conflict continued. Unfortunately, the conflict in former 
Yugoslavia lasted several years, and the majority of those admitted to Western Europe 
under temporary protection measures remain outside former Yugoslavia (Black et al. 
1998). Since the first refugees to be given temporary refuge arrived in Europe in 1992, 
questions relating to their settlement and integration need to be addressed. 
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Settlement 
There have been several studies of the settlement of migrants, some of which include 
refugees or people who could be considered refugees. Sociology began by considering 
that migrants would gradually become assimilated into the new country, eventually 
becoming just another citizen. Studies have shown, however, that this is often not the 
case. 
Gold (1992) compared the settlement of Soviet Jewish and Vietnamese refugees in the 
United States in order to further understand factors affecting the settlement of refugees in 
general. He found there were some common factors between the two groups, but also 
important points of departure. He found that the existence of mutual assistance networks 
was important for the long term well being of refugees, but that the formation of these 
networks was not always facilitated by the services available to the refugees. He suggests 
that where there is a chain of migration, these networks are developed more easily, but 
that in the absence of chain migration networks of mutual assistance develop slowly, if at 
all. He suggests that this is due to the lack of authority figures amongst new arrivals and 
to a lack of social ties within a group. He found that refugees tended to restrict their 
patterns of social association to a small network of family and close friends. He suggests 
that at a later date these small networks may unite and form a larger community. 
Gold's research is wide ranging, and a criticism that can be made of it is that it goes into 
so many aspects of the refugee settlement experience that it fails to fully account for any 
individual aspect. None the less, this is a valuable work since it illustrates three important 
areas. Firstly, it shows that the nature of the settlement policies enacted around a 
particular group affect their settlement. Secondly, it shows the importance of networks 
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and community associations for the well being of refugees. Thirdly it shows that the 
background of the refugee, both individually and in terms of their country of origin, 
affects their pattern of settlement. 
Hansen and Oliver-Smith (1982), in a study of involuntary migration and resettlement, 
suggest that compulsory relocation of whatever type is a stressful experience for the 
individual. This stress can be divided into three components, physiological, 
psychological, and sociocultural. Physiological stress has never been thoroughly studied, 
but they suggest that it occurs and is evidenced in increased rates of morbidity and 
mortality as compared to before relocation. Psychological stress in refugees is likely to 
take the form of trauma at the circumstances surrounding relocation and guilt at surviving 
or escaping while knowing that others have suffered a far worse fate. There is also likely 
to be grief for the loss of their original home, and anxiety about the future. They suggest 
that this is likely to induce depression amongst those who are forcibly relocated, and that 
the psychological strain of voluntary migrants will be much less severe and so far less 
likely to lead to depression. The third component of stress, they suggest, is sociocultural 
stress. This is connected to the economic, political and cultural effects of relocation, and 
is affected by the lack of effective community leadership. This will be due to either the 
leaders who were in place before relocation being left behind or lost in the migration, or 
due to their becoming discredited for their failure to prevent the relocation. (This lack of 
leadership was also noted by Gold, above) Sociocultural stress is also caused by the 
dissonance between the original culture and way of life and the new one. They suggest 
that after relocation refugees will follow a conservative strategy, whereby they seek to 
change as little about themselves as possible. One way of doing this is by ensuring they 
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are close to kin. Hansen and Oliver-Smith suggest that governments and planners should 
be aware of this desire to be close to kin, since those refugees who are placed away from 
kin for policy reasons will try to relocate themselves again in order to recreate their 
previous close kinship relationships. They suggest that there will be a period of transition 
between the time of arrival at the new location and the time when the individuals can be 
said to have been successfully resettled. This period, they suggest, is rarely less than two 
years and can be much longer. Though they admit there is no generally accepted 
definition of when successful resettlement can be said to have occurred, there are some 
indicators which can be used, relating to economic activity and initiative. 
"People still supported by food relief or it, elfare are obviously still in the transition stage, 
no matter how long they have been living on the new site. In terms of initiative, [an 
indicator is] 
... when the conservative stance and closed-system behavior are replaced by 
at least a prerelocation degree of risk taking. " (Hansen and Oliver-Smith, 1982, p 280) 
A further possible indicator is whether the refugee "feels at home" (p280). Though this is 
a difficult notion to assess, one possible indicator of it is whether community leaders 
have emerged to support the interests of the community. Another facet is the re- 
establishment of prerelocation rituals and customs, such as house decorations, traditional 
handicrafts, language and dance. 
In their summary of the policy implications of their work, they suggest that: 
"during the transition stage, the emphasis should be on attempting to alleviate the stress 
of removal in as humane a fashion as possible without creating a dependency 
relationship between the relocatees and the resettlement authority. " (Hansen & Oliver- 
Smith 1982 page 286) 
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McFarland and Walsh (1989) studied the settlement of refugees in Strathclyde, and found 
that two major difficulties faced by refugees were the attitude of the government towards 
refugees and asylum seekers, and the lack of co-ordination between local government, 
central government, and the voluntary sector, which is the result of the absence of a 
national settlement strategy. They note that the policy of dispersal (discussed further in 
chapter five) meant that in many cases refugees arrived in areas where support services 
were inadequate, which in turn meant that there was often poor language training 
provision and long term unemployment was chronic. They also report high levels of 
stress related ill health and psychological problems. Despite this, they suggest that the 
stereotypical view of refugees as victims should be avoided, since the individuals 
themselves often held potential, though this potential appears to have been rarely 
fulfilled. 
The rejection of the image of refugees as victims is also a theme of Preis' work (1996). 
Preis draws on a diverse range of work, and suggests that the issues of compassionate and 
humanitarian action is by its very nature problematic, and even more so when the focus 
of the action, refugees, have themselves been defined as victims. Comparing the 
settlement of Tamil refugees in Britain and Denmark, Preis notes the valuable role played 
by the pre-existing Tamil community in Britain in assisting the settlement of refugees. 
She also suggests that the policies of the host country have an important effect on the 
settlement process, policies in terms of both legal status and settlement policies. Preis 
(1996) suggests that the victimhood status of refugees affects the attitudes of those that 
assist them. Action which is deemed by the actor to be compassionate and humanitarian 
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is in itself, according to Preis, problematic, especially when that action is directed 
towards groups such as refugees who have been deemed to be victims. 
McFarland and Walsh (1994) studied the responses to Bosnian refugees in Glasgow. 
They found that the multi agency approach adopted in Glasgow, in part as a result of their 
earlier study, resulted in a better level of co-ordination between agencies than was seen 
with Vietnamese refugees. However, there were still gaps in provision and some of the 
blame for this they lay at the feet of central government due to their lack of support for 
refugee initiatives. 
If the differences between refugees and migrants can be understood, and a theoretical 
conception of the refugee developed, it may be possible to better understand the 
settlement process of refugees (Kunz 1973). This has been attempted by some authors, 
notably Joly (I 996b), Kunz (1973) and Zolberg et al (1989). 
Home country factor theories 
Many theories on refugees focus solely on the mode of and motivation for departure from 
the country of origin, and whether this was forced or voluntary, and what were the 
immediate pressures for departure, in order to draw a distinction between refugees and 
migrants. These theories have been termed push - pull theories, and at their most basic 
level distinguish between labour migrants and refugees according to the degree of `push' 
from the home country. Refugees, in this model, are characterised by the absence of 
`pull' towards the host country. 
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Richmond (1994) has criticised those theories which speak of migration in terms of push 
and pull factors and which seek to locate the difference between refugees and other 
migrants in the issue of whether their departure was forced or not. He says that though 
refugee movements are usually represented as forced, "they are only an extreme case of 
the constraints that are placed upon the choices available to an individual in particular 
circumstances" (Richmond 1994 page 53). 
Kunz (1973,1981) has attempted to take into consideration factors preceding and 
succeeding flight, and has described a typology of refugees which he calls a kinetic 
model. The type of refugee, in Kunz's classification, depends upon whether an individual 
is reacting to or anticipating events, and also whether they are identified with the majority 
or not, and their attitude towards displacement. Kunz suggests a basic division in the 
different types of refugee into reactive fate groups or purpose groups, according to their 
attitudes to displacement. Members of these groups can also be divided into majority 
identified, events alienated, and exiles. Majority identified refugees believe their 
opposition to events is shared by the majority of their fellow nationals. Although they 
identify themselves with the nation, they do not identify themselves with its government 
necessarily. Events alienated refugees are those who originally desired to be part of the 
nation, but events proved to them that they have been rejected, either by the whole nation 
or by a section of its citizens, and an example would be German Jews in the second world 
war. Exiles are those that have no wish to identify themselves with the nation, and whose 
departure is a logical result of their alienation. Reactive fate groups are typically refugees 
of wars and sudden revolutions, and tend to be mainly majority identified refugees. 
Within the group there may be a proportion of events alienated refugees, but the common 
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factor within the group is that they flee because they are reacting to a situation which they 
perceive to be intolerable. 
Purpose group members are very different, and at times the members of this group may 
be termed voluntary migrants. They may be divided into self-fulfilling purpose groups 
and revolutionary activists. Self-fulfilling purpose groups are usually composed of 
"... people who became alienated because of their insistence on the over riding 
importance of a certain facet of belief dogma, or their passionate pursuit of a form of 
society which derives its framework from minority ideologies inconsistent with those 
current in the home country. Whether they can be considered refugees or voluntary 
migrants depends on how much their ideologies clashed with those of their home country 
and whether their actual departure was caused by harassment and fear of prosecution or 
by their wish to start on the desired way of life " (Kunz 1981 page 45)). 
Revolutionary activists are those who, once in exile, focus their energies on trying to 
engineer a revolutionary change in their homeland, and sometimes the whole world. 
These different types of refugee have different characteristics and Kunz suggests that it is 
possible to discern patterns, for example anticipatory refugees will tend to be well 
educated, whereas civilian evacuees displaced by force as part of an acute refugee 
movement will contain few of the highest strata of educational attainment. The different 
refugee waves will also contain different patterns of ages and family groupings. These 
characteristics will then have a bearing on the settlement patterns of the different cohorts 
of refugees. 
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International factor theories 
Zolberg et al (1986) suggest that it is important to look beyond factors in the country of 
origin of refugees, since international factors will impinge upon the conditions leading to 
the creation of a refugee flow both directly and indirectly. In any theoretical definition of 
refugees, these international factors must therefore be taken into account. Zolberg et al 
(1989) further developed their theory on the causes of refugee flows, and they describe 
this work as "the first attempt to provide a comprehensive, theoretically grounded 
explanation of refugee flows. " (Zolberg et al. 1989 page v). They suggest that refugee 
producing factors need to be understood in order that patterns of refugee formation can be 
determined, to contradict the commonly held notion that the processes which lead to the 
creation of refugee flows are random, chaotic, unpredictable and therefore unavoidable. 
They suggest that it is not enough to look at factors solely within the country from which 
the refugee flow originates, as external factors also play a very large part. They affect the 
emergence and continuance of conflict in the home country, and also affect the 
emergence of refugees by their border control policies. They use the analogy of a bus to 
explain the importance of understanding refugee producing factors. 
"For example, as of 1987 the refugee `bus' contained only 46,000 Vietnamese, because 
nearly all of the several hundred who came aboard in 1975 and 1979 had been 
permanently resettled. But it contained over two million Palestinians, a majority of whom 
were the children and grandchildren of those who originally fled in 1948. Why some 
refugees got off the bus more easily whereas others linger on for so long can be 
explained mostly by why they got on the bus to start with. " (Zolberg et al 1989 page 229) 
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Their analysis of contemporary refugee flows leads them to develop a three fold 
sociological typology of refugees, whereby refugees can be distinguished instead of being 
viewed as a homogenous huddled mass. These types of refugee are: 
1. The activist, dissenters, and rebels, whose actions contributed to the conflict from 
which they flee; 
2. The target, that is individuals who have been singled out for violent action because of 
their membership of a particular group; 
3. The victims, who are randomly caught in the conflict or are victims of generalised 
violence. 
Zolberg et al suggest that the moral claims to protection of each group are equally valid, 
but that as the international community narrows its criteria for the acceptance of refugees 
the third type of refugee, the victim, has been increasingly seen as an illegitimate refugee. 
Zolberg also suggests a typology of conflicts, and shows that international factors as well 
as national factors are important in the production of refugee flows. 
Refugee perspective theories 
Joly (1996b) has suggested that although Kunz has considered the situation of the refugee 
in the country of origin, in flight, and in the country of asylum, he does not adequately 
address the issue of those groups who "may not be majority identified but nonetheless 
display more of the characteristics of majority identified refugees rather than alienated 
refugees. " (Joly 1996b page 12). 
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Joly suggests that when the adaptation and settlement of refugees is under consideration, 
the attitude towards the country of origin is important for understanding the situation in 
the country of exile (Joly 1996a). An important factor is the presence or absence of a 
collective project of return. Those refugees with a collective return project see their exile 
as temporary, and intend to return to their original country. Through the formation of 
community associations and political activity this return project ideal can be maintained. 
Those refugees without a collective project in the country of origin, or who have forsaken 
that project, do not intend to return to their original country. This leads to one of two 
responses: the refugees may have a more positive attitude to their host country; or the 
refugee may feel a double alienation, first from their home country and secondly from 
their host country. The outcome for those refugees without a return project is, according 
to Joly, largely determined by host country related factors. These categories are not fixed, 
and an individual may be seen to belong in a different category at different times, as their 
attitude changes or factors concerning either the host or home country change. 
This is an important note, since often those theorising about refugees focus solely on 
factors prior to their arrival in the host country, and fail to acknowledge the role the host 
country plays in the settlement of refugees. 
The need for a theory encompassing host country factors 
From these different theoretical perspectives, some clear notions emerge. It can be seen 
from Kunz's work that labour migrants and refugees are different, and these differences 
between them, and between cohorts of refugees, will be evidenced in their settlement. 
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From Zolberg et al's work it is clear that the circumstances which lead to the creation of 
refugee flows are not solely contained within the country of origin, and to fully 
understand the causes of refugee formation attention must be paid to international factors. 
Joly's (1996a, 1996b) work suggests that the perspective of the refugee themselves must 
be understood and analysed, since their settlement in the host country will be affected by 
the presence or absence of a project of return held by the individual refugee. However, it 
is argued by Joly (1996a), and also emerged during the course of this research, that an 
understanding of the influence of the host country was also necessary, since the nature of 
policies and the society in the host country affects many aspects of refugee settlement. 
Joly argues that for a full understanding of the refugee situation the circumstances 
preceding and following exile, and the events in between, must be examined. In Britain 
in particular, policies designed originally to accommodate economic migrants have been 
used towards refugees, and these policies need to be examined. 
Multi-culturalism and community 
Policies on the settlement of migrants in Britain have not remained static, but since the 
late 1960s Britain has adopted a broadly multi-cultural stance. Before then, policy had 
been assimilationist in nature, with an expectation that a minority group would over time 
absorb the values and behaviour of the majority population, and eventually become 
indistinguishable from the majority. Assimilationist theories are associated with the work 
of Robert Park, who developed a model of assimilation that he called the race relations 
cycle. Park's model suggests that migrant's initial contact with the majority is economic, 
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and there is very little interaction between the groups. Later, competition develops 
between the groups and this gives rise to conflict as they compete for resources within 
society. Eventually the groups agree some rules regulating the relations between them, 
and they tolerate and accept each other's presence, a phase Park calls accommodation. 
Finally acceptance becomes such that the groups no longer see members of different 
groups but instead see individuals, and assimilation has occurred (Park 1950, Park & 
Burgess 1929). Park's model has been criticised as not reflecting the reality of American 
society, where questions of ethnicity continue to be salient for minority groups (Glazer & 
Moynihan 1963). Assimilationist theories were the predominant discourse in Britain in 
the early post-war period, when it was expected that migrants would assimilate into 
British society eventually, and any racism that they encountered was the result of the 
migrants' strangeness and would eventually disappear (Anthias & Yuval-Davies 1992). 
However, racism did not slowly disappear, in the manner predicted by assimilationist 
theories, and different theories had to be developed to cope with the reality that was 
emerging (Rex & Tomlinson 1979). One alternative approach is to consider the 
incorporation of migrants as proceeding via acculturation, a process which is thought to 
describe the process of contacts between different cultures, and also the outcome of those 
contacts. It sees migrants as altering their culture over time until it is closer to that of the 
majority, but also the culture of the majority is affected and changes, and eventually the 
two are so close as to be indistinguishable (Abercrombie et al. 1988). Like theories of 
assimilation, acculturation theories find it hard to account for the continuation of 
difference, but also fail to explain how the process of acculturation occurs. Refugee 
groups in particular often retain links with their country of origin, and maintain ideas of 
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return, and so cannot be considered as likely to become acculturated. Multi-cultural 
theories propose that individuals can maintain their individual identity, and their 
membership of a minority group, whilst at the same time becoming part of the wider 
society. These theories became popular in Britain from the 1960s onwards, and were 
adopted as the dominant political model for the incorporation of migrants into British 
society (Abercrombie et al. 1988, Anthias & Yuval-Davies 1992, Rex & Tomlinson 
1979). Multi-culturalism recognises that different cultures can exist within one society, 
but that individuals at the same time are equal to each other. A multi-cultural society 
therefore is one which is equal in the public domain, but where diversity is encouraged in 
private or communal matters (Rex 1996). Implementation of multi-culturalism can take 
place in different ways (Alund & Schierup 1991, Favell 1998), and in Britain the model 
of multi-culturalism that has been adopted places great emphasis on the role and 
existence of `communities'. It is assumed that all individuals will be members of a 
community, which is culturally defined and has clear boundaries (Anthias & Yuval- 
Davies 1992, Goulbourne 1991). This assumption has some advantages for minorities, 
since it allows the expression of cultural values and behaviour, but assumptions on 
communities have been challenged by some authors. Divisions can occur within minority 
groups, and the preoccupation with community can obscure these differences (Werbner 
1991). In addition the assumption of a community brings with it an assumption that there 
can be community leaders who can represent that community, although these leaders are 
rarely elected or democratically chosen (Anthias & Yuval-Davies 1992). 
As the number of refugees in Britain increased in the 1980s, no new policies were 
developed to assist their settlement. Instead, the existing policies of multi-culturalism 
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were extended to cover refugee groups as well as immigrant groups, and assumptions of 
community were made of refugees (Wahlbeck 1999). These policies already emphasised 
self-help, and the role of communities and their formal associations in providing services 
tailored to the needs of ethnic communities (Candappa & Joly 1994, ECRE 1998, Majka 
1991). When directed towards assistance for refugees, they merely transferred the focus 
to refugee communities. Only one government department directly funds work with 
refugees, and this is the Voluntary Service Unit (VSU). This provides funding to 
voluntary organisations and community associations, both directly and indirectly through 
other agencies, in order that they can provide services for refugees (Carey-Wood et al. 
1997). Many local authorities also contribute to the community orientation of work with 
or for refugees. Political representation at a local level can often be obtained via local 
forums such as community relations councils and religious councils, but this route is only 
open to formally constituted groups. Local authorities often make grants of funds or 
services to established community groups, including refugee groups, and so play an 
important role in the creation and maintenance of formal associations. 
The role of community associations 
The role of associations in the settlement of immigrants and the incorporation of ethnic 
minorities has been examined by many authors and found to have many positive aspects. 
Rex (in Rex et al. 1987) found that community associations have four main functions: 
overcoming isolation, providing material help to community members, defending the 
interests of the community, and promoting the community's culture. In addition, it has 
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been suggested that through networking and information sharing, associations can play an 
important role in assisting the adaptation of the community members to the host society 
(Joly 1996a). 
As with immigrants and minority ethnic groups, the formation of refugee community 
associations can perform many useful functions. They can help to rebuild and reinforce a 
sense of belonging for people whose lives have been disrupted by exile, and they can play 
an important role in empowering the members of the community (Salinas et al. 1987). 
The benefits of community association formation are well known to the different 
agencies involved in work with refugees, and organisations such as Refugee Action 
devote a considerable proportion of their time to community development work. 
The focus on association formation by various refugee agencies reflects an agreement 
with Rex's assessment of the functions of associations, but fails to take into account the 
idea that rather than being a `natural' process, it may be a reflection more of British 
society than of immigrant inclinations. It has been suggested that the basis for group 
formation may lie in the way British institutions create spaces for the recognition of 
groups rather than individuals (Joly 1996a), and individuals need to form themselves into 
an association in order to enter into dialogue with the state (Favell 1996). There is also a 
failure to consider whether the needs of the group are best met by a formal association, or 
indeed whether there actually is a community. The effectiveness of refugee community 
associations is dependant on the extent to which refugee communities can be said to exist 
and reflect the needs of their members. 
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The Community 
The term community is widely and loosely used, and a careful definition is needed if the 
term is to have heuristic value. `Community' is used without being defined by both civic 
authorities and minority groups, and has become an important feature and rationale for 
ethnic mobilisation (Vertovec & Peach 1997). It has been suggested that its use is now so 
widespread that its meaning has become elusive and vague, and that community has 
become a term largely without specific meaning (Abercrombie et al. 1988). However, as 
long as notions of community are used within social policy, the term must be engaged 
with and its meaning investigated. 
There are two themes existing at the same time within the common sense notion of 
community. The first implies both a warmth and interconnectedness between members of 
the group, giving community strongly positive connotations. The second implicitly 
assumes that all the members will share values and goals (Alund and Schierup 1992; 
Vertovec and Peach 1997). Both of these themes can be seen within social policy towards 
ethnic minorities, for whom `community' is considered to be the best way of organising 
and who are assumed by policy makers and funding organisations to have much in 
common with each other. 
The question of what constitutes a community has been debated throughout the history of 
sociology. In the nineteenth century, Tonnies (discussed in Nisbet 1967) described two 
types of human collectivity, gemeinschaft and gesellschaft. Gemeinschaft is very close to 
common sense notions of community. In gemeinschaft relationships, there exists a 
complex web of traditions, habits and affective states. In contrast, gesellschaft relations 
contain a high degree of individualism, impersonality and contractualism. These relations 
-43- 
arise from volition or interest, whereas those of gemeinschaft have a deeper origin and 
cannot be conceived in such simple terms. Gemeinschaft is based upon three pillars: 
kinship, neighbourhood and friendship, whereas gesellschaft is based upon rationality and 
calculation. 
"The theory of the gesellschaft deals with the artificial construction of an aggregate of 
human beings which superficially resembles the gemeinschaft insofar as the individuals 
live and dwell together peacefully. However, in gemeinschaft they remain essentially 
united in spite of all separating factors, whereas in gesellschaft they are essentially 
separated in spite of all uniting factors. In the gesellschaft, as contrasted with the 
gemeinschaft, we find no actions that can be derived from an a priori and necessarily 
existing unity; no actions, therefore, which manifest the will and the spirit of the unity 
even if performed by the individual; no actions which, insofar as they are performed by 
the individual, take place on behalf of those united with him. In the gesellschaft, such 
actions do not exist. On the contrary, here everybody is by himself and isolated, and there 
exists a condition of tension against all others. " (Nisbet 1967 page 75) 
For Tonnies, then, members of a gemeinschaft form of collectivity are held together, 
though Tonnies does not explain how or what forces keep them together. The implication 
of Tonnies work is that a gemeinschaft collectivity has always been together and unless 
there a major societal changes it will always be together. This may have appeared to have 
been the case at the time Tonnies was writing, but his work was based on observation of 
the effects of a move from a village based society to a town based society, and the effects 
of modernisation. The two types of organisation he describes are therefore of only limited 
relevance when considering present day forms of collectivity. Despite this, the positive 
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connotations of gemeinschaft relationships are echoed in the common sense notion of 
community. 
Weber further developed a sociological understanding of community in his work on 
community and association. Weber proposed these as ideal types rather than absolutes. 
They differ in the motivation to action of the members of the two types of collectivity, 
and the role of emotion in the action. A relationship is associative when the actions of the 
individual in maintaining the association are based upon a rational calculation of interest, 
or on the will of the individual to perpetuate the association. In contrast, a communal 
relationship exists where there is a subjective feeling amongst the persons involved that 
they belong together, there is an emotional identification of the individual with the other 
parties in the relationship. 
For Durkheim (1933), the members of a society or community have a totality of beliefs 
and sentiments which are common to the average members of the society. This totality 
can be considered as having its own existence, and he calls this the `collective 
consciousness'. 
Though Weber, Tonnies and Durkheim establish a definition of community or communal 
relationships, their work is based upon a consideration of society that was changing, in 
that it was moving through the process of modernity. Their works contain an evaluation 
of the changes taking place in society at that time. There was a process of urbanisation, 
and a movement of people from villages to towns and cities, industrialisation, and a move 
away from the localised rural community towards the looser relationships of the town and 
city (Plant 1974). Though Tonnies, Weber, and Durkheim differ in their interpretation of 
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community, they have in common some features, and from these a definition of 
community can be drawn. 
Community has been defined as a form of relationship: 
"... characterised by a high degree of personal intimacy, emotional depth, moral 
commitment, social cohesion and continuity in time. " (Nisbet 1967 page 47). 
Other definitions of community are possible, but an important feature of definitions of 
community is the notion of the community as a form of collective. There is something 
that the members of the community feel they have in common, and which provides a link 
between members of the community. This commonality can take many forms, and may 
be real or imagined (Jenkins 1996). Because of the feeling of interdependence and mutual 
interest, communities are able to act in unison in order to defend the rights of the group. 
The origin, for those in the community, lies within the community itself. "People 
construct community symbolically, making it a resource and repository of meaning, and a 
referent of their identity. " (Cohen 1985 page 118). For Cohen, the individual members of 
a community do not consciously create that community, instead the notions of 
community and interconnectedness are transmitted through the group via that groups' 
culture. The group conceives of itself as a community when its culture impinges on the 
culture of another group. The evidence of difference then strengthens the notion of 
community. 
Different types of community can be identified, including ethnic communities, 
transnational communities, and diasporas or scattered communities. These different 
typologies have been created to try to account for both the continuing salience of notions 
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of community in the context of migration, and the different ways in which migrants adapt 
after migration. 
The usage of `community' within social policy concerning minority groups is usually 
referring to an `ethnic community', and this ethnic community is assumed to be a 
bounded and easily identifiable entity (Inglis 1994). For an ethnic community, the sense 
of belonging together comes from a belief in a shared ethnicity. In this respect an ethnic 
community is similar to Barth's (1969) `ethnic group', which he defined as having four 
characteristics. The group is largely self- perpetuating, it shares certain fundamental 
cultural values, it forms an identifiable field of communication and interaction, and 
finally the group defines itself as being a distinct group and is considered by those 
outside the group to be distinct. Ethnic communities have been associated with many 
positive traits. They are considered to be of positive value to the community members, 
both socially and economically (Gold 1992). As previously stated, the usage of 
`community' within social policy concerning minority groups usually refers to an ethnic 
community, and this ethnic community is assumed to be a bounded and easily identifiable 
entity (Inglis 1994). 
The concept of a transnational community was developed as a result of observations that 
many migrants retained extensive links with their country of origin after migration. In 
response to globalisation, people have created "communities that sit astride political 
borders and that, in a very real sense, are `neither here nor there' but in both places 
simultaneously. " (Nortes 1998). The social relations and economic activities of members 
of transnational communities are not confined to any one nation state. Rather, they exist 
across borders a multiplicity of involvements is maintained (Basch et al. 1994). Although 
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originally the term transnational was applied to labour migrants, its use has widened 
somewhat and other groups of migrants, such as refugees, have been considered as 
transnational communities (Al-Ali 1999, Al-Ali et al. 2001). Al-Ali et al compare the 
transnational characters of refugees from Bosnia and Eritrea, and argue that although the 
populations display some transnational practices, they cannot as yet be considered to 
form transnational communities. This suggests that theories on transnational communities 
will he of only limited use in understanding the situation of Bosnian refugees in Britain. 
The concept of `diaspora' was originally only used to describe the situation of a few 
groups, who have been scattered as a result of traumatic historical events (Cohen 1995b). 
More recently its use has been associated less with victimhood, and it has become used to 
describe scattered communities. Members of a diaspora identify with co-ethnics in other 
countries, as well as those in the country they reside in. The classic diaspora differs from 
a transnational community in that the homeland is either non-existent or is not available 
to the community, whilst the transnational community retains links with the homeland. 
As the term diaspora has become more widely used, however, it has been applied to 
groups with a long history of migration without necessarily losing the link with a 
homeland. They do, though, strive to maintain intergroup networks, and their ethno- 
national identity. One definition of diaspora lists six features common to all diasporas: 
there will have been a dispersal from one original region to two or more different places; 
a collective memory or myth of origin will be maintained, even if the dispersal took place 
one or more generations ago; they feel a degree of isolation and alienation from their host 
society, and may not be fully accepted; they consider the site from which they were 
originally dispersed as the place to which they or their descendants should ideally return, 
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and feel that they should as a group seek to create conditions in the homeland so that 
return will be possible; finally, they continue to relate in some way to the homeland, and 
the homeland continues to be a defining feature of group solidarity and group identity 
(Safran 1991). Wahlbeck (1997,1999) considered that the concept of diaspora was useful 
for understanding the situation of Kurdish refugees. However, for these theories to be of 
use in understanding the situation of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would need to 
be shown that there was some measure of group solidarity and group identity. 
Questioning community 
The idea that groups of refugees will form a community has rarely been challenged. 
Research on refugees often looks at one or more refugee `communities', and more 
recently groups of refugees have been considered as transnational communities (Al-Ali 
1999) or as diasporas, that is scattered communities (Wahlbeck 1999). 1 suggest that 
before taking this step, consideration should first be made as to whether a particular 
group of refugees can be described as a community. 
Gold's (Gold 1992) study of two refugee groups in the United States examined the 
settlement of refugees from the Soviet Union and from Vietnam. The study found that 
refugee populations are often highly internally diverse, and the creation or recreation of a 
group identity can take a considerable time. With some groups, it is better to talk of 
communities rather than a community, since although localised groups may appear to be 
becoming communities an identification with the rest of the group is absent. 
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The internal construction of community is of paramount importance. For all types of 
community, the prime defining feature is that the members believe themselves to be 
linked to the other members. If this linkage is based on ethnicity, then it is not important 
whether that ethnicity is real or imagined, only that the members of the community 
believe it to be real. 
Community formation among ethnic minorities has been questioned by some writers. 
They have questioned whether the communities which have been formed are 
collectivities which will endure and which are based upon ethnic solidarity, or whether 
they are a response to external forces within society such as racism and discrimination 
(Inglis 1994). If community can be questioned for ethnic minorities, it must be examined 
even more carefully when considering refugees, whose experiences in the conflict that 
they have sought refuge from may mean that there is no political unity, and there may be 
strong differences within the group (Wahlbeck 1999). If the existence of communities is 
being questioned, then the effectiveness of policies towards refugees based upon 
assumptions of community and encouraging the formation of refugee community 
associations must also be questioned. 
Problems of refugee community association formation 
When considering the associations formed by refugees it must be remembered that there 
are important differences between refugees and members of minority ethnic groups, and 
these differences may adversely affect the nature and functioning of those associations. 
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One of the differences between refugees and minority ethnic groups, who in the British 
context were initially labour migrants, is that for labour migrants there is often a pattern 
of chain migration. This is where new arrivals are following in the steps of earlier 
arrivals, and gain support and advice form those people. This has been described by Shaw 
in a study of Pakistani immigrants in Britain (Shaw 1988). The immigration of Pakistanis 
to Britain began with the arrival of a few single men or men who came without their 
families. The primary motive was economic. Those that came were predominantly from a 
few particular areas of Pakistan. These early arrivals sent back remittances to assist those 
left behind, but also to enable another person to come to Britain. Those later arrivals 
would in turn support the migration of someone else, a relative or someone from the same 
village. The earlier arrivals would assist those that came later to find work and 
somewhere to live. Because of this chain of migration, there often exists a kinship link 
between Pakistanis living in the same area in Britain. These kinship or personal links 
were also influential in determining the initial pattern of chain migration from the 
villages in Pakistan. These pre existing links between those who have migrated to Britain 
have meant that community formation has not been difficult, since the emotional link 
between the members of the group has already been established. The combination of 
chain migration and the pattern of settlement in areas close to others from the same 
country has created conditions which favour the formation of communities (Candappa & 
Joly 1994). 
For those that come to Britain as refugees, the same pattern of chain migration is not 
evident. Refugees tend to arrive in Britain as a result of a sudden upheaval in their 
country of origin. They frequently arrive without knowing anyone in the country and 
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kinship links with other members of the group are often absent. The formation of an 
association can be very difficult for those who arrive en masse as opposed to groups who 
arrive through chain migration (Gold 1992). This is an important difference between 
refugee groups and other minority groups, as chain migration is far more common among 
labour migrants than refugees. 
Not all refugee community associations will be the same. Joly (1996b) has suggested that 
the nature of association that is established will depend to a large extent on the 
orientation of the refugees to their homeland. Two broad types of refugee settlement can 
be distinguished: refugees who nurtured a collective project in their country of origin and 
take this project with them into the country of exile; and secondly those who did not have 
a collective project in the country of origin or who have given up that project. Patterns of 
group formation and interaction with the society of settlement will be different for the 
two groups. Those who held a strong collective project in the society of origin and have 
maintained their orientation towards the homeland, for example Chilean refugees, are 
likely to reproduce this in the associations they form. Associations formed by Chilean 
refugees were highly politicised and aimed to perpetuate the home-orientation of Chilean 
refugees in Britain. In contrast, Vietnamese refugees had little or no collective project 
and did not seek to orient themselves towards the homeland. Instead their associations 
aimed to improve the settlement of Vietnamese in Britain, and did not undertake 
campaigning work aimed at Vietnam. In addition those who did not have a collective 
project in the country of origin are less likely to have the organisational skills necessary 
to form a formal organisation, and are therefore prone to marginalisation (Joly 1996b). 
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Belief in a shared ethnicity is of itself not enough to produce an organised community 
(Gold 1992). 
A factor influencing the formation of associations among refugees is the availability of 
support services. Generally, when refugee organisations are formed, they are organised in 
order to attempt to meet a specific need of the community (Salinas et. al. 1987). The very 
existence of support services can be a disincentive to the formation of an association, 
since the provision of services takes away one of the main motives for forming an 
association (Gold 1992). An example of the effect of support services is given by 
Wahlbeck (1999) in his study of Kurdish refugees in Britain and Finland. He found that 
associations were formed in Britain in order to overcome problems associated with the 
lack of support services available to them, whereas Kurds in Finland, where there was a 
range of practical support available, formed associations with an orientation more 
towards social and cultural activities. 
Among refugee groups there is often little group-wide organisation, and a typical feature 
is factionalism and segmentation (Gold 1992). There are often divisions within refugee 
groups based upon differences in class, politics, religion, and so forth (Salinas et at. 
1987). This factionalism can inhibit attempts to create a formal association, or where an 
association is formed it may be unrepresentative. 
Lack of familiarity with the working of a society can hamper attempts at organisation, 
especially for newly arrived groups. If this is combined with an internally divided and 
economically disadvantaged situation, then there will often be considerable difficulty in 
forming and maintaining community based organisations (Dorais 1991, Gold 1992, 
Griffiths 1998). 
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If what exists cannot be termed a community, then what is it? To describe this, I use the 
term `contingent community'. For me, a contingent community is a group of people who 
will to some extent conform to the expectations of the host society in order to gain the 
advantages of a formal community association, but the private face of the group remains 
unconstituted as a community. 
Contingent communities 
Refugees are not merely objects of policy, but are social actors in their own right. As 
such they are affected by the policies around them, but since they remain social actors 
and individuals, their responses may differ. One way that refugees may respond to the 
particular form of multi-culturalism in Britain is through the formation of contingent 
communities. This is a concept I have developed through this research, in order to try to 
account for the apparent contradiction in the research findings, that there are formally 
constituted refugee community associations, yet there appears to be no refugee 
community on which they are based. A contingent community is one that appears from 
the outside to be a community, and to reflect the interests of that community a formal 
association is formed or an attempt is made at its formation. However, the interests that 
are articulated are not the common interests of the group, but rather their like interests. 
Conformity is apparent rather than actual, and among the members of the group there is 
no strongly held belief that they are interlinked and interdependent. Whilst there are 
benefits to be gained from constituting themselves as a formal community, then the group 
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may strive to appear as such. What is viewed from the outside as a community, may in 
fact be a construction from the outside. 
A contingent community enables members of a group to gain some of the benefits that 
British society gives to communities, such as financial and practical support, when the 
internal construction of a community is not present. However, the lack of an internally 
constructed community means that the continuance of the contingent community is 
dependant on the presence of a strong leader or leadership, and the suppression of 
differences between members of the group. It is also dependant on the accrual of benefits 
to the community, since its formation is in response to the perceived benefits of 
community formation. 
At a later stage, the members of the contingent community may develop an informal 
community, and feelings of interdependence and interconnectedness may emerge. In that 
case, a community may form and it will no longer be contingent. Without true 
community formation, though, the continuance of a contingent community will require 
consistent input and support from both those who take on the task of leadership, and of 
outside agencies. 
The notion of a contingent community rests on a particular notion of human action, since 
it is describing the way that social actors can respond to structures and policies in society. 
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Conclusion 
The conflict in former Yugoslavia occurred at a time when the climate in Europe had 
changed for refugees. Refugees and asylum seekers were being perceived by 
governments and sections of the media as economic migrants seeking to circumvent the 
usual migration controls. The response of Western governments, including in Britain, was 
to seek to limit the protection that they gave to refugees from former Yugoslavia. For 
those that were originally from Bosnia-Herzegovina, access to Britain was limited by the 
imposition of visa regulations and the introduction of safe third country rules to the 
determination procedures. In order to meet some of the humanitarian needs, Britain and 
other countries agreed to admit some refugees, but instead of accessing the normal 
asylum determination processes these refugees were given temporary protection. 
Temporary protection has several advantages for states, since it allows them to meet 
humanitarian objectives without creating long-term obligation, since the refugees can be 
returned when the crisis is over. 
The use of temporary protection also obviates the need for policies of settlement and 
integration. This leave a policy vacuum, which in the absence of new policies has been 
filled by the policies used for the settlement and integration of labour migrants. In 
Britain, these policies are based on notions of multi-culturalism, and place emphasis on 
the role of communities and community organisations. Refugee groups face particular 
problems in community formation, and consequently they may also face difficulties with 
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community association formation. However, in the absence of alternative integration 
policies, refugees have to adapt to the policies that exist. This means that although there 
may be problems of community formation, community associations may still be 
developed. 
To accommodate this apparent conundrum of community associations without 
communities, I have developed the concept of a `contingent community', whose 
existence is strongly related to the policies in British society. However, this concept alone 
cannot account for the situation of refugees, since as other authors have shown the factors 
which created a refugee flow, the nature of the conflict, and the orientation of the 
refugees towards the country of origin affect the situation of the refugees and also affect 
the extent of community formation. 
Thus any study of refugees in the host society needs to take into account these diverse 
factors, of the refugees' experience, but also must consider the policies of the host 
country and their impact on the refugees themselves. 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
Introduction 
This research investigates the way that Bosnian refugees are settling in Britain, and the 
factors affecting that settlement. I am trying to discover the way that the policies that 
were developed around the refugees affect the refugees themselves. I am interested in the 
amount of control that the refugees had over their own situation and their lives, and the 
effect that any lack of control may have had on them. I am also interested in the way that 
Bosnian refugees are incorporated into Britain, both from a group perspective and from 
an individual perspective. This means that as well as the views and experiences of the 
refugees, it is important to understand the development and operation of the policies 
surrounding them. I have used field research methods, involving both interviews and 
participant observation, in order to generate data (Burgess 1984, Schatzman & Strauss 
1973). In order to go beyond description and develop a theoretical understanding of the 
interaction of policies with the refugees themselves, I have analysed the research findings 
using grounded theory modes of analysis (Strauss 1987), whereby the data which is 
obtained is not merely collected and ordered, but the ideas contained are analysed, 
compared, and used to develop a theory grounded in the data (Glaser & Strauss 1967). 
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Choice of research methodology 
The choice of methodology for any research follows on from that which one is trying to 
investigate, and depends on the field of study and the research question. A grounded 
theory approach, as developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), is a methodological 
approach which is not committed to particular forms of data or theoretical interests, but 
instead is a style of analysis that tries to ensure conceptual analysis (Strauss 1987). It 
enables a researcher to go beyond description of social life and to develop theories 
(Strauss 1987). 
It also depends upon the ontological and epistemological positions of the researcher. 
Questions of ontology determine what the researcher considers to be social reality. In this 
case, I consider social reality to be meaningful interaction between social actors, rather 
than a collection of social facts. This leads to the use of research methods which do not 
impose categories on social action, but instead investigate the actors' own interpretations 
and perceptions. In this case, I am examining the policies and structures around the 
refugees from the perspective of the refugees. The methodology used during this research 
was determined by two factors. Firstly there was my own theoretical perspective of 
knowledge and the social world, which is broadly an interpretive approach (Rubin & 
Rubin 1995). For me, what is important about social life is not quantification and the 
search for immutable social laws, but the meanings of social life, how these meanings are 
constructed, and the differences that can be found in meanings and values. This requires a 
research process that can elicit the views of the participants and gain an understanding of 
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the way that they experience and interpret social life. Secondly, there is a shortage of 
demographic information on refugees in general, and on Bosnian refugees in particular, 
and therefore a statistical or quantitative approach would have been extremely difficult. 
Methodology in the social sciences can be broadly divided into two main types, 
quantitative and qualitative, and each has its own strengths and suitability. Quantitative 
methods have been characterised as placing emphasis on objectivity and the 
reproducibility of research (Silverman 1985). One branch of quantitative research, 
positivism, gives explanations of human behaviour in terms of causes and effects. It 
assumes that there are social facts which are in the social domain, waiting to be 
discovered. Research data is collected in order to test the accuracy of theory. In another 
form of quantitative research, empiricism, theory is generated from the data, and so the 
philosophical perspective of empiricism and positivism are slightly different. However 
both share a view of the world in. which there are social facts that can be discovered 
through social research. They assume that there is a social world which can be analysed 
objectively, and is independent of people's interpretations of it (May 1993). Whilst there 
is a place within sociological research for quantitative research, there is a limit to the 
information that can be obtained. Qualitative methods arose in part as a reaction to the 
qualitative methodological assumption that individuals exist as subjects or objects whose 
behaviour is determined by structures and facts within society. Some researchers have 
argued that the basis of quantitative methods, their objectivity, is not possible within the 
social sciences (Winch 1958). Social reality, which is the subject of sociological research, . 
is pre-defined and pre-constituted by its participants, including social researchers, and it 
is therefore impossible to separate the researcher's prior definitions from those generated 
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by the research. As a consequence, it is not possible to be wholly objective, since even 
issues such as which topics are to be researched will be influenced by the preferences of 
the researcher, and hence their subjectivity (Weber 1949). Thus true objectivity cannot be 
attained in the social sciences. The highly structured methods used in quantitative 
sociology involves the imposition of the researcher's assumptions of the social world on 
the subject of the research, and therefore make it difficult to discover evidence that may 
be at variance with the researcher's assumptions (Silverman 1985). Quantitative research 
can also lead to a `black box' analysis of social life, whereby causes and effects are 
measured, but there is no understanding generated of the mechanisms whereby the two 
interact, and of any other factors that might have influenced the proceedings (Silverman 
1985). 
Instead of searching for objectivity and social facts, qualitative methods seek the 
meanings of social life. A qualitative approach to the social sciences was developed by 
several researchers in order to overcome some of the problems that they perceived in 
quantitative methods. Instead of being considered as objects of research, the people 
whose lives are being studied are considered to be social actors, and qualitative methods 
emphasise the point of view of the social actors, and the meanings that they ascribe to 
their actions (Silverman 1985). They derive from a Weberian perspective of social life, 
where individuals and groups are considered as agents. It is not structure alone which 
determines behaviour, but the interaction of the agents with the structures in society 
(Burgess 1982b). To research this interaction, an interactionist approach must be taken 
which emphasises understanding the actions of participants (agents) and the relationship 
between their actions and their experiences. This necessarily points to a research method 
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which examines social action from the perspective of the actor. This is in contrast to the 
`objective' approach of much quantitative sociology, where the perspective taken is that 
of a detached observer (Burgess 1984). There must also be an understanding that human 
behaviour is complex and variable, and that behaviour can be a response to situations that 
have meaning for the actors involved. That meaning is defined and redefined through 
interaction. An interactive approach is also based upon an awareness that there are 
structures which affect the actors, but that structures do not exist on their own, and there 
is an interaction between the structures and action (Strauss & Corbin 1998). Qualitative 
research can be any research which does not depend on quantification for its findings. 
There can be some use of quantification, but the bulk of the findings are based upon an 
interpretive analysis (Strauss & Corbin 1998). One method for carrying out qualitative 
research which fulfils all these criteria of an interpretive approach and incorporating an 
analysis of structure as well as action is the field research method (Burgess 1982b). This 
interpretive approach involves not merely listening to the views and explanations of the 
actors, but interpreting them and the analysis of contrasting interpretations, and 
incorporates an analysis of structures in society as well as social action. 
Field research has been described as being: 
".. not an exclusive method in the same sense, say that experimentation is. Field method is 
more like an umbrella of activity beneath which any technique may be used for gaining 
the desired information, and for processes of thinking about this information. " 
(Schatzuran & Strauss 1973 page 14) 
Field research, the study and observation of people in real-life situations, requires 
flexibility in the methodology used, using a variety of techniques in order to gain an 
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insight, rather than rigid adherence to a particular method (Burgess 1984). It is possible 
that during the course of the research aspects of a problem will emerge as important that 
the researcher had not foreseen, and so the methodology adopted must be able to be 
adjusted accordingly (Burgess 1982a). In addition data needs to be continually checked 
against the researcher's interpretation, in order to ensure that the full meaning of the data 
can be grasped (Fielding 1993). The researcher must be prepared to revise or abandon the 
original hypothesis that they used, if the data appears to indicate that this is necessary. 
This is one of the advantages of the ethnographic method, in that the hypothesis itself can 
be revised during the course of the research. This occurred with this research, since my 
original hypothesis was that the Bosnia Project had disempowered the refugees, and this 
was the cause of the failure of community associations to reflect the needs and interests 
of the whole group. The hypothesis had to be revised in order to encompass the other 
factors that impinged on the lives of the refugees, including their experiences before and 
during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the nature and expectations of British society, 
as well as the Project itself. It became clear from the data that was generated that the 
original hypothesis was incomplete and not likely to generate an analysis of all the factors 
involved, and so the hypothesis was revised and amended several times. 
This research encompassed various aspects of the refugees' experiences, and required the 
use of several types of research method, based on the techniques used in ethnographic 
research. It is not, though, ethnographic research since it includes analysis of social 
structures and policies, as well as the actors themselves. Ethnographic research has been 
described as including: 
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"... some amount of genuinely social interaction in the field with the subjects of the study, 
some direct observation of relevant events, some formal and a great deal of informal 
interviewving, some systematic counting, some collection of documents and artefacts, and 
open-endedness in the direction the study takes. " (Fielding 1993 page 157) 
There is a tendency within research on refugees to omit the voices of the actors, that is of 
the refugees themselves. In a recent report for the Home Office a summary is given of 
recent research on asylum policy and process. The majority of the research identified in 
the report does not involve any interviews with refugees or asylum seekers. The research 
which does try to contain the views and experiences of refugees and asylum seekers tends 
to rely on the opinions and views of representatives, and relies heavily on community 
leaders and NGOs (Kelly & Owen 2001 forthcoming). To ensure that the voices of the 
refugees themselves are heard through this research, interviews were carried out. These 
interviews sought their views, experiences and opinions on a range of subjects. This 
research is not simply reporting the interpretations of the actors, however, and interviews, 
which try to find the views and opinions of the actors themselves, are not the sole source 
of information. The interviews are complemented by participant observation and 
contrasting the findings of this with the views of the actors. The techniques used were 
participant observation, interviews with refugees, interviews with staff, interviews with 
community association representatives, and analysis of primary data sources. 
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Location of the research 
Several considerations affected the choice of locations used for this research. The 
location of the research was determined by considerations of access and by personal and 
practical reasons. As I am resident in the city where much of this research took place, it 
formed a convenient location. I had worked in the city for the local authority in a post 
where I was responsible for organising and assisting the settlement of Bosnian refugees, 
and already had a detailed knowledge of the refugees in the city because of this. The city 
in which most of the research was based was home to 10% of all refugees that arrived on 
the programme, and so contained a large sample of refugees on which the research could 
be based. 
The majority of the participant observation fieldwork took place within a city in the 
Midlands, to be known for this research as Westham. Because I had worked with 
Bosnians housed in this particular city, I already had a lot of information on the Bosnians 
there and they also knew who I was. Gaining access is often the most difficult part of 
research with refugees, and even once the refugees have been located gaining a sufficient 
degree of trust to enable research to proceed can be difficult and time consuming. 
Refugees are often reluctant to trust those that they do not know because of the 
experiences that caused them to become refugees, and researchers must overcome their 
reluctance to participate. Since I was already known to the refugees in this city, the 
difficulties normally associated with gaining access were avoided. The initial stage of 
fieldwork, looking for the refugees, was much easier, since I already knew where 
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refugees in that city lived, their levels of English, and where and when they socialised. As 
they already knew me there was no need for initial introductions, although I still needed 
to explain my presence. In another city, I would have had to begin by finding out how 
many Bosnians were there, where they lived, and where they met, and this would have 
added considerably to the time needed for preliminary fieldwork. Living in the city and 
already being familiar with the refugees there meant that there was also accidental 
contact with refugees, and I would see and talk with people at locations such as 
supermarkets, clinics, and in the shopping centre. 
In addition to the fieldwork in this city, visits were made to other cities and towns in 
order to observe meetings and social events and to carry out some of the interviews. I 
relied on informants in Westham to tell me about these events, and was often 
accompanied by one of them. My work with Bosnian refugees had involved visiting 
reception centres which sent refugees to be housed in Westham, and the discussion on 
reception centres is based primarily on my experiences of those three centres, but also on 
information given to me by Bosnia Project staff concerning reception centres in other 
areas. 
There were two reception centres in particular that I developed very close links with and 
visited many times. My impressions and experiences of these have been used to base my 
findings on reception centres in general. Different reception centres operated in different 
ways, and it is possible that my findings might have been different if I had been basing 
my research on other reception centres. Robinson and Coleman (2000) carried out 
research on the reception centres and the cluster areas policy, and found that although 
there was variation between centres, at some centres residents were given a choice as to 
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where they were housed, choices for residents on the whole were `illusory' (Robinson & 
Coleman 2000 page 1233). Although their research focuses on different aspects to my 
own, their findings regarding the reception centres and cluster areas are broadly similar to 
my own, suggesting that my findings are not location specific. In order to assess possible 
differences between reception centres I interviewed a worker from another reception 
centre that did not settle Bosnians in the area that I was studying. I have also used 
information in the evaluations that were carried out on behalf of the Project, since these 
cover all of the reception centres that were used. 
There was very little planning in the allocation of individual refugees to particular areas, 
and there is no reason to suggest that these refugees were not representative of the whole 
programme. However, interviews were conducted with refugees in other towns and cities 
in order to ensure that there were no major differences based on location. 
The five community associations that were studied were chosen partly for reasons of 
access, since informants in Westham were able to tell me who to talk to in the other 
areas, and also because they were each slightly different in character. As is described in 
chapter seven, the mix between programme and non-programme refugees varied, and the 
amount and type of support from Bosnia Project varied, so they present different case 
studies. 'I attended two meetings at which representatives of most Bosnian associations 
were present, and in informal discussions with these leaders afterwards I discussed my 
interim findings on the associations. I did this in order for them to tell me if the 
associations that I studied were exceptional in any way, or if my findings reflected their 
own experiences. These discussions lead me to conclude that my findings regarding the 
associations are generally applicable. 
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Participant Observation 
Part of the methodology used during this research was participant observation. Gold 
(1958) says that there are four roles that can be adopted in participant observation. These 
roles are not mutually exclusive, and the researcher may move between roles at different 
stages of the research. 
Complete participant: the researcher attempts to pass as a member of the group. 
Participant as observer: researcher makes it known that they are undertaking research and 
this is the primary purpose of the observations and conversations. 
Observer as participant: contacts with the informants are brief and are formally defined in 
terms of the research interests of the observer 
Complete observer: researcher remains external to the group 
Each of these has their own strengths and weaknesses, though the ability of a researcher 
to fulfil any particular role is dependant to a large extent on his or her own abilities. The 
role I took during most of this research was as `participant as observer'. In addition I 
make use of observations made and information gained during a two year period in which 
I was employed to work with Bosnian refugees in a Midlands city. Dawe (in Burgess 
1984) suggests that the experiences of a researcher have an influence on the research 
which is carried out. Burgess (1984) suggests that for qualitative research those 
experiences are often highly influential in determining the research subject. In the case of 
this research, my experiences working with Bosnian refugees were a deciding factor in 
the research. 
During the time I was working with Bosnian refugees I attended several social events 
organised by or for Bosnians. I attended one New Years Eve celebration, held in a church 
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hall and attended by around fifty Bosnians plus their children and a worker from a local 
advice agency. Members of all religious groups traditionally celebrated New Year's Eve 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On two occasions I attended celebrations to mark the end of 
Bajram (Ramadan), which was traditionally celebrated by Muslims in Bosnia. I also went 
to an event organised to celebrate Bosnia's national day. Each of these events were 
similar in format, with several people preparing food, and both soft drinks and alcoholic 
drinks were available. Music was played, and several people danced. I also attended two 
weddings and the celebrations afterwards. One of these was a very quiet wedding, as the 
bride's father had been dead less than one year, and so the bride was still officially in 
mourning. This wedding was attended only by myself and one other person, and the 
wedding celebration was attended only by members of the groom's family. The other 
wedding was a larger affair, attended at the registry office by around thirty people, and 
with members of both families present at the groom's home for wedding celebrations. 
International Womens' Day was traditionally celebrated by all women in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, and on two occasions I organised a coffee morning for women in Westham. 
These were attended by around twenty women each time, and coffee and cakes were 
served. I was invited to and attended several parties organised by Bosnian associations. 
These were usually held in a Working Men's Club or a church hall, and were open to any 
Bosnian who wished to attend. A charge was made for entrance, and there was music and 
dancing. I also visited many people in their own homes for coffee and general socialising. 
I visited several women in hospital after they had delivered their babies, and visited 
others at home soon after returning from hospital. During the time that I was working 
with Bosnian refugees I was invited to the first few social events because of my position 
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as a worker, and was one of several workers that were invited. However, at some of these 
events I was the only worker that accepted the invitation, and my presence (and the other 
workers' absence) was commented on. At later events to which I was invited I discovered 
that although some volunteers had been invited, there were no other workers invited. I 
was told that this was because I was considered a friend as well as a worker. I attended 
the weddings as a friend of the couple that were getting married, and not in my capacity 
as worker. After my post with the local authority ended I continued to receive and accept 
invitations to events. I attended these as a friend of one or more of the Bosnians present, 
although I explained to people that I spoke to that I was carrying out research. On many 
of these occasions I brought one or more of my children with me. This was partly 
because my children were too young to be left at home, and in order to attend I had to 
bring them with me. Also although I met the Bosnians through my work, I came to 
consider some as friends, and we had talked about our children As a result they were 
curious to see my children, and several people mentioned that I should bring them with 
me. I was also told that everyone else was bringing their children, and some people might 
think I was rude, or a neglectful parent, if I left my children at home. I was also more 
comfortable bringing my children, since it meant that when I found the conversation in 
Bosnian too hard to follow I would still have someone to talk to. Their presence also 
served to provide a conversation opener, both for me and for the Bosnians. Women 
especially would come to me, admire the children, and begin a conversation in this way. 
Although my children were there mainly for personal reasons, I found that it enabled 
Bosnians to consider me as a friend rather than as a worker, and enabled greater 
participation and interaction. It enabled me to make greater contact and gain more 
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information about the women refugees that I came into contact with. I believe that many 
also found that since I was willing to share an aspect of my life with them, that is by 
introducing my children to them, they were more willing to trust me. 
After beginning this research I maintained the links I had made during the time I was 
working with Bosnians, and attended several more social events organised either by 
Bosnian associations or by enterprising individuals. I was informed of the events by 
Bosnians that I knew, and again attended with some of my children. 
I accepted the invitations from many Bosnians to have coffee with them in their home, 
and during these visits I learned more about Bosnian culture and general background. 
Having coffee in someone's home is an important part of Bosnian culture, and I was told 
by Bosnians when I first began working with them that traditionally women visited each 
other for coffee during the day. At these times coffee was served, and often a soft drink 
as well, and cakes or biscuit were served. Once in someone else's home, the visitor is 
treated with respect and any reasonable requests are accepted. It is also considered rude 
to refuse an invitation, or to refuse coffee or food when offered. Because of the etiquette 
involved in having coffee, I did not use these visits to conduct interviews, and instead 
treated them as participant observation and an opportunity to learn more general 
information and to practice my Bosnian language skills. 
At all the events apart from the women's coffee mornings I did not have an interpreter, 
and relied on my own language skills, the knowledge of English of the people I spoke 
with, and sympathetic individuals who would translate when necessary. 
As well as this observation in Britain, I spent six days in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2000, 
and although this was a short visit I made many observations which were useful for 
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understanding the situation of Bosnian refugees in Britain. I stayed in a town in the 
Herzegovina region which was mixed before the war but is now predominantly Muslim. I 
was able to meet and talk with the mayor, who was a member of the non-Nationalist 
Social Democratic Party. I also had long conversations with a Catholic priest and nun that 
lived in the town and was able to observe the way people lived in Bosnia in the post-war 
situation. I also met relatives of some of the Bosnian refugees in Britain. 
Employment to work with Bosnian refugees 
My employment in a post working with Bosnian refugees has been very important to this 
research. It gave me a broad base of knowledge from which this research could be 
developed, and it gave me a unique insight to the operation of the Bosnia Project, the 
policies that affected the refugees, and the way those policies were implemented in 
practice. 
I was appointed in July 1994 to the position of Bosnian Refugee Resettlement Officer 
with the Social Services department of a midlands city. The position had been created as 
a result of concerns raised by voluntary organisations in the city that the needs of Bosnian 
refugees were not being met by the Refugee Council, and as more refugees were 
expected an alternative source of support was needed (Farrand 1994). The post had a 
broad remit, and the intention was that I would carry out tasks and coordinate with other 
service providers in order to assist Bosnian refugees in their settlement. As part of my 
role, I met with residents of reception centres before they moved to the city, and soon 
after their arrival. I had at least one meeting with each Bosnian refugee after they were 
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housed. I also had further contacts with those who approached me for assistance with 
particular tasks, those with children, those that were willing to act as interpreters, and 
those involved in establishing the community association. Since most of my contact with 
people took place in their homes, I also met their friends and relatives who were visiting, 
and was often invited to meet relatives that came from abroad. 
Initially I could not speak any Bosnian (then called Serbo-croat), and had no official 
interpreter for several weeks. I therefore had to learn some phrases very quickly, in order 
to introduce myself, and although I relied on interpreters much of the time I became able 
to understand and converse on a limited range of topics through interaction with 
Bosnians, careful listening, and following a taped language course. 
Although there was a worker from the Bosnia Project in the city, they had not developed 
procedures and systems for passing on information about new arrivals or future arrivals 
to the city, and departments such as the education department asked me to develop 
procedures so that they could plan interpreter and support provision. In order to do this, I 
developed close links with the reception centres that sent refugees to the city, and asked 
them to try to predict which refugees would arrive in the city and when they were likely 
to move into their accommodation. This meant that provision for children in schools 
could be pre-arranged, and an interpreter could be there to help them on their first day. In 
order to ensure as smooth a transition as possible I tried to ensure that all of the refugees 
that were to move to this city had met me before they arrived. In that way I could try to 
assess any other support that might be necessary, and also I could tell them how to 
contact me after arrival if any further problems arose. 
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The links I developed with the reception centres meant that I was a frequent visitor to two 
of the centres, and was able to observe their operation at close quarters. I also had 
conversations with staff which gave me insights into the issues that arose in the centres 
and the difficulties that existed. I was also able to observe discussions as to the way they 
operated, and the conversations between staff as to the best methods of working with 
refugees. As well as this, I was able to witness some of the interaction between staff and 
residents. After residents left the reception centre I kept the centre informed as to how 
their former residents were managing in their new homes. Once a resident had left the 
centre, staff sometimes disclosed information about people that had been `difficult' in 
some way. This `difficult' behaviour included the family that moved out and took the 
television with them, the family that tried to insist on having an interpreter every time 
they went out, and the man that had severe nightmares as a result of his trauma, and 
whose screams often woke the other residents. These insights were often not especially 
useful in assisting a family or individual, but were instrumental in enabling me to see the 
refugees as human beings rather than victims. Although it did not affect my compassion, 
or the sympathy that I felt for their situation, it discouraged feelings of pity, and I was 
able to see the individual refugees as people, with fully formed characters that included 
good and bad features. 
The work brought me into close contact with workers of the Bosnia Project, the Red 
Cross, and Refugee Action, who were each involved with Bosnian refugees in some 
capacity. Working alongside them, without being part of their organisations, placed me in 
a unique position, whereby I could observe their actions, their interactions with the 
refugees, and their interactions with each other. I was in many ways in the Bosnia Project 
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without being of the Bosnia Project, and could observe the way it operated in practice in a 
way that both those working for the Project and those unconnected to it could not. I was 
at once an insider and an outsider, since I was within the circle of the various agencies 
but not under the direction of any of them. The staff that I came into contact with were 
aware of this, and responded in different ways. Some staff would share criticisms of the 
other agencies that worked with the refugees. These criticisms might be of working 
practices, of the qualification of staff, or the organisation of the agencies, and criticisms 
were made of both individual members of staff and of whole organisations. Although 
some of the criticism was unfounded, it was only because of my position as both an 
insider and outsider that I was party to their discussions. Because of my contacts with the 
different agencies, and the broad remit of my work, I was able to observe the operation of 
many different aspects of the Bosnia Project and obtain information that would not have 
been available to an outside researcher. 
My employment ended in July 1996, at a time when the reception centres had already 
closed and the Mid Term Support team no longer operated in the area. 
Interviews 
Formal interviews were conducted with former employees of the Bosnia Project, Bosnian 
Community Association representatives, and a selection of Bosnian refugees. The six 
Bosnia Project employees had all been in positions of responsibility throughout much of 
the life of the project and so were in a position to give background information, as well as 
policy information. The five Community association representatives that were 
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interviewed were from several towns and cities in England. In addition twenty-eight 
formal interviews were conducted with Bosnian refugees. 
I encountered some problems with arranging and conducting interviews which are 
specific to research with refugees. Refugees have been through traumatic experiences, 
and are often reluctant to talk of these experiences. Their experiences have often created 
a large degree of mistrust of others, and the process of gaining their trust in order to 
conduct an interview can be difficult. Many people that were approached refused to be 
interviewed. Honigmann (1982) says that resistance to interviewing is frequently 
encountered when small groups are being researched, and though some of the resistance 
may be due to hostility, it can also be due to a lack of experience with or taste for the 
introspection, forethought and reporting in response to seemingly unconnected questions 
that interviewing calls for. The response of Bosnian refugees as a whole seem to support 
this suggestion. Some claimed that they had no time, whilst others gave no reason. Others 
said that they had been interviewed before, and had found the experience very 
distressing, and would not be willing to go through the same experience again. Still 
others said they would not be interviewed, but that I was welcome to come to their house, 
have coffee, and talk. In these cases, I visited as part of the participant observation. Most 
people refused to be taped, and those few that were taped were people with whom a close 
relationship already existed before the research started. Some people agreed that I could 
make notes as we talked. In these cases I wrote down as much as I could at the time, 
trying to write down key sentences verbatim and writing the general gist of what the 
interviewee said. After the interview the gaps were filled in from memory. In those cases 
where the interviewee refused to allow me to make notes, I relied on memory and wrote 
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down as much as possible immediately after. There were also conversations which took 
place informally, for example at social functions, and notes of these were made 
immediately afterwards. 
The reluctance to be formally interviewed stems from several factors. Firstly, many were 
under the (mistaken) impression that I mostly wished to discuss their experiences in the 
prison camps. These experiences were what they felt were most important, but discussing 
them revives memories, and can be extremely distressing. Since their experiences during 
the war were what seemed most important to them, they assumed that any interest in their 
situation would focus on this aspect of their lives. Secondly, there was a concern that any 
criticism that was made of others, whether in the UK or in Bosnia, could be traced back 
to them. This concern was not assuaged by assurances that the persons name would not 
be used, since the population of Bosnians in Britain is so small that very few clues would 
be needed in order to uncover a persons identity. As a result of these concerns, very few 
biographical details are given of informants in the results section. Concern about 
disclosure of information stemmed from their fears and suspicions which in turn arose as 
a result of the experiences which caused them to become refugees. 
Sample for interviews 
The interviewees in this research cannot be claimed as a representative sample, and 
indeed it is questionable whether it would ever be possible to construct a representative 
sample. For those that came as part of the Bosnia Project, a global arrivals figure has 
been kept but there was no systematic recording of outcomes, and so there is very little 
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information on where the individuals went within the UK. For those Bosnians that came 
outside the remit of the programme, there is no definitive answer to the question of how 
many are in Britain, and their distribution within Britain is unknown. The Home Office 
statistics for asylum applications give a figure for applicants from the former Yugoslavia, 
but this is not broken down into the constituent states. Although most of the applications 
for asylum may have come from Bosnians, some will have been from Kosovo, some from 
Croatia, and so forth. 
Originally I had hoped to interview an equal number of programme and non-programme 
Bosnians. It rapidly became apparent, however, that this would not only be difficult but 
would not produce any meaningful comparisons in many cases. I found during the initial 
stages of assessing and consulting the population in Westham and Northam that there 
were major differences between the populations, and thus statistical comparisons would 
be of limited use. Of the non programme Bosnians in Westham, most were from a 
professional background, and most were from Sarajevo (the capital of Bosnia). In 
contrast, the majority of individuals on the programme were from towns and villages in 
Northern Bosnia, or the Herzegovina region. Though a few were from a professional 
background (there were two teachers and one trainee teacher in Westham) the majority 
were from a more working class or peasant background, and had worked as farmers, 
woodcutters or carpenters. The programme population in Northam had a similar 
background and membership to the population in Westham, but the non-programme 
population was more varied and much larger. 
There are several methods of defining a sample for interviewing which can be divided 
broadly into purposive and probability samples (Arber 1993). Probability samples depend 
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upon a well defined population, so that each member of the population has an equal 
chance of being selected. It is the best type of sample to use where one is seeking to 
describe the characteristics of a population, or to test an empirical hypothesis. Since in 
this research I was not testing an empirical hypothesis, and there was no clearly defined 
population, I decided not to use a probability sample. A purposive sample does not 
depend on a clearly defined and enumerated population, since the chance of selection for 
a particular member of the population remain unknown. Purposive samples are best 
suited to exploration of theories and theory development, and also for pilot studies. 
Snowball sampling is a way of selecting participants when there is insufficient 
information with which to construct a sampling frame. It involves approaching one 
member of a population, interviewing them, and then asking if they know of friends or 
relatives that would be willing to take part in the research. This process is repeated until 
no more contacts are obtained, and then recommences with a fresh individual, who 
preferably should have some different characteristics. The technique is good for getting 
samples from small groups, though it depends on the target population having some form 
of network or linkage between its members. Though I had hoped to use snowball 
sampling, I found that few people would provide me with details of someone else willing 
to be interviewed. Instead, an opportunistic sample was used (Honigmann 1982), and 
there are several reasons for this. Firstly, there are no reliable statistics on the Bosnian 
population in Britain that could be used as a basis for any sort of probability sample. The 
lack of availability of reliable information on the location and demographic 
characteristics of refugee populations in general was noted by Carey-Woods et al (1997), 
and the lack of statistics and information on Bosnian refugees in particular was noted by 
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Robinson and Coleman (Robinson & Coleman 2000) Secondly, my skills in speaking 
Bosnian are limited, and I relied on volunteer interpreters for communicating with those 
who spoke no English. Because of this, I tried to focus interviews on those who spoke at 
least some English, and used interpreters for participant observation and for interviews 
with community association representatives. Thirdly, the interviews were complementary 
to the impressions gained from participant observation, and were not being used on their 
own. This meant that the interviews themselves did not need to be with a representative 
sample, as the rest of the research was looking at the group as a whole. Finally, the 
reluctance of many within the population to be interviewed meant that I could not afford 
to be too selective over who I interviewed. Although those that were representing 
community associations were willing to be interviewed, those who were not a 
representative were much more likely to refuse to be interviewed. This may have been 
because they had no experience of being interviewed, whilst representatives would have 
had some experience from liaising with funding organisations. It also may have been 
because they could see little to be gained from participation. Association representatives 
are aware that there may be gains from research, since funding and support can follow, 
but for individuals there are no benefits. In particular, I found arranging interviews with 
those that were not resident in Westham was difficult, since the refugees did not know me 
and although I was given many contacts, I was unable to find many that were willing to 
be interviewed. Of those interviewed, eleven were women and seventeen were men. A 
decision was taken early on in the research that there would be more men interviewed 
than women. One reason for this is that I felt during participant observation I was 
participating more with women than with men, and more interviews with men would help 
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to redress any imbalance this caused. Of the women, six lived in Westham, and four of 
these were from the programme, and of the remaining five there were three from the 
programme. Eleven of the men lived in Westham, eight of who were from the 
programme, and of the remaining six men that were interviewed four were from the 
programme. 
Interview guidelines 
An interview guideline was produced at the beginning of the research. After two 
interviews it was apparent that the guide contained too many questions, as the interviews 
were stretching to several hours. A revised guide was then used (see appendix). This 
revised guide was used as a basis for the interviews but was not strictly adhered to. 
Qualitative interviews are more like a guided conversation (Lofland & Lofland 1995), 
and unlike quantitative interviews the exact questions can vary between interviews. This 
enables the researcher to be flexible with the interviewee, who may produce a wealth of 
information in an unexpected direction (Rubin & Rubin 1995). Using a guide instead of a 
strict list of questions also allows for new areas of potential interest to be explored 
(Fielding 1993). 1 used a check list of basic areas of interest to try to ensure that all the 
fundamental research areas were covered during an interview. In some cases interviewees 
refused to answer all the questions, and sometimes questions had to be omitted because 
the interview was taking too long. Most interviews lasted for between one and two hours. 
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The actors' accounts 
The statements made by those who participated in the research were not always taken at 
face value. The replies given by an individual may be affected by circumstances, and 
throughout the research the experiences gained through participant observation were 
compared and contrasted with the information gained in interviews. There were times 
when information was given in an interview that I knew to be untrue. Rather than discard 
the information, I have used it to understand the image some people were trying to 
project of themselves and the rest of the population. These statements were sometimes 
challenged, but it was not always possible to do so. In some cases, the contradictory 
information emerged later, and in others I felt it would be unsafe to challenge the 
individual. 
Language 
The first language of Bosnians is Bosnian, formerly known as Serbo-Croat. I acquired a 
limited knowledge of the language during the time spent working for the local authority, 
though for conversational purposes this knowledge was restricted to discussion of food, 
family, and treatment in concentration camps. During this time I was aware that there was 
often a degree of mistrust in the interpreters that were used. Sometimes this was 
connected to the background of the interpreter, and sometimes to a belief that the 
interpreter would not maintain confidentiality. Increasing knowledge of the language also 
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gave me an awareness that the interpreter did not always give a full translation. I 
therefore decided that wherever possible I would conduct interviews in English. This 
limited the pool of potential interviewees, since many Bosnians still have only a limited 
knowledge of English. Of the three interviews conducted through an interpreter, one was 
with the chairman of a community association using an interpreter that both the 
interviewee and myself were happy with. The other two were with individuals who said 
they wished to be interviewed, and using a relative of theirs as interpreter. 
The ability to speak some Bosnian meant that I could attend social events without having 
to prearrange an interpreter, and could hold some conversations in a mixture of Bosnian 
and English. 
Documentary evidence 
Many documentary sources were examined as part of the research. Use was made of the 
two evaluation reports of the Bosnia Project that were written though not published. The 
first evaluation was released in 1996, and covered the Bosnia Project from its inception to 
the end of 1995 (Graessle & Gawlinski 1996). The second evaluation covered the period 
from 1995 to 1997 when the second stage of the Bosnia Project was in operation. These 
evaluations made several recommendations for the future organisation of any refugee 
programme, and according to Refugee Council staff they were used to inform the 
establishment of the later programme for refugees from Kosovo. The Bosnia Project also 
produced a newsletter for its staff and clients, and copies of this have been studied. I also 
obtained minutes of meetings where the establishment of Bosnian community 
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associations was discussed, and minutes of early meetings of some associations. I was 
given copies of correspondence between a housing association and the Bosnia Project 
concerning the availability of housing for refugees. 
Information on the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the causes of the war that took 
place was obtained from published books and articles by academics and specialists. I also 
used internet resources to obtain information concerning the peace agreement in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement), and the situation in the country after the war. The 
Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo publishes on the internet the Bosnian 
election results, and UNHCR Sarajevo publishes statistics on return of refugees and 
internally displaced persons. 
Statistics on the number of persons that arrived in Britain as part of the programme were 
obtained from the Home Office statistical bulletins. Since there is a slight variation in the 
numbers stated in the reports for 1996 and 1997, I have taken the later figures and 
assumed that they are correct. However, the variation was very small, and does not affect 
the research. Reliable data on the number of arrivals or on their distribution could not be 
obtained from the Bosnia Project or the Refugee Council, as central records were not kept 
during the course of the Project. 
Ethics of the research 
Because of the experiences that refugees have had, research involving refugees requires 
an even greater degree of sensitivity than usual, and questions of ethics need careful 
attention. Anonymity and informed consent, as discussed earlier, are important in many 
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types of research, but when working with refugees they become more important. 
Whatever the subject of research, the researcher cannot ever tell the participants 
everything about the research. This holds true even when the researcher is open about the 
fact that they are conducting research. In the initial stages, the researcher may not have a 
clear idea of the information they are seeking, and as the research continues aspects may 
prove to be of greater interest than had been thought initially. Members of a population 
may not believe or may forget that the person is carrying out research (Lofland & 
Lofland 1995). This was certainly the case with some people that I met at social functions 
or, with Bosnians I had known before beginning the research, on casual meetings in the 
street, shopping, or at the dentists. On these occasions, people might share some 
information with me, without consciously considering that I was involved in researching 
the Bosnian population as a whole. This raised an ethical dilemma as to whether the 
information could be used as part of the research. The dilemma was resolved as follows: 
where I was not sure that information was given to me in the knowledge that I was a 
researcher, I have not used any quotations from the individual. However, I have used it as 
part of my participant observation in such a way that the individual could not be 
identified. I felt that if I knew something, then I could not separate that knowledge from 
the research. 
The period before beginning the research also raises ethical issues. During the two years 
working for the local authority I gained intimate knowledge of the Bosnia Project, and of 
the Bosnian population in the city where I worked, yet all of this was obtained without 
any of the people involved being asked if they consented to a later research project. How, 
then, could the information I had obtained be used in an ethical way? Since it was not 
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possible to unlearn the information, and since my work had uncovered invaluable and 
irreplaceable information, I decided to include it. Again, there are no quotations from this 
period, and I have attempted to make it difficult to identify individuals from what is 
written. 
The British Sociological Association's guidelines on ethical research (BSA 1982) state 
that covert methods of obtaining data violate the principles of informed consent and may 
invade the privacy of those being studied. They suggest that participant observation 
without the knowledge of the participants should only be used when it is impossible to 
obtain the data in any other way. In these cases, the participants' anonymity must be 
maintained and the participants' consent should be sought after the research. In order to 
adhere to this guidance, I class my experiences before officially beginning the PhD as 
covert participant observation, and have informed as many of the participants as possible 
that I was researching the Bosnian population. I have tried to ensure that it would be 
difficult to identify particular individuals from this research, except in those cases where 
permission was specifically given to include biographical details. 
Reliability of the research 
Errors and bias can affect any kind of research, but Lofland and Lofland (1995) suggest 
that within qualitative research they are likely to be of the following types: directness of 
the report; the spatial location of the researcher; social location skewing of reported 
opinion; and self-serving error and bias. 
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Directness of the report 
If the content of the research is not based upon first hand perceptions, then the reliability 
of the data needs to be questioned. It is therefore important that researchers are aware that 
the interpretations of others can be subjective, and to incorporate this into the research. In 
this research I am using mainly my own perceptions, but where I report those of others I 
try to ensure these are accurate, for example by speaking to reception centre staff as well 
as residents and ex residents, and by interviewing both current and former community 
association representatives. However, in many cases the perceptions of the participants 
conflict, and this is a finding in itself. 
Spatial location of the researcher 
It is possible that though the perceptions themselves are accurate, they may be affected 
by the location of the research, making the research findings skewed or partial. In this 
case the research was mainly confined to two cities in the Midlands, though interviews 
with community association representatives was over a wider area. However the two 
cities' combined population of Bosnian refugees constitutes a significant proportion of all 
those that came from the programme (4-500 out of around 2,500). In addition, there was a 
degree of randomness in the way that individuals were allocated to particular cities (see 
section on Bosnia Project) which suggests that the geographical location of the project 
will not skew the results to any great extent. As a balance, though, I included questions 
about the populations in different areas in the participant observation and the interviews 
with community association representatives to ensure there were not wide discrepancies. 
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Social location skewing of reported opinion 
The relationship between the researcher and the researchee may be such that the 
information given may be less than accurate. They may seek to omit or falsify details, or 
exaggerate, or say what they think the researcher wants to hear. This was a significant 
issue in this research, especially since many of the participants had prior personal 
knowledge of me but in a role in which I had a certain amount of power and influence in 
their lives. To some extent the reputation that I developed during the time I was working 
helped to prevent some skewing. Many saw me as honest and reliable, and able to 
maintain confidences. I also tried to avoid skewing by seeking out people with whom I 
had not been on especially friendly terms when working. In this way I hoped to gain the 
opinions of people who didn't like me or didn't care about me, as well as those that did, 
and so overcome researcher bias. 
Self-serving error and bias 
Researchers owe it to themselves and others to avoid only seeing what they wish to see. 
This can lead to research which is self-serving, and thus to be regarded with caution. One 
can never be completely free of bias, and in interpreting events there is always the 
possibility of the interpretation being self-serving or partial. Reflection whilst researching 
helps to avoid this, as does seeking out possible contradictions to ones expectations. In 
addition I had already realised that some of my perceptions were wrong when I began 
working with Bosnian refugees. In fact, it was the realisation of the differences between 
my initial perceptions and expectations and the reality that emerged which prompted this 
research. 
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Conclusion 
This research uses ethnographic research methods to investigate the interaction between 
Bosnian refugees and British society. Using these methods, the situation and 
interpretations of the social actors, the refugees, can be analysed from their own 
perspective, but this is then analysed and interpreted using contrasting interpretations and 
an analysis of the social structures that impinge upon the refugees. The research focussed 
mainly on refugees in one particular city, but in order to obtain a wider range of 
contradictory and complimentary cases the study also examined some refugees in other 
areas. 
A grounded theory approach was used to analyse and interpret the empirical evidence, as 
a result of which the original scope of the investigation was widened in order that all the 
factors affecting the situation of the refugees could be understood. The focus of the 
research needed to include an analysis of the situation of the refugees in their country of 
origin, as well as an analysis of the policies that were implemented in Britain. These 
policies include the explicit policies of the Bosnia Project, but also include the more 
general policies in Britain which are directed at minority groups. In addition the refugees 
themselves are investigated, from both an individual and a group perspective, to examine 
how they interact with the policies. 
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Chapter 4: Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Introduction 
The way in which refugees settle in their country of exile is dependant on several factors, 
but in particular their relationship with their country of origin. Issues such as their 
position in relation to the conflict in their country of origin, their situation as a member of 
a majority or a minority and their attitudes towards return will all impact upon their later 
settlement (Joly 1996b, Kunz 1973,1981). It is therefore important to have an 
understanding of the nature of the conflict in Bosnia and the refugees' positioning within 
that conflict in order to understand the reason why they became refugees and the effects 
this has on their situation in the country of exile. The situation with regard to the possible 
return of refugees and their attitudes towards return also need to be understood, and in the 
case of Bosnian refugees this is especially important since the status of temporary 
protection meant that they were expected to return once the conflict was over. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was from 1946 to 1992 a constituent republic of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia seceded from the federation in 
1991, a move opposed by the government of Yugoslavia. In 1992, a referendum was held 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina to decide whether it too should secede from the federation. The 
result was an overwhelming call for secession, but the majority of the Serbian population 
boycotted the vote. A Serbian opposition to the secession quickly emerged, and soon 
after Bosnia-Herzegovina declared itself an independent state violence erupted in various 
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parts of the country. Sarajevo, the capital, was besieged, and a full-scale war erupted. In 
some areas, the Serb militia established camps where prisoners could be held. Many of 
the Muslims held in these camps were tortured and killed. The violence created a massive 
wave of refugees, which was largely stemmed by the imposition of visa requirements by 
Western governments towards the end of 1992. The discovery by journalists of the 
existence of concentration camps in Bosnia eventually led to the closure of those camps, 
and UNHCR appealed for countries to offer a place of safety for those who had been 
detained. Britain offered to take a thousand persons, plus their dependants, and eventually 
around 2,500 persons in total arrived as part of this quota, on what became known as the 
Bosnia Project. 
In this chapter I summarise the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and outline the factors 
leading to the outbreak of war in 1992. To fully understand the causes of the conflict, it is 
necessary to examine the history of the country and ascertain whether the violence was 
simply inevitable inter-ethnic squabble with no other causes, or whether in fact the causes 
are more complex. This is important when trying to gain an understanding of the situation 
of the refugees created by the conflict. The conflict has been characterised as an ethnic 
conflict although asserting that ethnic differences exist is not sufficient to explain why 
war should have started or why its course was so violent. The notion that Bosnia 
contained three ethnic groups, each mutually antagonistic but whose enmity was subdued 
by communism, needs further examination. 
The situation of the refugees is also dependant to some extent on the nature of the war 
and the peace agreement made in 1996, since the refugees on the programme were given 
temporary protection and were expected to return to Bosnia when it was safe to do so. I 
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therefore include a short description of the course of the war, and of the peace agreement 
which was made. Finally I look at the situation in Bosnia today and the conditions that 
refugees would face if they returned. 
Life in pre-war Bosnia 
The way that people lived their lives in pre-war Bosnia, and the nature of the society in 
which they lived, was the product of the history of the country. It was a constituent state 
of Yugoslavia, and although for several hundred years it had not been independent, it had 
existed as a part of another country or an empire for almost all of the previous four 
hundred years. 
In Bosnia, as in the rest of Yugoslavia, the education system was secularly based and, 
coupled with a communist political culture and increasing Westernisation of society, 
religious observance declined. By the 1980s the majority of Muslims in Bosnia did not 
consider themselves religious believers, and in a survey only 17% classed themselves as 
believers. Instead they followed some of the practices of Islam as a matter of tradition 
and culture. Bosnia had become more urbanised - by the late 1980s between 30% and 
40% of marriages in urban areas were between people of different religions (Malcolm 
1996). 
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The census of 1991 shows that the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina was 4.3 million, 
made up of Muslims (43.6%), Serbs (31.3%), Croats (17.3%), and Yugoslavs (5.2%)'. 
The proportions of these varied in different areas of the country. For example, in Sarajevo 
10.7% considered themselves Yugoslav, and there was no region which could be 
considered as having a population which was not mixed. There were five cantons 
(administrative regions) where the population was over 90% Croat, two where it was over 
90% Muslim, and three where it was over 90% Serb. It was the only Yugoslav republic 
where there was not one group who could be said to form an overall majority of the 
population (Bennett 1995). 
Life in Central Bosnia was the subject of an ethnographic study by Bringa (1995). Her 
fieldwork was carried out in 1987 and 1988, but she maintained links with the villagers 
she had studied and her account includes references to the war and its effects. In her 
study of the way of life for Muslims in Bosnia she found that there were differences in 
the way Muslims and Croats lived their private lives, but that friendships and at times 
marriages meant that their lives were closely linked. The people she spoke to and lived 
with were aware of differences between themselves and their Catholic (Croat) 
neighbours, but these differences were in areas such as religious practices and food and 
drink habits and preferences, and were not considered divisive. Bringa found that in the 
area she was studying there were differences between the style of houses built by 
Muslims and Croats, but on the whole people's identity as Bosnians was inexorably 
linked to a notion of a multiethnic and multireligious coexistence. 
On the census forms people had to declare their nationality. The category `Yugoslav' was introduced for 
those who felt they could not label themselves as one of the other national categories, but who considered 
themselves to be Yugoslavian. 
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It was customary for neighbours to assist in the building of houses, and Bringa found that 
Muslim and Catholic neighbours joined in this activity equally. Bringa notes that the 
building of a house often took many years, with parts being added as money was 
available and for many families their home was a "work in progress" for ten or more 
years. Because of this, they had a great emotional investment in their home, and Bringa 
suggests that the destruction of homes during the war was especially devastating. 
Despite their awareness of differences, the people of the village studied by Bringa were 
unconcerned about these difference, and even as war developed in other areas of Bosnia 
most villagers seemed to have been sure that they would remain unaffected. The village, 
situated in Central Bosnia, remained peaceful until April 1993, almost a year after the 
outbreak of hostilities in many other areas of Bosnia, and the village was attacked by 
Bosnian Croat forces. Despite the fact that tension had been rising in the village for 
several months, and war was taking place in areas around the village from January 1993, 
until the fighting actually started the residents were still hopeful that they would avoid 
violence. 
Although few of the people that I interviewed for my own research were from Central 
Bosnia, many of Bringa's finding's are reflected in my own research. Bringa found that 
people of different religious background lived peacefully together, and the onset of 
violence came as a surprise. These were also findings of my research, discussed in greater 
detail in chapter 5 on individuals. There are some differences, although these can largely 
be explained by the fact that Bringa was looking at Central Bosnia and there were 
variations in practices throughout Bosnia. 
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The people I spoke to for my research said that there were no differences between the 
architecture of Muslim and non-Muslim houses, which contradicts one of Bringa's 
findings. However, this may have been a regional pattern which was not replicated in 
Northern Bosnia or Herzegovina, where most of my contacts were from. In addition 
many of the men in Northern Bosnia had worked abroad due to the lack of employment 
opportunities in the area, and the style of homes that they built on their return was often 
influenced by the style of homes they had seen in Austria and Germany. In addition those 
from both Herzegovina and Northern Bosnia who lived in cities or large towns often did 
not build their own homes, and so the architecture of their home had no relationship with 
their religious background. 
Bringa's respondents were aware of the differences between themselves and those of 
other religions, whilst many of the people that I spoke to claimed they were not, or not 
until shortly before the war began. Again, this could be partly due to regional variations. 
Central Bosnia was considered by many in Herzegovina and Northern Bosnia as a 
relatively religious area, and the overt following of religious practices may have meant 
that differences in behaviour were more obvious. However, it should also be remembered 
that although she was not aware of it at the time, Bringa's fieldwork took place only a 
few years before the war began, and at a time when nationalist sentiments were already 
being expressed by some politicians and in some sections of the mass media. She was 
therefore in a position to collect people's opinions at a time when ethnicity was beginning 
to become an issue, although the fact that there seems to have been no animosity based 
on religion means that her findings do not support the thesis that Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was an ethnic war waiting to happen. 
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Another ethnographic account of life in Bosnia is given in a thesis by Sivell-Muller 
(1994). He carried out fieldwork in Bosnia in an area close to that of many of the 
respondents of this research during 1992 and 1993. He spent time in the area before the 
outbreak of war, and interviewed some of the refugees after they had been displaced. 
Many of the refugees he interviewed maintained that religious affiliation had not been 
important. Sometimes they claimed that they could not know the religious affiliation of 
others, and at other times they claimed that they might have known but that it was not 
important and before the war it did not matter. However, Sivell-Muller's own 
observations suggest that the divisions which became apparent when the war started must 
have been emergent before the war. He found that in the centre of a nearby town there 
were two bars close to each other but with different clientele. One was mainly patronised 
by supporters of the Serbian SDS, and the other by members of the mainly Muslim SDA 
and Croatian HDZ. He says this suggests that divisions were beginning to emerge, but 
also says that the majority of the population seemed to either not see these divisions or 
they ignored them. The importance of Sivell-Muller's work is that it seems to suggest 
that the ordinary population, those not active in politics, preferred to overlook differences 
based on religion or ethnic background. 
Another study looking at the same region as Sivell-Muller found that in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina culturally diverse communities were held together by neighbours and the 
importance placed on good neighbourly relations (Sorabji 1993). Those interviewed for 
this study repeatedly assured the author that they did not know who belonged to what 
religion, and that even names were not an indication. They also said that they celebrated 
each other's major religious festivals. One Muslim boy told Sorabji that his godfather 
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was a Serb, and he found later that it was common practice in ethnically mixed areas for 
children to have a godparent of a different religion. Sorabji notes that choosing a 
godparent from a different religious background, and the fact that the child was aware of 
this, indicates that people were in fact aware of the religious background of others, 
despite their assurances to the contrary. However it also shows that they were prepared to 
accept differences and did not seek separation. Sorabji suggests that in the town he 
studied people were aware of cultural differences based on religion, and expressed these 
differences through their religious practices, the naming of children and through cultural 
festivals. Neighbours were able to celebrate each other's differences by joining in their 
neighbour's festivals, thus showing their respect for the differences and their desire for 
togetherness. 
A picture emerges from these studies of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a country where people 
of different religious groups lived peacefully together. There was no strong call for 
independence for Bosnia until the collapse of Yugoslavia was started by the secession 
from the federation of Croatia and Slovenia, and although Bosnian Croats and Serbs 
identified to some extent with nationalists in those countries, Bosnian Muslims did not 
have a history of nationalism or separate organisation. Although they were the largest 
single group in Bosnia, they were not an overall majority of the population, and had no 
history of collective action, either as a majority or as a minority. The implication of this 
for the people displaced by war is that they themselves may not have identified 
themselves strongly as Muslim, Croat or Serb. Further, to identify oneself as Bosnian is 
not straightforward, since there remains the unresolved issue of whether the primary 
identifier in that is religion (Muslim) or geographical origin (Bosnia-Herzegovina). It 
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remains to be seen how a group of refugees who are predominately Muslim can manage 
to mobilise themselves as an ethnic group on arrival in Britain. Muslims in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina have no history of organisation and mobilisation along ethnic lines, and 
instead have been divided when they have been forced to choose between competing 
powers. 
Despite having lived peacefully together, as communism and the Yugoslav state 
collapsed, Bosnians turned to nationalist parties for a solution. To understand the reasons 
for this it is necessary to understand some of the history of the region. 
Ancient history 
The history of the territory now known as Bosnia-Herzegovina is complicated and 
confusing, and the waters have been muddied considerably by writers during this century 
and the last who have tried to impose particular racial or ethnic identities on the people 
who live there. 
Like most, if not all, European countries, archaeologists have established that the territory 
has been settled by a succession of peoples over thousands of years. These included 
Illyrians, Romans, Goths, Slavs and many others. Each successive wave contributed to 
the population of the area in ancient times, and so none of the settlers and invaders can be 
said to hold the key to the ethnic origin of the inhabitants, since even the largest groups of 
settlers were never greater in number than the incumbent population (Malcolm 1996). 
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Malcolm (1996) asserts that there is no single ethnic origin for the peoples of the area and 
those claiming a unique ethnic heritage for each religious group are incorrect, and that in 
fact all three share a common history. 
The Turkish army invaded Bosnia in 1463, and rapidly took control of the whole country. 
The Ottoman feudal system was installed, and the religion of Islam was introduced. In the 
fourteenth century, before the arrival of Ottoman rule, three religious groups were present 
in Bosnia. In the North and West there were Catholics, recognising the Pope as head of 
their church. In the South and East, there were Serbian Orthodox bishops, priests, and 
some churches. In the central region, covering the area to the Drina river in the East and 
as far south as the Neretva river in the South, there existed the Bosnian church, neither 
Catholic nor Orthodox. All three religious groups were rather remote from the majority of 
the population. The Catholic and Bosnian churches centred on monasteries, and large 
sections of the ordinary population would have rarely seen a priest (Fine 1994). The 
nature of the Bosnian church has been argued over by many scholars, with different 
scholars giving different explanations of its origins. These different theories in turn gain 
support from different historians and scholars, depending on which way they prefer to see 
the origins of Bosnia's Muslims and the Bosnian State. Linking the Bosnian church to 
either the Catholic or Orthodox churches implies a close affinity between Bosnian and 
either Croatia or Serbia. Consequently identifying it as unique, in turn supports the view 
of Bosnia and the Muslim part of its population as having unique origins (Friedman 1996, 
Malcolm 1996). 
In the 19`h century, an important Croatian historian, Franjo Racki, argued that the 
Bosnian church was a branch of the Bulgarian heretical movement, the Bogomils 
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(Malcolm 1996). Racki argued strongly that the Bosnian church was distinct from the 
Catholic and Orthodox churches, whose beliefs and customs were strongly rejected by 
the Bogomils. The distinctiveness of the Bosnian church is an attractive notion for those 
who wish to assert that Bosnia's Muslims have distinct origins, and are not simply Serbs 
or Croats who converted. This theory gives a partial explanation for the number of 
conversions to Islam that took place during Ottoman rule. If much of the population 
allied itself with the Bosnian church, whose heretical beliefs were such that the church 
had been at odds with both Catholic and Orthodox churches, then conversion to Islam 
may have seemed preferable to becoming part of one of the two Christian Churches. This 
theory became popular with many Bosnian Muslims in the twentieth century, as it gave 
an explanation of their origins as a group distinct from Catholic and Orthodox Christians, 
rather than seeing then as converts from those religion (Friedman 1996, Malcolm 1996). 
Other theories of the nature of the Bosnian church dispute the idea that the church was 
Bogomil. One historian, writing at the same time as Racki, argued that the Bosnian 
church was in fact originally a Serbian church, but over time it developed some ideas 
which were heretical, and had broken its links with the Serbian church. This gained 
support from those Serbian writers who sought to demonstrate that Bosnia was in reality 
closely linked to Serbia. Another theory was that the Bosnian church was essentially 
Catholic, but which developed some heretical tendencies. This theory became popular 
with some Catholic writers, who, similarly to Serbian writers, were seeking to 
demonstrate that Bosnia was closely linked with Catholicism and Croatia (Malcolm 
1996). Fine (Fine 1994) argues that in reality by the time the Ottoman empire invaded in 
1463, the majority of the Bosnian population were likely to have been largely indifferent 
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to organised religion. There were few priests, of either Orthodox or Catholic religion, and 
religious practices took place mostly within monasteries. The Ottoman conquest of 
Bosnia was not completed until 1482, and in the intervening period the only possible 
source of outside support in the Bosnia resistance to Ottoman invasion was from the 
neighbouring Catholic countries (Banac 1994). This led to increased influence for the 
Catholic church in Bosnia. The Orthodox church could not be considered as likely to 
offer any support, since the leader of the Orthodox community was based in 
Constantinople, at the heart of the Ottoman empire. The Catholic church considered the 
Bosnian church to be heretical, and insisted on the conversion to Catholicism of the 
Bosnian priests as a condition of support, and any that refused to convert were forced to 
leave (Malcolm 1996). 
Although there were no forced conversions to Islam in Bosnia, many people did convert 
as there were advantages to being a Muslim within the Ottoman Empire. For example, 
peasants could gain some security of tenure and gain ownership of a small parcel of land 
(Malcolm 1996). Malcolm (1996) shows that the rate of conversions was slow, and it was 
not until around the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century that Muslims became a 
majority of the population. Ottoman records show that there was not a great rate of 
immigration into Bosnia from other regions of the empire, and conversions rather than 
immigration are responsible for the rise in numbers of Muslims. 
The Ottoman empire was a Muslim empire, but other religions were tolerated, as is 
evidenced by the presence in Constantinople of the Orthodox patriarch. The collapse of 
the Bosnian church did not precipitate a large-scale conversion of the population of 
Bosnia. As was mentioned above the population as a whole was likely to have been only 
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loosely attached to their nominal religious group. The Ottoman empire did not have a 
policy of forced conversions in Bosnia, and though eventually many people did convert 
to Islam this was a very slow process, and throughout the period of Ottoman rule 
conversions occurred from and to each of Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Islam (Malcolm 
1996). Though the Ottomans were tolerant of both Catholicism and Orthodoxy, they were 
more sympathetic towards Orthodoxy as it was not considered as subversive. The head of 
the Catholic Church, the Pope in Rome, actively supported and sometimes initiated the 
Crusades, which were mounted to oppose the Ottoman 
The period of Ottoman rule, described in detail in Malcolm (1996), continued until 1878 
when Bosnia was incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The period until 1914 
saw investment in Bosnia's infrastructure and the development of industries. The three 
main religious groups, Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim, as well as a Jewish population, 
continued to live in Bosnia, and Malcolm (1996) quotes and American journalist who 
visited Bosnia in 1902 as saying the members of the different faiths mixed together freely 
and showed mutual respect and toleration. Despite this, however, Bosnia remained 
unstable, and the object of territorial ambitions by several of its neighbours. Relations 
between Serbia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire were particularly tense, and in 1914 a 
Serb nationalist assassinated the heir to the Habsburg throne, Archduke Ferdinand, as he 
drove through Sarajevo. This incident is widely interpreted as the event which marks the 
beginning of a train of events which culminated in the outbreak of the First World War. 
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The First Yugoslavia, 1918 to 1941 
After the outbreak of World War in 1914, the collapse of the Habsburg Empire looked 
possible for the first time. As the war progressed the Serbian army recaptured Serbia and 
gained control of Montenegro. Despite the reservations many people had about becoming 
part of a greater Serbia or Croatia, Slav politicians in the territory controlled by the 
Habsburg empire formed a National Committee, based in Zagreb, and this committee 
sought unification with Serbia at the end of the war in order to prevent their becoming 
part of yet another empire. This eventually led to the formation in 1918 of a Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was originally called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes, and it was headed by Prince Alexander of Serbia. 
Malcolm (1996) notes that during this period Muslim political power increased, but at the 
same time secularisation was progressing. Bosnian Muslims were slower to abandon 
traditional dress than Christians and Orthodox member of the population, and because of 
this they were a visible presence, but Malcolm (1996) quotes a journalist visiting 
Sarajevo in 1930 who comments on the dress of the Muslims but comments that the 
different religious groups seemed to fit happily together. 
Despite its theoretical unity, the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes was beset by 
divisions and rivalries, and in an attempt to create a greater degree of unification the King 
renamed the country `Yugoslavia' in 1929, and imposed a centralised administration. 
This reorganisation saw the partitioning of Bosnia, as the new administration sought to 
create unity by redrawing the administrative map. This was the first time in four hundred 
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years that Bosnia-Herzegovina had been partitioned, and many in Bosnia were unhappy 
with this development. Croats within Croatia and Bosnia felt that the centralisation of 
power was in fact increasing Serbian influence, and one prominent Bosnian Croat 
politician, Ante Pavelic, left the country. He went on to organise a movement with 
support from Mussolini campaigning for Croatian independence known as the `Ustase'. 
In an attempt to placate Croatian demands for autonomy, a plan was adopted in 1939 
whereby Croatia would have its own parliament and a large measure of independence 
within Yugoslavia. The territory classed as Croatia included large areas of what had been 
Bosnia, whilst the remaining areas of Bosnia were mainly those with a Serb majority and 
were kept under the control of the centralised Yugoslav government. This in effect meant 
that Bosnia was controlled by Croatia and Serbia, as Serbia was the dominant power in 
Yugoslavia, and many Muslims were unhappy with this arrangement. 
When war began in Europe in 1939, the government of Yugoslavia realised that it was 
unlikely to find support from other countries, since France had quickly collapsed and the 
countries of Europe were busy on other fronts. The annexation of Austria brought the 
German Reich to the borders of Yugoslavia, and in order to avert invasion the 
government followed a policy of appeasement. However, this appeasement was of only 
limited effect, and in 1941 the government was pressurised by Germany to sign a pact 
with the Axis powers. This in turn led to a coup against the government led by the army 
and some Serbian political parties, which introduced a government of national unity. 
Although this new government tried to behave in a conciliatory way towards Germany, 
after only ten days the country was invaded by a combination of German, Italian, 
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Hungarian and Bulgarian troops. Yugoslavia was soon overrun, and after eleven days the 
army surrendered. 
The Second World War 
The surrender of the Yugoslav army left Yugoslavia in the control of the Axis powers 
who divided control of the territory between them. The Germans established an 
independent Croatia with a fascist government which included the territory of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. Two main resistance movements to the Axis occupation were formed, the 
Cetniks and the communist partisans. Tito led the partisan group, and at the end of the 
war he became president of a reunited Communist Yugoslavia. During the war the 
Croatian fascists bitterly opposed the predominantly Serb partisans, and there are 
documented accounts of many atrocities committed by the Ustase. Despite being 
originally Serbian organisations, both the partisans and the Cetniks acquired members 
from other ethnic groups during the course of the war (Malcolm 1996). 
The Ustase movement was openly fascist, and as well as actively supporting German 
anti-Semitic policies, ultimately leading to the death of 12,000 of Bosnia's 14,000 Jewish 
population, carried out actions intended to remove the Serb population in the new 
Croatia. Many atrocities were carried out in the areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina controlled 
by Croatia, and Malcolm (1996) says that by July 1941 "even the Germans were 
complaining about the brutality of these attacks" (Malcolm 1996). These actions 
encouraged Serbs to join either the Cetniks or the communist partisans, which although 
fighting a common enemy were also rivals. Some Cetniks' ambitions were for the 
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creation of a powerful Serbia, which should not contain any non-Serbs despite their 
desire to control territory covering Bosnia and beyond. There was also a measure of anti- 
Muslim feeling, as Muslims were considered to have collaborated with the Ustase in anti- 
Serb actions. Although there may have been some collaboration, in fact many Muslims 
simply failed to prevent the actions of the Ustase in their area, and Cetniks killed many 
Muslims in reprisal. Partisans also carried out attacks on Muslims at times, again for their 
failure to oppose actions against Serbs. 
During the course of the war the partisans grew in strength, and by 1944 they were given 
backing by Allied powers including Britain, who had previously supported the Cetniks. 
The partisans fought a war not just against the Germans, but also against the Cetniks, and 
as German forces retreated the partisans, supported by Soviet troops, took control of most 
of the country. 
Bosnian Muslims rarely joined the Cetniks, due to the atrocities committed by them 
against Muslim villagers, but towards the end of 1941 the partisan commanders began 
controlling their forces more tightly and prevented further atrocities by their troops. This 
led to Muslims joining the partisans in increasing numbers, although some did join the 
Cetniks, and some continued to support the Ustase. 
The importance of this period in Bosnia's history is to underline two major facts about 
the area. Firstly, the country had been the focus of ambitions of other nations for many 
years, and the Second World War fighting which took place on Bosnian soil was not 
between Bosnians, but rather between competing foreign powers who were able to 
command support from only part of the population. Secondly, the response of the three 
religious groups differed, although Muslim Bosnians did not have a unified response. 
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Instead, they could be found among the ranks of the different factions, and could not be 
said to have behaved as a group. 
During the course of the war the partisans became the pre-eminent opposition to the Axis 
powers, and eventually with support from Allied forces were able to gain control of the 
whole country. They had also been able to defeat the Cetnik forces, and emerged at the 
end of the war in a position to form a national government. 
Second Yugoslavia, 1946-1991 
The Yugoslavia established by the partisans at the end of the war was a Socialist Federal 
Republic consisting of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, and 
Montenegro. The constitution adopted in 1946 recognised that the state consisted of a 
federation of equal nations and national minorities, and sought to respect the national 
integrity of each republic (Necak 1995). The amended constitution of 1974 devolved 
substantial power to the individual republics as well as to the autonomous provinces of 
Kosovo and Vojvodina. 
In 1945, Albania was the only European country which was poorer and less developed 
than Yugoslavia (Schierup 1991). However, there were great differences between the 
constituent republics in their wealth and development. Slovenia and Croatia in the North 
were in an economically stronger position than the Southern republics of Macedonia and 
Bosnia-Hercegovina (Schierup 1991). The government recognised that a process of rapid 
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industrialisation needed to be undertaken in order that the country could grow 
economically. 
Despite being communist, Tito refused to be a puppet to the Soviet government, at that 
time ruled by Stalin, and sought to follow a path that was socialist without being Stalinist. 
This led to a break with the Soviet Union in 1948, and from then onwards Yugoslavia 
followed its own path. As it was situated between the Eastern bloc Communist countries 
and the Western capitalist countries, a new model of Socialism had to be developed if a 
Socialist Yugoslavia was to survive. The state which emerged was overtly Socialist, but 
did not slavishly follow the teachings of Marx as interpreted by Stalin, or indeed Lenin, 
but which drew on a variety of intellectual sources including early Marxism and social 
democracy (Dimitrijevic 1995). The ideological shift that occurred when Yugoslavia split 
from the Soviet sphere of domination deserves further analysis. Dimitrijevic (1995) 
suggests that this split can be regarded as the first indicator of the fallacy of a major 
aspect of the communist project, the universal proletariat. Tito's embrace of national 
communism for Yugoslavia in 1948 led logically to the development of separate 
communist parties for the constituent republics, and Dimitrijevic considers this to be 
evidence of the legitimisation of nationalism. 
As far as industrialisation was concerned, the principle of worker participation became 
important, as did the notion of distributing factories around the country in order that each 
region would benefit from economic growth. This led to local, as opposed to central, 
control of industry. This Yugoslav model of development, which was far less centralised 
and bureaucratic than that which existed in the other Communist countries to the East, 
was admired in both the West and the East (Cohen 1995a). 
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The system of political control was also less centralised than in the other Eastern bloc 
countries, and each republic had a degree of independence from the centre. It was hoped 
that this would allay fears of the state being dominated by its largest republic, Serbia. 
Seen alongside the federal system of government, a picture emerged of a state which felt 
it had overcome `inter-ethnic' problems. 
Areas such as Croatia and Slovenia were wealthier and more economically developed 
than areas such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. In turn, this led to differing 
levels of unemployment, wages and GNP in the different republics. A series of economic 
reforms in the 1970s further accentuated these differences, and a fund established to bring 
about a measure of redistribution of wealth between regions became a source of conflict, 
as richer regions objected to the subsidies going to poorer areas. These complaints 
became louder in the 1980s when there was yet another economic crisis in Yugoslavia. 
This uneven development coupled with a decentralised economic system of state 
socialism led to inter-region rivalry, with each region wanting for itself whatever gains it 
considered another region to have. This in turn contributed to the regionalisation of the 
economy. In each region, trade took place largely within the borders of the region or with 
outside countries, with very little trade taking place between regions. In some cases this 
led to one region exporting a raw material, whilst another imported that same raw 
material from the world market. Decentralisation meant that each republic could largely 
take control of its own affairs, and this led to each republic having its own 
telecommunications company, its own railway company, and its own transport and 
energy organisations. The level of inter-regional communication was so low that 
Schierup (1990) suggests there was more co-operation between the rail companies of 
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neighbouring European countries than between those of the Yugoslav republics. This 
meant that each had their own standards, and there was no form of agreement on 
purchasing, so negotiations with foreign companies for purchases took place on a region 
by region basis, rather than at a national level. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in Yugoslavia 
During the existence of the Second Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of the 
constituent republics. Its population was a mixture of Muslims, Catholics, and Orthodox 
Christians, along with small Jewish and Roma populations. Catholics and Orthodox 
Christians had begun to call themselves Croat and Serb respectively from the late 
nineteenth century onwards, although this identification was based solely on religion 
rather than on descent (Malcolm 1996). Muslims in Bosnia, when forced to choose 
between these two labels, tended to opt for a label that gave the most advantages at that 
time, and at different periods in Bosnia's history the Muslim population has called itself 
Croat or Serb or a mixture of both in differing proportions. The first census in 
Yugoslavia allowed Muslims to choose between `Muslim Serb', `Muslim Croat' or 
`Muslim, nationality undeclared', and although the vast majority of Muslims were 
`undeclared' (nearly 800,000) there were some who chose the other categories (72,000 
and 25,000 respectively). In the census of 1953 there was no category of `Muslim', but 
instead a new category was introduced of `Yugoslav, nationality undeclared', and almost 
nine hundred thousand chose this category. Although this number may have included 
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some non-Muslims, it was also the category chosen by Muslims who did not consider 
themselves to be Serb or Croat. A later census allowed identification as `Muslim in the 
ethnic sense', but it was not until 1971 that a category of `Muslim in the sense of a 
nation' was introduced. This for the first time allowed Muslims to identify themselves as 
such, without implying they followed religious practices, and the classification of 
Muslims as a nation meant that they had the same status as a people as Bosnian Serbs and 
Bosnian Croats (Friedman 1996, Malcolm 1996). 
According to Friedman (1996), many of the senior posts within Yugoslavia's republics 
were filled according to ethnic criteria. So the identification of Muslims as a nation and 
their emergence as the single largest group in Bosnia-Herzegovina meant that they had 
increased influence within the Bosnian government. It is possible that the increased 
power given to Muslims, which was necessarily at the expense of Croats and Serbs, 
provided a basis for resentment among politicians and Communist party members which 
nationalists were able to exploit later. 
At the same time as these political developments were taking place in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, there was not corresponding economic development. Bosnia remained 
relatively undeveloped and backwards economically compared to the rest of Yugoslavia, 
and in fact its economic position relative to the other republics worsened during the 
1950s and 1960s (Malcolm 1996). The economic situation and the poorer standard of 
living contributed to a high rate of emigration to other parts of Yugoslavia, and the 
numbers of Bosnian Serbs emigrating to Serbia was largely responsible for Bosnian 
Muslims becoming the largest single group in Bosnia by the mid 1960s (Malcolm 1996). 
Economic and political changes in Yugoslavia meant that in the 1970s the economic 
situation seemed to improve, and Bosnian authorities began renovation and improvement 
works. However much of this work was funded by borrowing and the economic 
difficulties of the 1980s affected Bosnia-Herzegovina badly. 
Kosovo and the emergence of Milosevic 
When Yugoslavia's internal borders were created in 1945, two areas which had been 
controlled by Serbia in an earlier part of the century were given a large degree of 
independence. Vojvodina, where Serbs were less than half of the population, was 
declared an autonomous province. Kosovo, which had a large Albanian majority, was 
declared an autonomous region. Under the decentralisation reforms of 1974 these areas 
were given increased independence and their status became close to that of the republics 
(Bennett 1995, Malcolm 1996). As Kosovo increased control over its own affairs, some 
Serbs within Kosovo began to feel they were being treated unfairly by the 
`Albanianisation' of the region. At the same time, the poor economic conditions of 
Kosovo induced some Serbs to leave to seek a better standard of living elsewhere. These 
two factors combined to fuel a growing Serbian nationalist movement within Serbia 
which felt that Kosovo needed to be brought under full Serbian control. 
Kosovo, although it had not had a Serbian majority population for centuries, had a 
symbolic importance to Serbian nationalism, being the site of important battles in 
previous centuries and home to some of the Serbian Orthodox church's holiest sites 
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(Silber & Little 1995). Kosovo became a focus for Serbian nationalism, and since the 
Albanian population were largely Muslim, Serbian nationalist rhetoric began to include 
openly anti-Islamic references (Malcolm 1996). 
Competing claims of the Serbian and Albanian populations led to unrest, which was not 
quelled by the imposition of martial law, and in 1986 a group of prominent Serbian 
intellectuals petitioned the Serb parliament demanding they intervene in Kosovo to 
prevent the `genocide' of the Serb people there, and to bring Kosovo into Serbia proper 
(Magas 1993). 1987 the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, visited Kosovo to see 
the conditions there for himself. On being told by a crowd of Serbs that they were being 
mistreated, Milosevic assured them that no one had the right to beat them, and some 
commentators cite this as the incident which sparked the break-up of Yugoslavia 
(Almond 1994, Kellas 1991, Schierup 1991). From 1987 onwards, Milosevic became 
increasingly nationalist, and purged non-nationalists from the communist party (Magas 
1993). It seems that at the time, the problems in Kosovo were blamed on inter-ethnic 
rivalries, and so were seized on by nationalists, and any economic causes for the unrest 
there were ignored by the majority of politicians. 
Economic difficulties of the 1980s 
During the 1980s Yugoslavia faced an economic crisis, as the mismanagement of 
previous years began to take its effect. Yugoslavia had invested heavily in large industrial 
complexes, financed by foreign loans, but many of these enterprises were never 
economic. As loans still had to be repaid, the country became poorer and some 
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enterprises were closed, causing unemployment. The rate of inflation began to increase, 
reaching 120% in 1987, and 250% in 1988. The dinar was devalued and, coupled with the 
spiralling inflation, many ordinary people saw the value of their savings disappear 
overnight. The economic crisis fuelled dissatisfaction with communism and with the 
economic arrangements of the country. As a result the federal government's attempts at 
economic reform were met with widespread unrest and demonstrations (Malcolm 1996). 
This was not the first time that Yugoslavia had faced economic crisis, and the 1960s had 
also been a time of economic stagnation, mass unemployment, rising inflation and labour 
unrest, although the situation in the 1980s was more severe. However, in the 1960s the 
discontent that this generated was channelled into the radical student movement, which 
supported the working class and was able to prevent further reforms to the economy. In 
the 1980s, the working class was just as unhappy as they had been in the 1960s, but this 
time there was no movement to which they could look for support. Instead, the reactions 
of party officials and many intellectuals was to look at the effects purely in their own 
region, seeking a local solution and so furthering nationalist claims. 
Seeking local solutions meant that richer areas of Yugoslavia, such as Slovenia and 
Croatia, were aware that their economic situation was being negatively affected by the 
poorer regions, and attempts to improve their own situation inevitably meant overlooking 
the plight of the other regions. 
At the same time that the economy was suffering, political changes were occurring, and 
soon Croatia and Slovenia were seeking to leave the Yugoslav federation. 
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Political unrest and the secession of Croatia and Slovenia 
Both Slovenia and Croatia saw the increasing control over Kosovo as an indication of 
Serbian expansionist aspirations, whilst Milosevic's open support for Serb chauvinism in 
Croatia and desire for increased centralisation enhanced nationalist feelings in both 
countries (Friedman 1996). Political leaders of both countries began to mobilise 
nationalist sentiments, and to consider ceding from the federation. During federal 
presidium meetings in 1990 and 1991 the issue of Croatian and Slovenian secession was 
discussed. Milosevic apparently said that he would allow Croatia to secede, so long as 
they did not take with them regions where large numbers of Serbs lived (Glenny 1992). 
New political parties were formed in Yugoslavia from 1988 onwards, independent of the 
communist party (Malcolm 1996). At the same time as communist regimes collapsed in 
the rest of Europe, the communist party in Yugoslavia became increasingly divided, and 
in 1990 the party collapsed. In many of the republics, the communist party reformed 
under a new name, but with openly nationalist aspirations (Bennett 1995). Multi-party 
elections were held in Slovenia and Croatia in January 1990, which in Slovenia were won 
by a liberal-nationalist coalition, and in Croatia were won by a new Croatian nationalist 
party, HDZ, led by Franjo Tudjman, who had been leader of the communist party in 
Croatia. 
In an attempt to prevent the break-up of the federation, Izetbegovic, the president of 
Bosnia, and Gligorov, the president of Macedonia, tried to propose a revised constitution, 
under which some republics would have large degrees of autonomy whilst remaining 
within a federation. They hoped that this would satisfy Slovenian, Croatian and Serb 
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demands, but the proposal floundered when shortly afterwards the Slovenian parliament 
announced that it was soon to declare independence (Silber & Little 1995). 
Slovenia declared itself an independent republic on 25th June 1991, as did Croatia. On 
the same day the federal government discussed the issue of secession and agreed that 
Slovenia's independence would not be allowed. The Yugoslav army was sent to try to 
bring Slovenia back into the federation, but after ten days a peace agreement was 
brokered between the Slovene government and the Yugoslav government, and the troops 
gradually withdrew. Despite requests from Slovenia to prevent it, Croatia had not taken 
steps to prevent the movement of Yugoslav troops across its territory into Slovenia, 
considering it was not in Croatia's interests to become involved in a war between Serbia 
and Slovenia. President Tudjman thought that he had an agreement with Serbia, but as 
attention moved away from Slovenia, the troops instead turned to Croatia, and began 
opposing their withdrawal from the federation (Silber & Little 1995). 
During the early part of 1991 Serb irregular soldiers began claiming parts of Croatia with 
significant Serb populations, and from July onwards the Yugoslav army was present in 
force but standing behind the irregulars. In September 1991, the fighting became an open 
war between Croatia and the Yugoslav army, which by then was Serb dominated. The 
war caused many deaths and casualties, but the Yugoslav and Croatian leaders were able 
to declare a truce in November 1991, and international monitors entered areas of Croatia 
with large Serb populations to try to ensure the maintenance of peace. By the end of the 
year, Croatia was fully independent apart from those Serbian populated areas. 
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Independence for Croatia meant that Bosnian leaders felt they had little choice but to also 
seek independence, fearing that otherwise their country would become part of a Greater 
Serbia (Malcolm 1996). 
1992: War in Bosnia 
In the Bosnian elections of 1990, there were five major parties competing for seats. The 
SDA, Stranka Demokraske Akcije, was led by Alija Izetbegovic, who had been 
imprisoned in the 1970s for his views on the role of Islam in public life and politics. The 
party formally supported the continuance of unity with Yugoslavia, though Izetbegovic 
had warned that this was conditional on the presence within the federation of Croatia and 
Slovenia. The party initially tried to appeal to all sections of the Muslim population, both 
secular and non-secular. The HDZ, Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, represented 
Bosnian Croats, and was founded as a branch of the ruling HDZ of Croatia. Its policies 
were closely modelled of those of the Croatian party, and the party called for the 
secession of Bosnia. The SDS, Srpska Demokratska Stranka Bosne i Hercegovine, was 
led by Radovan Karadzic, and represented Bosnian Serbs. The party was opposed both to 
secession of Bosnia, and to any constitutional changes which might have led to Serbs 
being ruled by another group. The other two parties were not nationalist and attempted to 
appeal to all groups within the country. The SK-SDP, Savez Komunista- Socijalisticka 
Demokratska Partija was the party of reformed Communists and was led by a Muslim 
Communist, Nijaz Durakovic. The SSRJ, Savez Reformskih Snaga Jugoslavije, acted as 
an umbrella party for many smaller liberal democratic and reformist parties, but opposed 
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Bosnian independence and supported the federal president Ante Markovic and his 
economic reforms. There was no party which supported Bosnian independence and was 
also anti-communist; those who wished to express their opposition to Communism had to 
do so through voting for one of the nationalist parties (Almond 1994, Burg & Shoup 
1999, Magas 1993). 
The result of the election was that the majority of the electorate voted along ethnic lines, 
with Muslims supporting the SDA, Serbs supporting the SDS and Croats supporting the 
HDZ. Initially the three nationalist parties formed a coalition government, but after a year 
the coalition collapsed (Silber & Little 1995). Bosnia-Herzegovina was forced to confront 
the events happening in Croatia, as fighting between Croats and Serbs there threatened to 
spill over into Bosnia. Bosnian Serbs in Northern Bosnia had begun to form local defence 
units towards the end of 1990, and were mounting guard on villages to prevent any attack 
from Croatian troops crossing the border. These defence units received covert support 
from Serbia and the Yugoslav army (Ramet 1996), since the area was strategically 
important to them. It was important to be able to move men and weapons across the area 
to support the Serbs in the Krajina region of Croatia (Almond 1994). 
As the coalition government collapsed, the SDS established its own ministries and 
departments in Northern Bosnia, allegedly to defend the interests of the Serb population 
there, and the Yugoslav army sent troops to the region. These troops remained in place 
even when Bosnia declared independence. 
The international recognition of Croatia and the uneasy peace that they negotiated with 
Serbia prompted action in Bosnia. Without Croatia and Slovenia, the Yugoslav federation 
was dominated by Serbia, and leaders of the SDA and HDZ were concerned as to the 
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consequences of this. The SDA felt that unless they sought independence the whole of 
Bosnia would become a part of Serbia, and this would have strongly negative 
implications for the Muslim population, as Serb nationalists had been demonising 
Muslims for some time. Together the SDA and HDZ argued that Bosnia-Herzegovina 
needed to become an independent state, and in December 1991 they requested that the 
European Union give the country diplomatic recognition (Ramet 1996). The following 
day the Serb politicians in Northern Bosnia and Herzegovina declared the creation of a 
Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The European Community announced that a referendum on independence was needed 
before they would recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state (Almond 1994, 
Bennett 1995, Glenny 1999). Though this ballot, held on the 28 `h February 1992, resulted 
in a vote overwhelmingly in favour of independence, a large proportion of the Serbian 
population boycotted the process after the leaders of the SDS declared it was their duty to 
refuse to vote. In response to this result, Serb gunmen placed barricades around Sarajevo 
on March 1St (Bennett 1995). The government in Sarajevo ignored the barricades and 
declared independence on March 3 `a 
Karadjic, the Bosnian Serb leader, openly talked of war as a response to independence, in 
order to keep the Serbian populated areas of Bosnia within Yugoslavia. There was 
sporadic violence between then and April, and on April 2"d Arkanovci, a paramilitary 
organisation led by a Serbian gangster, raided the town of Bijeljina. On April 5`h Bosnian 
Serb gunmen fired shots from the Holiday Inn in Sarajevo at an anti-war demonstration. 
The event which marked the beginning of the war proper was when Bosnian Serbs, 
supported by the Yugoslav Army, formed a military front on the Eastern border of Bosnia 
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and on April 6`h began to force their way west. That was the same day that the European 
Union recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state. After five weeks Bosnian 
Serbs controlled 60% of the country (Ramet 1996). The use of Yugoslav troops was the 
subject of international condemnation, and Milosevic announced that he would withdraw 
Yugoslav troops from Bosnia in May. However, of the 89,000 troops which the Yugoslav 
army had sent in, only 14,000 were withdrawn and the rest were transferred to the control 
of Karadzic and renamed the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Ramet 1996). 
As Bosnian Serbs took control of towns and villages in Northern Bosnia, the phrase 
`ethnic cleansing' (etnicko ciscenje) entered the international vocabulary (Silber & Little 
1995). The Serb paramilitary units were determined that areas under their control would 
be emptied (cleansed) of their non-Serb population by any means necessary, and often 
this meant large scale violence and mass killings. In some areas, such as the town of 
Orasac, the Serbian forces were militarily superior and the towns surrendered with little 
violence. In these cases the townspeople were ordered to leave their homes and the 
women and children were allowed to leave after being stripped of any valuables. The 
men were taken prisoner, and held in camps where they received beatings and 
maltreatment. Some of the men, whose. names were on a list, were separated out and 
taken away. Their fate was never determined, although they are believed to be dead. In 
other areas, the process was even more brutal, with men being shot in front of their wives 
and children, and the rape of women. During this time many died or fled, and many men 
were taken prisoner. 
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Concentration camps in Bosnia 
The men that were held as prisoners were kept in camps, and the most notorious of these 
were at Trnopolje, Manjaca, and the far worse Omarska and Keraterm. In all four, the 
prisoners, who were mainly Muslim but also some Croats were present, were 
predominantly from the surrounding towns and villages of Northern Bosnia, and they 
were held under shocking conditions. In Trnopolje and Manjaca there were appalling 
conditions and random beatings and sadistic practices. At Omarska and Keraterm the 
regime was worse, and there were random beatings, starvation rations as well as frequent 
executions. Some were tortured, and some were forced to torture others. The men were 
separated according to whether they had been important, such as politicians, leaders, or 
officers of the Bosnian militias and defence units, and most of these were killed soon 
after arrival. Men who had been members of the territorial defence units were held in 
Omarska and Keraterm, and those who were judged not to have been involved were 
either transferred to Trnopolje or Manjaca, or were exchanged for Serbs who had been 
taken prisoner by government forces. 
Case study 
Damir, who was eighteen, and his father Mehmet were taken prisoner at the same time. 
They had tried to defend their village, but had only rifles to oppose the heavy artillery of 
the Serbs. They surrendered when it became obvious that they would be killed if they 
resisted any longer. Damir's mother and sister were put with the other women and 
children on a truck taking them out of town, and Damir and Mehmet were taken with 
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many of the other men to one of the camps. They were very badly treated, but one 
incident stands out. One day they were taken out of the shed where they were being held 
and put in adjacent rooms. They could no longer see each other but could hear what was 
going on. First, Mehmet was beaten, but he tried not to scream too loudly because he 
knew his son could hear everything. Then they started beating Damir, and as Damir 
screamed he called out for his father. The guards opened the door and allowed Mehmet to 
crawl in, and both thought the beatings were over. But then the guards began beating 
Damir again, and this time forced his father to watch. 
This account illustrates the horrific nature of their treatment, but it is by no means an 
unusual story. Most of the accounts that I was given were far more gruesome than this, 
and an indication of the severity of treatment which went on is that these men were not 
among those invited to give evidence at the war crimes tribunal held several years later. 
An American reporter, who was the first to report on the existence of the camps, reported 
that at Omarska hundreds of men were held in sheds or warehouses with no sanitation 
and were not allowed exercise. They were given very little food or water, and many died 
as a result. Rumours began about the existence of these camps and reports by Gutman 
about the camp at Manjaca appeared in the American magazine Newsday, which led to 
questions being asked of Karadzic at a news conference in Britain. He denied the 
existence of concentration camps. Instead, he said, there were prisoner of war camps and 
journalists could visit them if they wished. Two journalists, from ITN and the Guardian, 
went to the area, and produced video and photographic evidence of the camp at Omarska. 
The images they produced have become notorious, showing as they did skeletal men 
- 122- 
staring from behind a wire fence. The Guardian reporter reported that when it was time to 
eat, the men were given precisely three minutes to get to the room where the food was, 
eat the scalding hot stew, and return (Danner 1997). 
The treatment meted out to prisoners in the camps, and to the general population, was 
often characterised by extreme violence and atrocities, and it is not clear why this is so. 
Lapeyronnic (in Joly 1998a), in a study of racism in France, suggested that as the 
distance between the racist and the racialised decreases, the virulence of racism increases. 
Perhaps there is a similar feature at work in Bosnia, with the closeness of the different 
groups and the similarities between them so strong, that it was necessary to dehumanise 
those being attacked in order to perpetuate the war. In addition, extremes of behaviour 
make reconciliation more difficult, and so increases the chances of long term success for 
separatist leaders. 
Proof of the existence of the camps meant that pressure could be brought to improve 
conditions and release the inmates, a process that eventually happened with the 
intervention of the Red Cross. Karadzic agreed to close the camps with the proviso that 
the inmates were removed from the combat area (Silber & Little 1995), and gradually the 
detainees were decanted out to safe areas in Bosnia and Croatia. 
Refugees and displaced persons in Bosnia 
As a result of the use of ethnic cleansing and the concentration camps, as well as the 
general fighting, there was a massive population movement. A US Senate report of 18`h 
August 1992 states that there was by then an area within Bosnia bordering Serbia which 
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was exclusively Serb populated (Almond 1994). Those that were not dead had been 
displaced, and had made their way or were sent by the Serb forces to other parts of 
Bosnia and to Croatia, and over a million were displaced by mid July 1992. Some of 
those that were displaced remained in Bosnia, but there were large numbers crossing into 
Croatia, and some travelled on to Slovenia, and some were able to travel further and 
reached the countries of Europe, where they sought asylum. The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees called for a compassionate and humanitarian response (Joly 
et al. 1997), but many European countries felt that they had already received enough 
refugees from the region and began to impose restrictions intended to curb the flow of 
refugees. As the war continued there were more people displaced, and by the end of 1992 
around two million people, nearly half the population, were unable to return to their 
homes (Silber & Little 1995). As the nature of the war changed and Bosnian Croats 
started fighting Bosnian Muslims, even more people were forced to leave their homes. 
Fighting between Muslims and Bosnian Croats 
For the first year of the war, the Bosnian Croats were officially on the side of the Bosnian 
government. However, the Bosnian Croats of the Herzegovina region had been organised 
militarily before the war, and some had fought with Croatian forces in that country's war 
with Yugoslavia. They continued to receive military support from Croatia, which had 
been instrumental in allowing Bosnian Croat forces (the HVO) to prevent Bosnian Serbs 
taking over large parts of Herzegovina. Although many expected them to carry on from 
that and assist the government troops in Sarajevo, they failed to do so and instead 
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consolidated their positions in Herzegovina. In April 1993, the HVO attacked a Muslim 
village, murdering many of the residents and destroying the buildings, and thus signalling 
that they were no longer supporting the Bosnian government. 
In July of 1993, the HVO began arresting Muslim men in areas which they already 
controlled and held them in concentration camps. They also sought to extend their control 
over territory, and attacked and captured more towns and villages. Although each side by 
this time had established prisoner of war camps and/or concentration camps, at least two 
thirds of detainees in August 1993 were Muslims held by Croats (Silber & Little 1995). 
The camp established at Dretelj, south of Mostar, had a regime similar to that of the Serb 
run camps at Omarska and Keraterm, with random beatings, torture, executions, and 
starvation rations. Eventually international pressure on Croatia was able to force the 
closure of these camps, and the surviving detainees were moved to safe areas in Bosnia 
and Croatia. 
International efforts continued to try to broker a peace agreement between the three sides, 
and after intense American pressure Croatia was persuaded to withdraw the troops that it 
had supporting the HVO in Bosnia. After intense negotiations, an agreement was reached 
in March 1994 between Croatia and Bosnia, and fighting between Bosnian Croats and the 
Bosnian government ended. After that date there were some joint offensives, and inroads 
were made into Serb-controlled territory. The course of the war, and the myriad changes 
to the front line, are too complex to describe succinctly, but eventually a form of peace 
was negotiated. Yet more negotiations, this time taking place in the US and lasting three 
weeks, resulted in the Dayton Agreement, and this marked the beginning of peace in 
Bosnia. 
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The Dayton Agreement 
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton 
Agreement) was announced on November 21" 1995, and signed by the presidents of 
Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia in Paris on December 14`h. The agreement split control of the 
territory in the ratio of 51: 49 between the Muslim and Croat Federation and the Serb 
Republic. These were to form two entities with their own parliaments and administrative 
systems, but with a handful of concerns being the responsibility of a country-wide 
parliament. As such, the Agreement performs the unusual feat of both conceding partition 
and creating a single country (Glenny 1999). 
An important section of the Dayton Agreement is Annex 7, which gives all refugees and 
internally displaced persons the right to return to the area where they used to live and 
restores property rights. 
"All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of 
origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them their property of which they 
were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any 
property that cannot be restored to them. The early return of refugees and displaced 
persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. " (The Dayton Agreement 1995 annex 7) 
Some authors have been very critical of the peace process and the Dayton Agreement. 
Pajic (1995) is very critical of the European sponsored peace process. He suggests that 
the project is akin to the imposition of apartheid, since the core principle is the division of 
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Bosnia along ethnic lines. This project, he suggests, is fundamentally unworkable in the 
Bosnian context, where communities and often families were ethnically heterogeneous. 
He points out that apartheid has collapsed in South Africa, and partition has been tried in 
other situations such as Cyprus and Palestine, but has failed to provide a lasting solution. 
"While apartheid, which is based on the total segregation of ethnic groups, is falling 
apart in South Africa, it is being reborn in Southern Europe. " (Pajic 1995) 
Although the Agreement contains provisions on human rights, the return of refugees to 
their home, and the creation of a unified army much of the Dayton provisions have yet to 
be enacted, and although there is peace currently, Glenny (1999) suggests that the 
settlement is full of anomalies and frictions, and says that the Bosnian question remains 
unanswered. 
Causes of war in Bosnia Herzegovina 
History can only describe the incidents and events leading up to the outbreak of war, but 
it is important to consider the causes of the war carefully. There are three main schools of 
thought on the causes of the war in Bosnia. One common explanation is that the war was 
the expression of ancient hatreds which had been suppressed under communism but 
resurfaced after the death of Tito (Kaplan 1993). This was the explanation used by some 
foreign leaders at the time, and was used by them to explain the futility of intervention 
(Cox 1998). The second school of thought is that the cause of the conflict was elite 
manipulation by former communist leaders, who utilised the manipulation of historical 
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material and mass media (Almond 1994, Bennett 1995, Glenny 1992,1999, Thompson 
1994). The third school of thought is that the structural features of former Yugoslavia 
were such that the collapse of communism led inevitably to the rise of ethnic nationalism 
(Magas 1993, Schierup 1990,1991,1999). Study of the history of the region and the 
conduct of the war shows that the `ancient hatreds' thesis fails to offer a supportable 
explanation. Instead, the truth probably lies somewhere between the two latter schools of 
thought, with the real causes of the war a combination of elite manipulation and the 
particular form of economic and political development in the region. 
The ancient hatreds thesis 
The history of the region, discussed earlier, shows that there is no biological basis for the 
assumption of three separate ethnic groups. In addition, there is no long history of 
conflict between the groups. In contrast, the earliest writers on Bosnia noted the absence 
of conflict despite the presence of several religions (Bennett 1995, Malcolm 1996). To 
gain an understanding of the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina, and hence to learn more 
about the situation of the refugees thus created, it is necessary to understand the history of 
the whole region. Malcolm (1996) contains a thorough history of the inhabitants of what 
is now Bosnia Herzegovina, and asserts that the ethnic origin of Muslims, orthodox 
Christians and Catholics is the same. These religious differences have been assumed by 
John Major, and many other commentators, as indicative of different ethnic origins, 
which in turn inevitably led to conflict between them. 
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The British prime minister, speaking of the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina, explained the 
outbreak of violence thus: 
"The biggest single element behind what has happened in Bosnia is the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and of the discipline that that exerted over the ancient hatreds in the old 
Yugoslavia. Once that discipline had disappeared, those ancient hatreds reappeared, and 
we began to see their consequences when the fighting occurred. There were subsidiary 
elements, but that collapse was by far the greatest. " John Major, Hansard 23.6.93 
John Major suggests that the Soviet Union's influence over Yugoslavia forced the already 
existing inter-ethnic tension underground, but when the Soviet Union collapsed this 
tension could be fully unleashed, and it emerged in the form of extreme violence. This 
view is supported by Necak (1995), who suggests that one of the major contributory 
factors in the collapse of the communist states was their neglect of questions of 
nationalism and national aspirations. Nationalism is antithetic to Marxism, and so those 
states which based their ideology on Marxism left nationalist issues unaddressed. Necak 
suggests that despite the apparent ideological differences between the Titoist form of 
socialism and the ideology of the other communist states, there was nonetheless a 
common management of ethnic tensions through the use of ideological restraint, which 
rather than eliminating ethnic tensions merely pushed them under the surface where they 
festered, only to reappear in a virulent form once communism finally collapsed. 
However, a look at the history of Yugoslavia shows that contrary to John Major's 
opinion, the hold of the Soviet Union over Yugoslavia was almost non-existent after 
1948. The government of Yugoslavia had differed with the government of the Soviet 
Union over a fundamental aspect of ideology. This suggests, therefore, that whilst the 
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break up of the Soviet Union may have been a significant factor in the break up of 
Yugoslavia, it cannot be seen as a move which unleashed ethnic tensions since its 
influence over Yugoslavia was such that it could never have contained them. 
Fine (1994) suggests that both Serbian and Croatian protagonists have attempted to 
portray the conflict as an ethnic war in order to justify their expansion into territory 
which would otherwise be controlled by the Bosnian government. Historically, the 
majority of the population of the whole region, that is Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia, share a 
common Slav origin. The arrival of Islam during the rule of the Ottoman Empire resulted 
in the conversion of some of the population to Islam, but there were a large number of 
religious conversions in many directions, not just to Islam. During the Ottoman rule, the 
categorisation of the population was on the basis of religion, not according to ethnic 
labels. It was not until the late nineteenth century, after the introduction of Austrian rule, 
that nationalism became a force in the region and taught the equation of Catholicism with 
Croatian origin and Orthodoxy with Serbian origin. Fine (1994) says that these terms 
were meaningless, since the multiplicity of religious conversions since the arrival of the 
Ottoman empire meant that there was no way of knowing from which religious origin a 
particular adherent of any of the religions had descended. 
The portrayal of the conflict as an ethnic one also ignores the fact that the Bosnian 
government contains members of all three religious groups, and that the population of the 
besieged urban areas such as Tuzla and Sarajevo remained `mixed' throughout the war. 
Serbia and Croatia were pursuing a modernist agenda, seeking political control over 
swathes of territory, and following the political realist model of politics they sought 
security through strength and a nation state with a single ethnic identity. The Bosnian 
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state can be considered instead to be a post-modern ideal. The Bosnian state for which 
many people voted was not a Muslim state, nor even a state dominated by Muslims but 
which tolerated non Muslims. The ideology underpinning Bosnia in 1992 was a multi- 
ethnic state where differences were accepted and putative ethnic difference were 
unimportant. 
"We are not on the road to a national state, our only way out is towards a free civic 
union. This is the future. Some people may want that (to make Bosnia a Muslim state), 
but this is not a realistic wish. Even though the Muslims are the most numerous nation in 
the republic, there are not enough of then ... they ivould 
have to comprise about seventy 
per cent of the population. " (Al fa Izetb(-,, govic, 1990, quoted in Silber and Little 1995 
page 230) 
The peaceful coexistence was a reality in the urban areas of Bosnia, where up to 40% of 
all marriages in urban areas between the end of the second world war and the outbreak of 
war in Bosnia were `mixed', that is they were between partners of different religious 
background (Fine 1994). 
Necak's (1995) argument that ethnic tensions predated communism and were exacerbated 
by it are not entirely convincing, since he also asserts that the economic fortunes of the 
country are important, and the economic mismanagement and severe economic problems 
they brought in their wake. He further asserts that right up until the day after Slovenia's 
declaration of independence there was a possibility of the continuance of Yugoslavia as a 
loose federation. This does not appear, then, to entirely support his argument that 
communism incubated inter-ethnic tensions in a deterministic way. 
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Reliance on ethnicity and ethnic hatred cannot explain another aspect of the war: the 
relative lack of effort expended by Serb troops on the Muslim enclave of Bihac. Despite 
being surrounded by Serb troops, the Bihac region remained under Muslim control. There 
had been an attempt to gain control in 1992, but this failed, and in 1993 fighting in the 
area tailed off. The Serb army made no attempt to overrun the area, and permitted trade to 
take place between the area and Croatia, as well as the surrounding Serb controlled 
territory. The survival of Bihac is indication of two things. Firstly, ethnic tensions alone 
cannot account for the war, since if they were the sole cause then there is no reason why 
Bihac's Muslims should have been allowed to remain in the area. Secondly, economic 
forces had a major role in the conflict and in people's loyalties. Bihac was led by Fikret 
Abdic, who first came to prominence in Yugoslavia some years before. He had been 
director of a company called `Agrokomerc', which at first had been considered the most 
successful of all the enterprises in Yugoslavia. The company, based in Bihac, began as a 
small chicken farm, but developed into an agro-industrial enterprise employing over 
13,000 people. In August 1987, the bubble burst and it was revealed that the wealth of 
the company was based on economic fraud. The collapse of the company had far 
reaching effects, and the economy of the whole region collapsed. The federal leadership 
tried to blame the whole affair on the Bosnian republic's leaders, though the leaders of 
Agrokomerc had done the same as many other enterprises, though perhaps on a larger 
scale, and the leadership in Belgrade was therefore just as responsible (Burg & Shoup 
1999, Magas 1993). Despite the collapse of the company, Abdic remained popular in the 
region, which he used to win an election in 1990 and to gain a seat on the presidency 
(Friedman 1996). Both the federal and republican governments failed to intervene to 
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support the region, beyond ensuring that mass starvation did not occur, and the region 
was plunged into mass unemployment and poverty. The political repercussions extended 
beyond Bihac, and it has been suggested that the affair was used as an excuse to purge the 
Muslim political elites (Friedman 1996, Magas 1993). Hamdija Pozderac was in 1987 the 
highest ranking Muslim politician in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but he was also from a family 
who were prominent in building up Agrokomerc's unsecured debts. The collapse of the 
enterprise forced his resignation, but the Bosnian Muslims lost not only their vice- 
president. Pozderac was the next in line in Yugoslavia's federal presidium, so the 
opportunity to have a Muslim federal president was also lost (Friedman 1996). 
Abdic himself remained in the SDA, and remained politically active. Abdic attempted to 
make a separate deal with Serbs and Croats in 1993, despite strong opposition from the 
government in Sarajevo (Burg & Shoup 1999). This in turn led to an important, though 
often overlooked, event: the fighting between the Bosnian Government's Fifth Corps, 
who had defended Bihac during 1992, and Muslim forces loyal to Abdic. This event is 
important, as it illustrates that divisions within the Muslim population were at times very 
strong, and the government did not always represent all of the Muslim population. After 
three months of fighting, a cease-fire agreement was signed in January 1994, and the 
Fifth corps took control of most of the region. Soon after this, Serb forces attacked the 
Government forces to prevent them taking over the area where Abdic's troops remained. 
The heaviest fighting of 1994 took place in Bihac, as Government troops fought both 
Serbs and Abdic's troops, who received support from Serbs within Croatia (Burg & 
Shoup 1999). 
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Few scholars support the notion that the cause of the war in Bosnia in Bosnia was the re- 
emergence of ethnic hatreds, and instead alternative explanations have been sought 
focussing on the manipulation of the population by elites or the political economy of the 
country. 
Political elites and the role of the mass media 
Silber and Little (1995) suggest that to call the conflict inevitable is "to avoid addressing 
oneself to the central dynamic of the war" (Silber & Little 1995 page xxiii). They locate 
the origins of the conflict in the rise of Serbian nationalism in the mid 1980s among 
intellectuals in Belgrade, and suggest Milosevic consciously used nationalism in order to 
gain power in Serbia, and this in turn provoked other republics to try to leave the 
Yugoslav Federation. 
Bennett (1995) agrees that the violence in the former Yugoslavia is not "a tale of ancient 
hatreds" (Bennett 1995) but rather the result of a media generated nationalist hysteria. 
Conflict between Serbs and Croats, which was visible in both world wars, was not the 
result of centuries of animosity, but of the extreme circumstances of those wars. Bennett 
says that when trying to locate causes of events in history, it is the perception of history 
which is important, rather than what actually happened. 
"... to attribute developments in the 1990s to events which took place half a century 
earlier, as some propagandists would, is surely far-fetched. By the same logic the whole 
of Europe should he in a permanent state of war. " (Bennett 1995) 
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Bennett suggests that the animosity between peoples of the whole of Yugoslavia is in fact 
a recent phenomenon. It may be in part the result of the failure of the two Yugoslav states 
to develop a sustainable coexistence, but owes much to the reinterpretation of past events 
by the media in the 1980s. Glenny (1992) agrees with Bennett's assertion that the three 
main religious groups in Bosnia are not distinct ethnic groups, and that religious 
differences are a result of the history of Bosnia. 
Cigar (1995) says that the treatment of Muslims in Bosnia could be termed genocide. In 
the Bosnian situation, he suggests that the decisive factor in the instigation of genocide 
were "top-down leadership and official legitimisation" (Cigar 1995), and that these were 
far more significant factors than either history or tradition. In dismissing the argument 
that the conflict was inevitable given the way the different religious groups were 
intermingled with no one group in an overall majority, Cigar notes that Bosnia- 
Herzegovina was not the only country in the world with a diverse ethnicity. Indeed, there 
are many countries whose ethnic diversity is far greater than that of Bosnia, such as the 
United States, where genocide has not occurred. Cigar is of the opinion that rather than 
being an outbreak of primeval popular emotion beyond the control of the Serbian 
leadership, or the spontaneous eruption of historical antagonisms, the conflict in Bosnia 
was the result of the campaign waged by the Serbian elite, both within and without 
government, which sought to create a nationalist movement in order to extend its power. 
This campaign was conducted in such a way that relations between the Serbs and other 
groups deteriorated severely, making the idea of genocide both possible and plausible. 
Nationalist ideology in Serbia was not Milosevic's creation. In the early 1980s some 
intellectuals in Serbia and the Serbian Orthodox church began supporting Serbian 
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nationalism openly. In 1986 a `Memorandum' was produced by a group of leading 
intellectuals in Serbia, some of whom had political ambitions, which called for the 
creation of a Greater Serbia which would encompass all territory on which Serbs lived. 
Though the memorandum itself was explicitly rejected by the president of Serbia, Ivan 
Stambolic, the ideas contained within it did not. Gradually the Muslim population of 
Yugoslavia, whose presence would inevitably be a stumbling block for any attempt to 
create a greater Serbia, became demonised by the media and by Serbian intellectuals. The 
role of intellectuals should not be seen as any less important than that of the media, 
especially when it is considered that much of the work of the intellectuals found its way 
into the media where the ideas could be disseminated further and were given credence 
because of their intellectual roots. In 1982 Serbian author Vuk Draskovic published a 
novel set in wartime Yugoslavia, in which Muslim characters were portrayed as traitors 
and murderers, who came into being centuries ago by betraying their Serb relatives and 
converting to Islam (Cigar 1995). 
Bennett agrees with Silber and Little that the rise to power of Milosevic in Serbia was a 
crucial factor. He suggests Milosevic's intervention in Kosovo in 1989, which led to the 
end of autonomy in the province, was the decisive factor (Bennett 1995). 
Janjic (1995) agrees that the conflict in Yugoslavia cannot be blamed on historical 
conflict re-emerging. He asserts: 
"National antagonisms were not inevitable or predestined; they had been managed 
peacefully since the foundation of the Yugoslav state in 1918 until 1941-45, and then 
until 1991, when they erupted in the form of large scale armed conflicts. " (Janjic 1995 
page 32) 
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The main cause of the outbreak of violence is located by Janjic in: 
"an underdeveloped political culture and a heritage of authoritarianism compounded by 
growing nationalism, which diverted democratic aspirations into a purely nationalistic 
struggle for self determination. " (Janjic 1995 page 33) 
Magas (1993) also locates the collapse of Yugoslavia in the rise to power of Serbian 
nationalists in the 1980s. Since Yugoslavia was a communist state, and communism is 
theoretically opposed to nationalism, this emergence of nationalism as a political force 
needs to be accounted for. 
Milosevic also harnessed the power of the media, and as early as 1987 the media in 
Serbia were "already on a war footing, spewing out a barrage of ethnic hatred. " (Bennett 
1995). Bennett is adamant that the role of the media was crucial in generating a distorted 
interpretation of the past. The Yugoslavia which existed after the Second World War was 
by no means perfect, but it was also not a hot bed of ethnic divisions. 
"You must imagine a United States with every little TV station everywhere taking exactly 
the same editorial line -a line dictated by David Duke. You would have war in five 
years. " (Milos Vanic, Belgrade journalist, quoted in Malcolm 1994 page 252) 
The separate economic developments of the states of Yugoslavia was reflected in the 
development of separate radio stations, television stations and newspapers, each focussed 
on the interests of a particular state (Thompson 1994). Decentralisation in the 1960s and 
1970s gave the local communist parties a large degree of control over news media in their 
region, but the absence of democratic control meant that the content of these media was 
largely controlled by and reflected the interests of the local parties. 
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During the 1980s and early 1990s, exhumations took place of mass graves of Serbians 
who died during the Second World War. The bodies were reburied with much ceremony 
to honour Serbian war dead, and the ceremonies were shown on Serbian television. This 
was a largely successful attempt to remind the population of the fighting that went on 
during the Second World War and to attempt to encourage Serb support for a Greater 
Serbia (Almond 1994). These reburials also served to encourage anti-Croat feelings. 
Among stories used by the mass media to ignite anti-Croat feeling was a story in a 
magazine in August 1991 which said that in Zagreb it was possible to buy lamps made 
from skulls taken from a Serbian mass grave. As well as inducing ill-feeling, the story 
served to justify the reburial of war dead by suggesting that Croats were disturbing 
graves. This renewed Serbian interest in war dead was reflected in Croat, Slovene, and 
(later) Bosnian Muslim leaders, who also began to discuss the numbers that died during 
the Second World War. 
"This exhumation of the dead whose spirits cried out for vengeance was the necessary 
prelude to the savage war which broke out in 1991, and spread across Yugoslavia. But it 
was not the cause of the war. ... 
[To see the war as having historical inevitability] is to 
commit the classic historian's mistake of seeking long-term roots for profound and far- 
reaching crises. " (Almond 1994 page 8) 
According to Almond, politicians and their sympathisers within the mass media 
manipulated events and images to provide a revised version of history, in order to incite 
divisions. The mass media and politicians also used inflammatory language, with 
Croatian nationalists being labelled as Ustase and Serb nationalists labelled as Cetniks. 
As the Ustase, a fascist organisation active during the Second World War, had been 
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responsible for many atrocities, the labelling of Croat nationalists as Ustase served two 
purposes. First of all it served as a reminder of the potential of organisations to carry out 
atrocities, but it also demonised Croat nationalists. If they were simply nationalists, they 
would be upholders of a particular political ideal. If, however, they were Ustase, they 
were fascist terrorists who sought the death of as many Serbs as possible. 
Manipulation by political elites and the mass media were therefore crucial in igniting war 
in Bosnia, but their actions alone cannot explain the war that took place. It is important 
also to consider the conditions that existed in the country, particularly its economic and 
political developments, in order to gain an understanding of the situation. 
Economic and political development and the war 
Schierup (1991) suggests that the `ethnification' of politics in Yugoslavia was not an 
expression of past ethnic divisions, but rather was the characteristic result of a socialist 
state system. Like many other commentators, he sees as decisive Milosevic's `palace 
coup' of 1987, when spurious claims of persecution of ethnic Serbians in Kosovo were 
used to justify the ending of autonomy in that province, and which led to Milosevic 
gaining control of the Serbian communist party and ushering in an era of Serbian 
nationalism. From that point onwards, politics in Yugoslavia became more explicitly 
ethnicised. The role of the media must be seen as crucial in this process, but Schierup 
sees it as a process stemming not from the media or from historical antagonisms, but 
from the way the state was organised and conducted itself in Yugoslavia. A similar 
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process can be seen to have been at work in other former communist countries, but for a 
variety of reasons the process has been most acute in Yugoslavia. 
Kellas (1991) suggests that the surge in nationalism in Yugoslavia was a direct 
consequence of the economic problems of the country. 
"Nationalism feeds on economic discontent, and channels it into a nationalist 
perspective. It does this especially it, hen there is regional uneven economic development, 
and where there is a cultural division of labour and many immigrant workers. Both the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are economies in dire trouble with shortages, uneven 
development and a strong tinge of `internal colonialism'. " (Kellas 1991 page 114) 
Schierup (1990) gives a detailed account of the economic history of Yugoslavia. He says 
that in 1945 Yugoslavia was the poorest country in Europe after its neighbour Albania. 
At that time, the communist party was "the only universal (non-ethnic, non-national) 
political movement in a heterogeneous and fragmented country. " (Schierup 1990 page 
26). According to Schierup (1990), when bureaucratic power is concentrated in the 
centre, there is a tendency for the centre to attempt to increase its administrative control, 
creating local economic monopolies which it then defends from competition. The 
bureaucratic power structures then defend these monopolies from competition. Within 
Yugoslavia, this process was more pronounced since decentralisation allowed local 
bureaucracies to create monopolies which were then defended by the central bureaucracy. 
"Through transferring most economic responsibilities from the federation to the 
republics, the 1974 constitution provided a unique opportunity to resurrect divisive 
bureaucratic monopolies, which could now be defended through mechanisms such as 
particularistic tax policies [etc. ]. ... increasingly solid and powerful 
links were forged 
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between traditionalist kinship and local community networks and local, and regional 
state apparatuses. " (Schierup 1990 page 234) 
The thrust of Schierup's work is that Yugoslavia had become an economically divided 
country well before it became divided politically. There was little or no redistribution of 
wealth between the richer and poorer areas of the country. Croatia and Slovenia remained 
the wealthiest parts. Their secession from the federation must have been made 
considerably easier by the economic structure, since if they were not dependant on the 
rest of Yugoslavia for the import or export of goods, and trading links with other 
countries had already been established, then the task of establishing a republic as an 
independent state in the world market must have been greatly eased. 
The implication of Schierup's work, and remember he was writing before the outbreak of 
open hostilities in Yugoslavia, is that that the break up of Yugoslavia was not primarily 
the result of ethnic tensions. Rather, the way that Tito had implemented state socialism in 
Yugoslavia, even though his intention was to create a unified Slav state, meant that 
economic divisions were enhanced and internal borders became more, not less, important. 
The dissent brought about by economic problems could not be expressed politically 
because of the political regime, and instead was directed towards nationalistic modes of 
expression. The nationalism in Yugoslavia can therefore be seen as the result of 
economic problems and the mode of state socialism in Yugoslavia, which then was 
harnessed by politicians and amplified through the media. This seems to me to be a more 
believable account. After all, there is no inherent genetic difference between peoples in 
different parts of Yugoslavia or between those of different religions. Those who suggest 
the war is nothing more than an outbreak of tribal violence or ancient hatreds fail to 
-141- 
explain why the predominant mode of existence in the region has been one of peace 
rather than war, or to explain the degree of Yugoslav nationalism or the extent of 
marriages which took place between people of different religions. An examination of the 
way of life for the ordinary citizen in pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina shows that people of 
different religions lived peacefully alongside each other until the outbreak of war, and in 
some areas were able to maintain a mixed society throughout the war. 
Whatever one's opinions on the causes of the war the fact remains that the war took 
place, and hostilities were ended by the Dayton Agreement. Those living in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina today have a life which has been deeply affected by the war, and their future 
depends on the maintenance of peace and the reconstruction of Bosnian society. 
The future for Bosnia 
"With no common experience except war and atrocity, and no genuine consensus behind 
the project of nation building, there is not yet a Bosnian identity to counteract the 
centrifugal forces of ethnic separatism, and national ties across the borders with Croatia 
and Serbia are far stronger than civil identity within Bosnia. The most basic challenge of 
the peace process is to create a single society out of three sharply defined ethnic 
groups. " (Cox 1998 page 9) 
One of the major problems facing Bosnia today is the continuance of divisions based of 
ethnicity. As Cox says, the only common experience of the population of Bosnia is war 
and atrocities, and these took place mainly along ethnic lines. For many people it is 
difficult to transcend these experiences and forge a new Bosnian identity which can 
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encompass all three parties. This is the lasting legacy of the war, the continuing and 
heightened importance of ethnicity in post-war Bosnia. 
Divisions based on religion are not set in stone, however, and in elections held since the 
end of the war non-nationalist parties have gradually increased their share of the vote. 
Analysis of the voting in the 1997 municipal elections shows that non-nationalist parties 
were more likely to gain support in areas where there were more than one religious group 
present (Pugh & Cobble 2001), although at that time the non-nationalist vote remained 
small. However, in the elections held in November 2000 the non-nationalist SDP gained 
roughly half the votes cast in predominantly Muslim areas (Thorpe 2000) and were able 
to take control in some municipal areas. 
In considering the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina today, considerations of ethnicity and 
religion alone are not enough, it is important also to understand the economic situation of 
the country. As well as the damage to infrastructure caused by the war, Bosnia has also 
had to cope with the change from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. 
Much of the heavy industry in Bosnia-Herzegovina was operating at a loss before the 
war, and even if funds were available to rebuild those enterprises which have been 
destroyed, they are unlikely to be rebuilt since they would be unable to operate at a profit. 
There have been some new enterprises, but these are more modern and tend to employ far 
fewer people than the old enterprises. For example, a taxi driver in Sarajevo took me on a 
guided tour of the city, and among the sites he pointed out was a derelict factory which 
used to make engine parts for Yugo cars. The factory had been in the Serb controlled part 
of Sarajevo, and as the Serbs withdrew they took what equipment they could with them 
and destroyed the rest. Yugo cars are no longer produced, and there is little chance of the 
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factory being reopened. It used to employ several thousand workers. Nearby he pointed 
out the new factory built by Coca-cola. This plant makes and bottles cola and other soft 
drinks, and is a welcome investment, but only employs a handful of people (the driver 
told me thirty, but I have not been able to verify this). The result is that despite some new 
investment, unemployment is extremely high, running at over 40% in most of the country 
(Thorpe 2000), and aid workers I spoke to in Bosnia said that in some districts 
unemployment was around 80%. 
There are many NGOs operating in Bosnia now, and many of these are seeking 
reconciliation and reconstruction. Their efforts have had some success, and there have 
been some people have returned to areas where they constitute a minority. However, thus 
far these moves have been small scale, and in some cases they have been violently 
opposed by the majority population in the area (Black et al. 1998, Cox 1998). 
Cox (1998) argues that the focus of international organisations and their interventions 
should be towards ethnic reconciliation rather than reintegration. He says that for a long- 
term solution to the conflict in Bosnia, it is important that the living conditions of the 
greatest number of people is normalised as soon as possible. Minority return, the return of 
an individual to an area in which they would be part of a minority group, should be the 
favoured solution where it is feasible. However, where there is open hostility to minority 
returns, the forcing through of minority returns can increase ethnic tension and so make 
the process of ethnic reconciliation more difficult. Cox also argues that there should not 
be too great a reliance on minority return to solve the problem of displacement in Bosnia. 
The numbers displaced were enormous, and the nature of the conflict was such that many 
may choose not to return to areas where they would constitute a minority. 
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For those who are displaced within Bosnia, the question of whether they can or should 
return to their former home depends on many factors. Their home may have been 
destroyed during the war, and return will then only be possible if they have the resources 
to rebuild it. If their home still stands, it is likely to have been occupied by someone else 
who has been displaced from another area. For people whose homes are occupied, a 
scheme has been established whereby the ownership of a property can be registered and 
negotiations entered into with the inhabitant in order to seek repossession, compensation 
or rent from the occupier. There is also the question of employment in the area where 
they are from, and those who have been displaced and have found some form of 
employment may be reluctant to move if their economic future is uncertain. Finally, they 
may be reluctant to move to an area where they would be part of a minority population, 
regardless of their pre-war mode of living. 
Conclusion 
An examination of the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina shows that for several hundred 
years it has been home to people holding different religious beliefs. Despite this, the 
people of Bosnia-Herzegovina have only rarely fought each other on their own account. 
There have been many wars and battles on Bosnian territory, and the people of Bosnia 
have become caught up in these, but in rather than taking sides against each other, their 
actions can be seen as taking different sides in some else's wars. 
There are no distinct ethnic origins for the three religious groups, and instead at different 
periods of history there have been conversions from and to each religion. As time has 
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past, the different religious groups have tended to identify themselves with one or other 
of the neighbouring states, and although most Catholics classed themselves as Croat, and 
Orthodox Christians as Serb, the self-identification of Muslims has varied considerably 
both over time and within the group. Bosnia's Muslims do not have a history of separate 
identification, or of separate organisation. 
The causes of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina are complicated, but one factor referred to 
by many politicians can be discounted by examining the history of the region and the 
course of the war. This is the notion that Bosnia-Herzegovina was the home of people 
harbouring ancient hatreds of each other, and although communism had been able to 
suppress these feelings they had re-emerged as communism collapsed. In fact the history 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of people getting along peacefully. Even during the war, 
towns such as Tuzla and Sarajevo remained mixed, with those of different religious 
background working together. The Bosnian army contained senior officers who were 
Serb and Croat, as well as Muslims. An examination of the way people lived their lives 
immediately before the war shows that the lives of people of different religion were 
closely linked, with relationships of work, neighbourhood, friendship and sometimes 
marriage crossing and re-crossing between them. Instead of being the result of ancient 
hatreds, the war is a product of manipulations by political elites and the mass media they 
controlled, and the emergence of nationalism as the only coherent opposition to a 
crumbling communist economy. Devolution of power away from the centre, without the 
introduction of democratic control, meant that regional communist parties were able to 
tightly control the media in their area, and manipulate output to justify their activities. 
When the communist parties collapsed, there place was taken by a variety of parties, the 
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most powerful of which were the new nationalist parties, whose leaders were former 
communist party members. These parties, as well as their communist predecessors, 
sought to maximise the economic situation of their region, and opposed any redistribution 
of wealth. Part of the reason for nationalist sentiment in Slovenia was that the country 
perceived itself to be subsidising the rest of Yugoslavia, and considered it would be 
richer if independent. 
The rise of nationalism in Serbia was matched by the rise of nationalism in Croatia, and 
leaders in both countries sought the support of Serbs and Croats in Bosnia, whilst seeking 
to support national minorities within the other country. After Croatia became 
independent, the government of Bosnia also sought independence, fearing that without 
the balancing power of Croatia, Bosnia would become merely a part of Serbia. 
Despite the Dayton Agreement, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not yet stable, and 
many people remain displaced from their homes. This means that for those who remain 
outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, the question of return is very difficult. For many return to 
their former home, if it exists, means returning to an area where they would be part of a 
minority, and their experiences of the war mean that they are reluctant to accept that. 
Even if return is an option, the Bosnia-Herzegovina they would be returning to would be 
very different to the place they used to live. The economic and political situation, as well 
as the distribution of people, is very different to that which previously existed. 
Despite the experiences of the war, and the atrocities which were committed, many 
people in Bosnia-Herzegovina remain convinced that peaceful co-existence is the only 
option for the future. Non-nationalist parties have gradually increased their share of the 
national vote, although nationalist parties remain powerful. The massive population 
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displacement that occurred as a result of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has drastically 
altered the distribution of religious groups throughout the country. Whereas pre-war 
Bosnia-Herzegovina had very few areas which were monoethnic, post-war Bosnia sees 
the majority of the population in areas where there are few people from other religious 
groups. This means that the way of life that existed before the war, with people of 
different religion mixing freely and often working and studying side by side is no longer 
possible. Study of the pre-war society in Bosnia shows that Bosnian Muslims did not 
have a strong group identity, and instead occupied a complex and disunited position. 
They have little history of organisation and mobilisation as a group, and the quest for 
Bosnian independence can be considered as a reaction to events in other countries, rather 
than a group project. This suggests that policies based on the supposed group 
identification of Bosnian Muslims will struggle, since they have little history of group 
identification or group organisation. It is possible that in the future a Bosnian Muslim 
group identity will emerge, but its current existence cannot be deduced from the history 
of the country. This applies to policies for Bosnians outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well 
as within the country. 
The flow of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina was the greatest outflow of refugees 
since in Europe since the Second World War. Although the countries of Europe were 
reluctant to accept them, the discovery of the concentration camps lad to governments in 
Europe accepting quota's of refugees from the conflict. Britain's programme is discussed 
in detail in the next chapter. 
The ethnicised nature of the conflict, and its incongruity with life in pre-war Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, has affected the way that Bosnians think about themselves and each other, 
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and these effects are discussed in chapter six. In chapter seven I consider the Bosnians as 
a group, and the difficulties they face now in trying to reconcile British policies on 
community with their experiences both before and during the war, and their lack of 
history of group organisation. 
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Chapter 5: The Bosnia Project 
Introduction 
The outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992, discussed in chapter four, 
produced the largest flow of refugees and displaced persons in Europe since the Second 
World War. Thousands of people fled outwards and sought safety in other European 
countries, but although there may have been much sympathy for their plight, the large 
numbers involved appear to have worried receiving countries. In a pattern that has 
emerged with other refugee flows, the reaction of many receiving countries was to 
impose visa restrictions in order to make it more difficult for persons from Bosnia 
Herzegovina to travel to those countries and seek asylum. 
In Britain, the arrival of asylum seekers from Bosnia had been noticed, and as was the 
case with previous refugee flows, the reaction of the government was to introduce a 
requirement that all Bosnians entering Britain must be in prior possession of an entry 
visa. This made it much harder for those seeking asylum in Britain to enter, and indeed 
the swiftness with which the measures were instituted meant that some refugees were 
stranded in transit ("Refugees Stranded in Transit" 1992). 
The discovery by journalists of the existence of concentration camps eventually led to the 
closure of those camps, and the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (ICRC) together with the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) took responsibility for the care of those who had been detained as 
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soon as the camps were closed down, but it rapidly became clear that the inmates could 
not be returned to their homes. They were from towns and villages where a policy had 
emerged, later to be called `ethnic cleansing', whereby all non-Serbs were forcibly 
removed from the area deemed to belong to Serbs by whatever means were necessary. 
Later similar camps were discovered in the Herzegovina region, where Bosnian Croats 
held Muslims captive. These were also eventually closed by UNHCR, and their inmates 
also had to be given safer accommodation. 
The war raging in Bosnia meant that it was difficult for the ex-detainees to be placed in a 
safe area of Bosnia, and for many a place of safety therefore meant a place outside of 
Bosnia. The governments of the world were called upon to offer refuge to those in need 
of protection, which would respect the principles of non-refoulement and basic human 
rights, but which would allow for repatriation when conditions allowed it (Joly 1998b). 
Many countries responded, and the British government agreed to accept 1,000 ex- 
detainees plus their dependants, though this was later revised to include those evacuated 
for medical treatment and 'vulnerable persons' nominated by UNHCR. Later an 
extension of the programme was announced, which made available a further 500 places, 
to include dependants. The initial estimate was that a total of around 4,500 persons would 
be admitted to Britain from Bosnia, though in fact the actual number of persons is around 
2,500. 
In order to cope with the expected influx of 4,500 people, the Home Office approached 
the Refugee Council and the British Red Cross to organise reception and resettlement 
facilities. At a later date the Scottish Refugee Council and Refugee Action also became 
part of the programme. Together these organisations formed 'The Bosnia Project', the 
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British programme for the resettlement of ex-detainees and vulnerable persons from 
Bosnia Herzegovina. The persons accepted on the programme were given temporary 
protection, and were initially housed in reception centres before being given more 
permanent accommodation. After leaving the reception centre, support was offered by the 
Mid Term Support teams, and longer term support was offered by the community 
development workers and Refugee Action. 
The data in this chapter is based upon internal documents of the Bosnia Project, as well 
as participant observation and my experiences whilst working with Bosnian refugees. In 
addition I make use of the two evaluations of the Bosnia Project which were carried out 
on behalf of the refugee agencies and the Home Office. The first evaluation (Graessle & 
Gawlinski 1996) resulted in the modification of the second stage of the programme, and 
the second (Compass 1997) as well as giving the agencies an overview of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the programme informed the policies used for the more recent 
programme for refugees from Kosovo. I briefly examine the nature and operation of 
previous refugee programmes in Britain, and then consider the Bosnia Project in detail. I 
argue that the way the Project was operated and managed had an effect on the settlement 
of those refugees that came under its remit, and this effect was not altogether positive. 
The Bosnia Project took into account aspects such as mid-term support and longer-term 
strategies, which were a welcome development when compared to other programmes. 
However, unlike previous programmes, the status given to refugees on the programme 
was temporary protection, implying eventual return, and this affected both the way the 
programme operated and the refugees themselves. Those on the programme were treated 
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as victims and objects of policy, rather than as individuals, and this impeded their scope 
for initiatives and the formulation of positive life projects. 
Previous refugee programmes 
The Bosnia project was not the first programme for refugees in Britain, and there had 
been previous programmes for refugees from Uganda and Vietnam. The nature of these 
programmes differed, but the common involvement of some agencies and individuals has 
meant that to some extent each programme has been influenced by the one before. 
However, there has been little systematic evaluation of these programmes, and it has been 
argued that the policies they used have been characterised by ad hoquery, rather than 
being a considered response to the prevailing circumstances (Joly 1996b). 
Ugandan Resettlement Board 
In Uganda in the 1960s, the government began introducing policies of `Africanisation'. 
At first these policies gave priority to Ugandan citizens over Asian residents, who had a 
largely chosen to retain British citizenship after Uganda's independence, but the policies 
gradually became more discriminatory and Ugandan Asians began to leave the country. 
In 1971 the leader, Idi Amin, began making openly hostile statements concerning Asian 
residents. In August 1972 Amin announced that all Asians who were not citizens of 
Uganda had to leave the country within 90 days, and later extended this to include all 
-153- 
Asians regardless of citizenship. Since most had British passports, they made their way to 
Britain (Robinson 1986). 
The large numbers of people involved combined with the short period during which they 
were to arrive in Britain meant that it was necessary for the government to organise some 
form of reception system if it was to avoid appearing to be as inhumane as the country 
from which they were expelled. For this reason, the Ugandan Resettlement Board (URB) 
was established in 1972 by the Home Office in order to assist in the reception and 
settlement of British passport holders who were expelled from Uganda by Idi Amin's 
government. Their British passports were a legacy of the colonial era, and though some 
had family links with Britain most had only tenuous links, other than their passport and 
the legal right to enter and remain in Britain. Though the persons involved were not 
technically refugees, they can be considered a form of de facto refugee, since they were 
forced to leave the country of their residence. The URB, established after Ugandans had 
begun to arrive, was intended to make plans for the reception of the refugees, in order 
that the process should be smooth and orderly, and to disperse the refugees as widely as 
possible (Dalglish 1989). 
The URB established reception camps where new arrivals could be accommodated, with 
voluntary agencies such as the WRVS and the Red Cross assisting with their immediate 
needs, since those expelled were permitted to take few belongings with them. The search 
for accommodation for the refugees was prioritised, as it was felt that the stay in the 
reception centres should be as short as possible (Dalglish 1989). The Home Office 
established a policy whereby areas would be designated either red, meaning refugees 
should not go there, or green, areas which refugees should go to. The designation of areas 
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was based on an assessment of the levels of housing, education and social services 
resources, and local authorities in green areas were encouraged to accept refugees, with 
some financial support being made available to them. Dalglish (1989) argues that existing 
levels of Commonwealth immigrants in an area were also taken into account, since it was 
considered that the pressure of Ugandan Asians arriving would place too much pressure 
on the local authorities. However, the red and green policy was not tremendously 
successful, and only 38% of the Ugandan refugees who were initially under the auspices 
of the URB actually were accommodated in green areas (Bristow 1976). 
The vast majority of funding for the Uganda programme was directed towards the 
reception phase, and once housed the refugees relied on support from existing agencies 
and community groups (Cunningham 1973). The major policy of initiatives of the URB, 
short reception centre stays and dispersal, were repeated in a revised form for refugees 
from Vietnam (Dalglish 1989). 
Vietnamese Refugees 
In the late 1970s, thousands of people fled Vietnam seeking refuge in other countries. 
They left in various ways, but the most popular route was by sea. The resultant mass of 
people became collectively known as `the boat people'. Neighbouring countries allowed 
the boat people to land, but rapidly made clear that they were unable or unwilling to 
accept the vast numbers of people involved permanently. At the same time, many of 
those seeking refuge expressed a desire to be accommodated in Western countries. Many 
Western governments agreed, at the request of UNHCR to establish programmes 
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whereby Vietnamese who had already left Vietnam could be relocated to a Western 
country and settle there, thus relieving the countries neighbouring Vietnam of some of the 
duty of care. 
The programme established by Britain accepted over 22,000 Vietnamese between 1975 
and 1988 (Dalglish 1989). Though the funding for most of the work with Vietnamese was 
provided by central government, the work itself was mainly carried out by various 
voluntary agencies. For many of the refugees, Britain had not been their first choice when 
they considered which country they wished to go to, and the early arrivals usually had 
few relatives or friends already present. There was no existing Vietnamese community to 
which the refugees could turn for support, and so they were reliant on voluntary agencies 
for support (Robinson & Hale 1989). Before the introduction of a quota for refuges from 
Vietnam, some refugees had been arriving and these had been assisted by the British 
Council for Aid to Refugees (which later became the Refuge Council) and the Ockenden 
Venture who along with Save the Children had some prior experience of resettling 
refugees in Britain. When the Home Office agreed to accept a quota of refugees in 1979, 
the Home Office felt that these agencies had already shown their ability to respond 
appropriately to refugee arrivals, and were already employing staff with the necessary 
language skills and abilities. Later Refugee Action was also involved. The Home Office 
also felt that, as with the Ugandan Programme, voluntary agencies were able to respond 
more quickly and effectively than government departments. For these reasons, 
responsibility for operation of the Vietnamese programme was passed to these agencies 
(Dalglish 1989). 
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There was little co-ordination between the agencies initially (Joly 1988). At a later stage 
a Joint Committee for Refugees from Vietnam was established which co-ordinated the 
work of the different agencies. Although this provided a forum for discussion of policies 
and was intended to ensure the co-ordination of activities undertaken as part of the 
programme, in practice co-ordination and the discussion of experiences between agencies 
were minimal (Dalglish 1989, Joly 1988). All the agencies became involved in all aspects 
of reception and settlement, and the division of labour between the agencies was mainly 
on a geographical rather than a task basis. Refugee Action was responsible for those 
Vietnamese settled in Scotland, Yorkshire, South Midlands, and East Midlands; 
Ockenden Venture was responsible for those in West Midlands, Manchester, North East 
and North West England, and North Wales (Dalglish 1989). Initially the refugees were 
housed in reception centres, run by either the British Council for Aid to Refugees, which 
later evolved into the British Refugee Council, the Ockenden Venture or the Save the 
Children Fund, though after 1981 Refugee Action took over most of the reception work 
(Joly & Cohen 1989). 
The stay in the reception centre was supposed to last around three months, during which 
time there would be some English classes and they could be given some orientation in 
order to prepare them for life in Britain (Home Office 1985, in Dalglish 1989) but the 
stay was frequently longer, largely due to problems with finding accommodation 
(Dalglish 1989, Robinson 1986). A policy was developed very early on whereby the 
number of refugees housed in any particular area was strictly limited, theoretically to 
avoid any one area being overburdened. Since it was intended that voluntary groups 
would provide much of the support to the refugees once they were housed, the devisers of 
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this policy wished to ensure that those volunteers would be able to cope with the number 
of refugees in their area (Joly 1988). This policy, `no more than ten no less than four', 
was difficult to implement in practice because no additional funding was made available 
to local authorities, and consequently some authorities simply refused to accept any 
Vietnamese into their area. This led to the concentration of Vietnamese in areas where 
there was housing readily available, for example 21% settled in the North East of 
England, an area which at the time was suffering from the third highest male 
unemployment rate in Britain (Robinson 1986). The strict dispersal policy was 
abandoned in 1984, and later arrivals were allowed more choice in their area of 
settlement (Joly . 
1998). Resettlement was considered to have been achieved when the 
refugee was placed in accommodation, and the programme did not directly address 
employment issues (Dalglish 1989, Robinson 1993). The lack of job opportunities in 
those areas, combined with the social isolation experienced by those who fund 
themselves in an area with only a handful of other Vietnamese, led to large-scale 
secondary settlement, with many Vietnamese relocating themselves to areas such as 
London and Birmingham. It has been estimated that 51% of Vietnamese had left their 
settlement address within five years of arrival (Robinson & Hale 1989). The dispersal 
policy was abandoned in 1984, when it became apparent that it was no longer practicable 
(Joly & Cohen 1989). After that date, the refugees themselves were given far more choice 
over where housing should be sought for them, and many expressed a preference for 
London or Birmingham. 
Under the Vietnamese programme, those selected for admission to Britain were given full 
refugee status on arrival. As with the previous programmes, the majority of funding 
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provided by central government (£21 million of the £23 million allocated) was directed 
towards the reception phase. 
Some support was provided for the refugees once they moved from the reception centres, 
though the nature of this support varied over time and between agencies. As might be 
expected with a programme lasting over ten years, policy and practices evolved over 
time. One important policy development of the Vietnamese programme was the 
introduction of a community development approach. This policy was adopted in 1985, 
when it became apparent to the agencies involved that there was still a need for some 
form of resettlement support. The purpose of those appointed to the community 
development posts was to sensitise and mobilise statutory and voluntary services in the 
areas where the refugees lived, and also to assist the refugee communities to organise 
themselves and provide support to their members (Joly 1988). 
Dalglish (1989) argues that the Vietnamese programme failed to involve local authorities 
sufficiently, despite the fact that the costs of longer term support, such as education, 
language tuition and employment training, would be the responsibility of local 
authorities. Dalglish is also critical of the use of a multiplicity of agencies. Voluntary 
agencies were used to implement the programme because the government felt that they 
were able to respond quickly and with greater flexibility than government departments. 
However, because they were not statutory organisations they were unable to exert much 
influence on local authorities or policy development, and had no power to ensure the 
provision of services which they felt the refugees needed. 
The Vietnamese programme began to end in the late 1980s, although Refugee Action 
were still operating a reception centre as the Bosnia Project began in 1992. As some of 
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the same agencies and individuals were involved in both the Vietnamese programme and 
the Bosnia Project, it is likely that the nature of the Bosnia Project was to some extent 
influenced by the earlier programme. 
The Bosnia Programme 
The announcement that Britain would accept a quota of refugees from Bosnia- 
Herzegovina was made on November 5 th 1992, at the same time that visa restrictions 
were announced for those travelling from the former Yugoslavia. 150 places were 
promised for Bosnians who had been detained in the camps, plus their dependants. On the 
3 oth November the government announced that the number of places was being increased 
to 1000, and their dependants. This led to the creation of a programme whereby voluntary 
agencies would receive funding from central government for work with those included in 
the programme. The programme became known as the Bosnia Project, and the lead 
agencies initially were the Refugee Council and the British Red Cross, though later 
Scottish Refugee Council and Refugee Action were also involved. Refugee Housing also 
became involved at a later stage to assist with the search for accommodation. Initially the 
Home Office contacted organisations that might be interested in operating the 
programme, and Refugee Council and the British Red Cross agreed to be the lead 
agencies. According to Bosnia Project staff the Red Cross became part of the Bosnia 
Project because of their involvement with Bosnian refugees in Bosnia and Croatia. They 
had been instrumental in securing the release of detainees in the camps, who were later to 
become clients of the programme, and also were involved in refugee camps in Croatia for 
-160- 
ex-detainees. Because of -this the Red Cross was keen to become involved with the 
refugees after they arrived in Britain. Robinson and Coleman (2000) report that the 
Refugee Council 'represented the obvious NGO to co-ordinate the programme', and so 
the decision to share responsibility between the two agencies was questioned at the time 
due to the Red Cross's lack of experience in resettlement. They report that one staff 
member said that the Red Cross 'muscled in' on the opportunity, although this perhaps 
suggests that rather than the Red Cross acting in an opportunistic way, the Refugee 
Council was perhaps resentful of someone else acting in what they saw as their territory. 
Staff at Refugee Action said that they had been approached informally about the Bosnia 
Project, but declined to become involved when the Project started as they were in the 
process of ending their work with Vietnamese refugees. However, once this work ended 
they became a member of the Bosnia Project. Although the vast majority of funding 
allocated to the project came from the Home Office, the Home Office adopted a 'hands 
off' approach to management of the service, leaving it up to the agencies involved to 
specify the nature of their work (Compass 1997), which had also been the case with 
previous programmes. 
In 1995, the UNHCR again appealed for countries to accept refugees from Bosnia, and on 
this occasion the British government offered 500 places, to include principals and 
dependants. These were housed in reception centres in Rugby, Derby, Yorkshire and 
Edinburgh. The quotas on both programmes were never filled, and the total number of 
persons who came on the programmes was around 2,500, far less than was initially 
expected. The reasons for this are discussed below in the section on family reunion. 
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Despite the official view that their stay in Britain was to be temporary, the direction and 
activities of the Bosnia Project were towards long-term settlement rather than temporary 
containment. This reflects the belief held by many of the refugee organisations and 
agencies from the outset that though return may be a possibility in the future, it was not 
imminent. It therefore was decided from the outset to use a model of resettlement rather 
than containment. 
The Bosnia Project can be seen as having three distinct parts: the reception centres; Mid 
Term Support; and community development. Return is also discussed here, although 
there was no return component included in the programme. Reception centres were the 
first part to be developed, as the refugees had to have somewhere to stay when they first 
arrived. Agencies and policy makers were aware that there had been problems in earlier 
programmes if the refugees' stay in reception centres was too long, since they might 
become too dependant on the centre and struggle to manage once housed. Experiences 
with refugees on the Vietnamese programme had shown that the refugees often needed a 
measure of ongoing support once they left the reception centre, and local authorities were 
sometimes reluctant to offer housing to both Ugandan and Vietnamese refugees because 
it was thought that they might prove too great a burden on their resources. For this reason 
the policy of using mid-term support workers was developed. The agencies considered 
that the community development policy developed for the Vietnamese programme had 
been relatively successful, and were later able to obtain funds from the Home Office to 
fund community development work. The agencies were also aware from their own 
experiences and from research that the dispersal policies used under the Vietnamese and 
Ugandan programmes had been failures, and instead sought to develop a new policy 
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which would avoid some of the earlier mistakes. This policy became the cluster areas 
policy, and resulted in dispersal based on clusters or groups. 
The intention of the reception centre stay was to provide the person with a period of 
orientation before moving them out into long-term accommodation. The average length 
of stay was between two and three months, but occasionally stays were much longer than 
this, a subject I shall return to later. After being moved into more permanent 
accommodation, assistance was to be provided by the workers of the Mid Term Support 
teams established by the Refugee Council. The Mid Term Support teams were 
established because the agencies involved in the programme felt that the lack of a pre- 
existing Bosnian community in Britain meant that there were no support structures in 
place. Without some form of support, Bosnians might find themselves becoming isolated 
and unaware of their rights and entitlements, and more vulnerable members of the 
population might escape the attention of statutory providers (Morrison 1994). The system 
was the same for those who were added to the quota on the grounds that they were 
'vulnerable persons', who were often widowed women with children or dependent 
relatives of people accepted on the quota who did not meet the definition ordependent 
used by the British government. The community development phase was intended to 
address the long-term needs of the refugees and assist with their settlement into British 
society. The refugee agencies had seen that there were a large number of Vietnamese 
communities established in Britain, some of whom employ workers to advise and assist 
Vietnamese in their area, and they felt this was a good model for refugees from Bosnia. 
However, the programme was started at a time when the government had made a political 
decision to try to prevent refugees from Bosnia entering Britain, by introducing visa 
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restrictions. The programme was started as a result of pressure from UNFICR and other 
European countries to share the burden of looking after people who had been detained in 
the camps, and the government decided that all those admitted under the programme 
should be given a new status of temporary protection, rather than being given refugee 
status. Before they could get that temporary protection, however, they had to be accepted 
onto the programme. 
Joining the programme 
There were three ways in which an individual could be included on the programme in 
Britain, as a principal applicant, as their dependant, or as a medical evacuee. Places were 
allocated initially for one thousand principal applicants, who were originally intended to 
be people released from the concentration camps, although later the definition of a 
principal applicant was widened so that exceptionally vulnerable people could be 
included. These principal applicants could apply for places for their dependants, although 
the definition of dependant varied over time. Sometimes an application was made for 
adult relatives to be included as dependants, and they Nvere accepted and redefined as 
principal applicants. Places were also made available for treatment of seriously ill people, 
who became part of the Medevac section of the programme. These were also allowed to 
bring dependants with them, but had slightly different rights to family reunion. 
The process of gaining a place on the programme took place formally as follows. Firstly, 
UNHCR discussed the individual's options, which were usually very limited, and 
obtained the agreement of the individual to travel to Britain. UNHCR then nominated the 
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individual to the British government, who made the official decision whether or not to 
include them, although in practice it was virtually unknown for the British government to 
refuse a nomination. Once the nomination was accepted, the British government made a 
decision as to which dependants they were allowed to include on their application. 
Although UNHCR assisted with the filling of application forms, they had little influence 
over this aspect of the process. Any dependants that were accepted by the British 
government as dependants would be allocated entry visas. If they were present in Croatia 
with the principal applicant, they would all be flown together when places were available 
for them on the flights. Transport was organised jointly by the UNHCR and the Red 
Cross. 
There are several reasons why the number of dependants was lower than initially 
expected. It had been assumed that most of the men in the camps would have been 
married with children, but a higher than expected number were single or married with 
older children. These older children were sometimes included, but not always. For 
example, the government usually would accept children up to the age of 18, but would 
sometimes allow unmarried girls up to the age of 21. There were some cases of places 
being allocated to young women as dependants, who subsequently refused to travel 
because their fianc6 was not allowed to join them. These women's visas were often kept 
on file in case they changed their mind at a later date. 
Visas were also issued for dependants who never travelled to Britain, either because they 
chose to remain in Croatia with other family members, or because they died during the 
war. 
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Principal applicants and their dependants 
The government announced in November 1992 that it would create a programme 
whereby 1,000 people plus their dependants would be allowed to travel to Britain. Their 
dependants were allowed to join them, and it was expected that there would be around 
4,500 people in total. In the end, 976 people came as principal applicants, and they 
brought with them 1239 dependants (Watson & Danzelman 1998). 
Gaining a place on the programme was via an opaque process administered by UNHCR 
in Croatia. Many of the refugees reported that they had no choice over which country 
they travelled to, and most knew little of Britain before they arrived (discussed in more 
detail in chapter six). If their relatives were with them in Croatia, they could apply on the 
spot for places and if accepted they could travel to Britain together. If their relatives were 
in Bosnia or missing, they could fill in forms to apply for visas for their relatives. If these 
were granted, the Red Cross would keep them on file until such time as they were able to 
travel, and their travel from Croatia to Britain was arranged for them. In the early stages 
of the programme some people were allowed to include their Fiancde as a dependant, and 
others were able to include parents, although these concessions were removed later on. 
When dependants were missing, the Red Cross, who operated a tracing service, assisted 
the principal applicant to fill in the relevant forms for tracing individuals. The visas were 
kept on file until such time as the individual was found. When they were found, if they 
were in a position to travel they were told about the visa and offered transport to Britain. 
Dependants who were in Bosnia were sometimes in a difficult position. If they were in 
territory controlled by rival forces, then safe passage out could often be negotiated, since 
those rival forces often encouraged the removal of those from a different ethnic group. 
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However, those who were in territory controlled by the Bosnian government were in a 
different position, regardless of their ethnicity, because the Bosnian government was 
opposed to the removal of people from its area and allowing people to leave was seen as 
contributing to ethnic cleansing. In addition men over the age of seventeen were drafted 
into the army, and attempts to leave were considered as desertion. Some people were able 
to leave legitimately, but some were only able to leave by illicit means, for example by 
bribery or by deserting their army post. Once they arrived in Croatia, they became the 
responsibility of the Red Cross, who would inform their relatives that they had been 
found, and with UNHCR arrangements would be made for travel to Britain. 
On arrival in Britain, the principal applicant was given a paper stating that they had 
temporary protection, and listing the names of those who were included as their 
dependants. They could apply for family reunion for family that had not travelled with 
them from Croatia, and they were entitled to social security benefits. 
Medevac Programme 
The system for those who were classed as medical evacuees was different to that of the 
main programme. The first medical evacuees (Medevacs) arrived in September 1992. 
They were supported by the British Red Cross, and no plans were made for their 
treatment after leaving hospital. They were later incorporated into the Medevac 
programme, established in August 1993, when 'Operation Irma' brought 21 medical 
evacuees and their relatives to Britain (Graessle & Gawlinski 1996). Irma was a young 
girl in a Sarajevo hospital whose mother had been killed, and who was desperately ill 
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with meningitis. The siege of Sarajevo meant that though doctors were available to treat 
her, they had few drugs and their ability to perform operations was severely limited. After 
a wealth of media attention focussing on her plight, the government agreed to admit Irma 
and several other ill persons for treatment in the UK as long as hospitals were willing to 
treat them. It was expected that the majority of medical evacuees would be sick children, 
but in the event the majority were adults, and though some were extremely ill others 
could have been classed as walking wounded. One worker had been at the airport when 
the plane arrived with the first group of medical evacuees. He later told me that he had 
been very surprised, and annoyed, when he saw that few of the people on the plane were 
children. 
After a short medical assessment, those who needed outpatient treatment only were often 
placed in a reception centre and from there were housed in the community. Those who 
needed in-patient treatment were admitted to a hospital with the facilities to treat them 
and the persons accompanying them were often housed in bed and breakfast 
accommodation nearby. The funding for this accommodation and the interpreters 
required in hospital was separate from the rest of the programme funding. As patients 
became well enough to leave hospital they were housed in the same way as those from 
the main programme. Although some made a full recovery others are still receiving 
treatment, but on an outpatient basis. As these people were brought specifically for 
medical treatment they did not have the same entitlement to family reunion. When they 
left Bosnia they were allowed in most cases to bring a carer with them, and for children 
this was usually the mother, along with that person's dependent children. It was not usual 
for complete families to leave Bosnia together. In practice, though, most were allowed to 
- 168- 
apply for other close family members to join them after they arrived in Britain. The fact 
that they were brought for treatment also meant that they had a right to return to Bosnia, 
and those Medevacs who decided to return, even when the war was still going on, were 
provided with flights by IOM. Medevacs were eventually incorporated into the main 
programme, and other than their family reunion rights were treated in the same way as 
the other people on the programme. A total of 68 people came on the Medevac 
programme, and they were accompanied by 120 dependants or carers (Watson & 
Danzelman 1998). Although the first arrivals were told that they could remain until their 
treatment was finished, this was later changed and all medical evacuees were given 
temporary protection (Graessle & Gawlinski 1996). 
Temporary protection 
The question of return to the country of origin has been more pertinent in the case of the 
Bosnia programme than in any of the previous programmes. Whilst those arriving from 
Uganda already had British passports, and those from Vietnam were given full refugee 
status upon arrival, the legal status of the Bosnian arrivals has been far less secure. All 
those arriving as part of the programme were issued with visas which stated that they had 
'temporary refuge from the conflict in former Yugoslavia', and that they would be 
expected to return to Bosnia when the British government deemed it safe for them to do 
so. The visas were initially valid for six months, and needed to be renewed periodically 
after that. The length of any one visa subsequent to that issued on arrival was between 
one and four years, though I have been unable to determine any reason for the variation. 
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Those who have been in Britain for more than seven years are now able to apply for 
indefinite leave to remain (ILR) at the time they renew their visas. However the Bosnians 
have not been informed whether this change of status is automatic, or whether there are 
conditions which must be met for ILR to be granted other than seven years of temporary 
protection. They are also unaware of the reason for ILR being issued, and whether 
'indefinite' means for a period of indeterminate length, and is thus in effect still 
temporary. 
The emergence of large numbers of refuges from the former Yugoslavia occurred at a 
time when the countries of Europe were trying to restrict the entry of non-European 
Union citizens, and at a time when refugees and asylum seekers were being considered to 
be a burden on the receiving society (Goodwin-Gill 1996). UNHCR recognised that 
European states were reluctant to assist in the Yugoslav refugee crisis, and in July 1992 
the High Commissioner called for a response to the refugees which was comprehensive 
and humanitarian, and which recognised the temporary nature of the problem and the 
need for emergency assistance (ECRE 1993). UNHCR felt that the numbers involved 
meant that it would be impossible for each claim to be individually assessed, and instead 
some form of group decision should be made. 
As a result of UNHCR's statements, and pressure to accept some of the ex-detainees, the 
British government agreed to accept a quota of ex-detainees, who would be given 
temporary protection. This required no legislative changes, since it was classed as a 
special category outside the normal immigration rules. 
Temporary protection carried with it many benefits that were not available to asylum 
seekers. They were allowed to apply for family reunion, whereas asylum seekers have no 
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right to family reunion, and those with exceptional leave to remain must wait for four 
years before applying. They also were entitled to social security benefits at the normal 
rate if they met the relevant criteria, and were allowed to work without needing either 
permission from the Home Office or a work permit. In these respects their status was 
similar to that of people given full refugee status, but their status differed in one 
important respect: they were expected to return to their country of origin when the Home 
Secretary felt it was safe for them to do so. This meant that the issue of their status and 
return remained important to those on the programme throughout their stay. The notion 
that the refugees would be in Britain temporarily, and thus needed to be given temporary 
protection rather than refugee status, affected the organisation of the programme. 
Temporary implied short term, and so the funding arrangements were always short term. 
The Bosnia Project was given allocations of funds to last a short period, and extensions to 
the programme needed to be negotiated with the Home Office. In this respect the funding 
of the Bosnia Project was similar to the other programmes, since they also had short term 
funding (Joly 1996b). 
Funding of the Programme 
The Bosnia Project was established at very short notice, and the programme was 
originally established as a temporary feature, with the expectation that the refugees would 
only be in Britain for a short time. The government allocated funds, but in the beginning 
the agencies of the Bosnia Project were unable to plan more than a few weeks ahead and 
were making repeated requests for extensions to the funding. This led to short term 
contracts for staff, made planning more difficult, and increased costs (Graessle & 
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Gawlinski 1996). It was not until July 1993 that a six-month budget was set, and in April 
1995 a one-year budget was set to cover the period until the Bosnia Project was supposed 
to end. This was revised in August 1995 when renewed fighting in Bosnia led to the 
introduction of a new quota of 500 places, although this was given a separate budget. The 
Bosnia Project finally ended in the summer of 1997. 
Initially almost all the funds allocated by government were directed towards the reception 
centres. The voluntary agencies involved in the programme felt that it was necessary to 
focus more attention than previous programmes had to the process of settlement after 
leaving the reception ccntre. Their experiences with refugees from Vietnam and Uganda 
led to a belief that it was not enough to provide a person with somewhere to live after 
leaving the reception centre and give them no additional support. Refugees from Vietnam 
experienced extremely high rates of unemployment, and many quickly moved away from 
the area in which they were first housed and joined other Vietnamese in large cities such 
as Manchester and Birmingham. The development of Vietnamese community 
associations was thought by the agencies to have improved the situation of the refugees, 
since these associations could lobby for service provision and provide a measure of 
community based support to the refugees in their area. Agencies such as the Refugee 
Council and Refugee Action were also involved with refugee community groups and 
were aware that funding was often available to these groups for training and support 
services to their members. These were able to provide services that were not available in 
the statutory sector, and also they could tailor services to meet the needs of the group. To 
this end the agencies of the Bosnia Project lobbied the Home Off-ice to -make greater 
funding available for the later stages of settlement. The government eventually accepted 
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this, and made funds available for Mid Term Support in July 1993, and later for longer 
term development work (Graessle & Gawlinski 1996). 
Not all of the applications for funding made to the Home Office were successful. 
Although an argument was successfully made for community development funding, the 
Bosnia Project was unable to secure funds for trauma counselling. The refugees had been 
subjected to terrible treatment during their times in the camps, as well as experiencing 
war, and many were in need of psychological support. Many wives reported that their 
husbands had recurrent nightmares, and some would not sleep in the same room because 
of their husband's disturbed behaviour. Others suffered from anxiety and depression, and 
many workers within the Bosnia Project felt that a counselling service would be 
beneficial. The Home Office refused to fund counselling services for the refugees, on the 
grounds that this was a health issue and so should be funded by the Department of 
Health. However, the Department of Health did not allocate any funds for this purpose. 
The generous funding of the programme meant that some of the problems faced by earlier 
programmes could be avoided. The project was well resourced, both in terms of staff and 
in terms of technology. Each Mid Term Support team that was established had enough 
money to establish and stock their office, and funds to cover travel. The funding was 
specifically for support services for those who came as part of the programme, and no 
extra funding was made available from the Home Office for other refugee agencies who 
were dealing with refugees from Bosnia who were not part of the programme. According 
to senior Bosnia Project staff, the total amount spent on the Bosnia Project over the 
period of its existence was approximately L13 million over a period of almost five years. 
This compares favourably with the E23 million spent on the programme for refugees 
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from Vietnam when one considers that the Vietnamese programme was for a far larger 
number of people. Despite the introduction of Mid Term Support and community 
development, the reception phase of the programme accounted for over half the total 
funds spent on the Bosnia Project. As with previous programmes, funding was front-end 
loaded, with the largest part of funds concentrated on the initial reception phase. 
Reception Centre Phase 
First arrivals under the auspices of the programme were in December 1992, when 96 
persons, predominately men, arrived. These were housed at the Goldhawk Road reception 
centre in London, which the Refugee Council had been using as a hostel for refugees. 
Soon a further centre was opened in Cambridge, managed by the Red Cross, another in 
Rugby also managed by the Red Cross, another in Derby managed by Refugee Action, 
and another in Dewsbury managed by the Refugee Council. In Scotland the Scottish 
Refugee Council established a centre in Edinburgh. Robinson and Coleman (2000) found 
that there were criteria for the location of reception centres, but that the availability of 
property was usually the deciding factor in the location of reception centres. 
On arrival in the UK, those disembarking from the planes were subject to a brief medical, 
and then put on buses to reception centres. Usually those arriving would be divided 
between several reception centres rather than all going to one. This was for several 
reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, it was unusual for a single centre to have enough 
vacancies to house all the new arrivals. Secondly, it was often beneficial for new arrivals 
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to learn from the experiences of those who had arrived earlier. Thirdly, it was felt by the 
staff of the reception centres that it was often preferable to have a mix of residents, that is 
a mixture of single persons and families. 
Those managing the reception centres often had little experience of or information on 
previous refugee reception centre practices, and were not always aware of developments 
and practices at other reception centres, and this meant that they developed their own 
procedures and practices in an information vacuum (Compass 1997). The problem of lack 
of information was compounded by the fact that the centres were being run by three 
separate agencies, and the managers did not initially have any fora for sharing or 
analysing their experiences. 
The intentions of the reception centre phase were to give the residents a place of safety 
while resettlement was arranged, and to provide an introduction to British culture and the 
English language (Compass 1997). Although each reception centre had the same broad 
aims, there were differences between them caused by differences in staffing levels and 
service provider, and the different interpretations of the managers (Compass 1997). Some 
of the early reception centres initially had central catering, though this was soon changed 
so that all reception centres were self-catering. According to Bosnia Project staff, it was 
agreed in discussion between the agencies that reception centre facilities should be self- 
catering, in order to give the residents as great a degree of independence as possible. It 
was also felt that since the stay in a reception centre was planned to last three months, 
then the experience of shopping for food during that time, when assistance and translation 
was available, would help to acclimatise the residents to life in Britain. Each resident or 
head of family was paid an allowance with which to buy food, based on social security 
- 175- 
rates. Residents were expected to shop for themselves, though in the first few days 
reception centre staff would accompany them. Visits to local doctors would be 
accompanied by an interpreter, as would early visits to a dentist. The exact level of 
support received by residents varied between centres, and was also dependent on the level 
of occupancy of the centre. Some centre staff in the early days had time to accompany 
residents on driving lessons, though as the centres became busier this practice was rapidly 
dropped. There were few formal rules on the exact role of reception centre staff, which 
was found to have led accusations by residents of favouritism by staff (Compass 1997). 
An example of the variation between centres is their policies on interpreting. In some 
centres, interpreting for situation such as shopping was available for the first few 
occasions, whilst others were more flexible and would accompany clients whenever they 
had the time. One centre developed a strict policy that they would interpret for no more 
than three visits to the dentist. Although this may seem restrictive, they ensured that by 
the third visit the client was aware of what treatment to expect, and they also taught the 
dentist useful phrases. Other reception centres would send an interpreter for every visit. 
The length of stay in a reception centre was intended to be around three months. 
However, some residents spent far longer in reception centres. Sometimes this was due to 
the inability to identify housing acceptable to the family concerned, and in other cases 
residents were allowed to remain in the centre whilst awaiting the arrival of close family 
members. The decision on whether a move should be delayed until the arrival of the 
remainder of a family was taken by centres on an individual basis. Some residents were 
housed in permanent accommodation before the arrival of their wives and children, who 
arrived up to twenty months later. Others remained in the reception centre for six months 
- 176 - 
or longer awaiting family. There was often little choice over housing. Each reception 
centre sent residents to specific cluster areas, for example Rugby sent residents mainly to 
Coventry, Solihull and Birmingham, whilst Dewsbury sent residents to Batley and 
Newcastle. As initial offers of housing were accepted, the choice for later arrivals became 
even more limited, as cluster areas became 'full'. Housing choice was further limited by 
the lack of availability of larger properties. Many residents wished to be housed in 
extended family units, but most housing authorities and housing associations had very 
few properties available with more than three bedrooms. Some families were allowed to 
remain in the reception centre until suitable accommodation could be found, but in other 
cases families had to be persuaded to accept two smaller properties instead of one large 
one. 
Housing and cluster areas 
After a period in the reception centre, the residents were moved into longer-term 
accommodation. In the very early stages of the programme the issue of resettlement was 
discussed, and lessons appear to have been learnt from the experiences of the Vietnamese 
programme, in that instead of scattering Bosnians in housing all over the country, they 
were predominantly housed in cluster areas. Cluster areas were never clearly defined, and 
in discussion during the early stages of the programme figures ranging from 150 to 700 
were discussed (Robinson & Coleman 2000) but in practice the phrase came to mean that 
Bosnian refugees were housed in clusters of between sixty and 250 individuals in a local 
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authority area 2. The agencies of the Bosnia Project felt that this would be sufficient for a 
degree of mutual support to occur, without having so many in one area that local service 
providers were unable to cope with their needs. Many Vietnamese moved from their 
original accommodation to London and other major cities, and the relatively low level of 
secondary resettlement of Aosnian refugees indicates that the policy of using cluster areas 
was fairly successful in that respect (Robinson & Coleman 2000). 
During the debate in the House of Commons concerning the introduction of a programme 
for refugees from Bosnia, the Home Office minister stated that the Refugee Council 
would be asked to ensure that Bosnians were housed after reception in areas where there 
were fewer pressures on local services and where voluntary organisations would be able 
to offer support. In response to a question concerning the 'burden' placed on local 
authorities in London and the South East, he said that the existing pressure placed on 
these authorities by the refugees already present would be taken into account (Hansard 
1992b). 
The cluster areas selected initially were London, West Midlands, East Midlands, West 
Yorkshire, North East England, and central Scotland. In addition some refugees went to 
the Home Counties and a few to other parts of Britain. In discussions with the Home 
Office, the agencies of the Bosnia Project agreed to limit the numbers that would be 
settled in London due to the lack of housing generally available there, and because the 
Home Office felt that the authorities there were already under pressure from the existing 
refugees in London. The cluster areas appear to have been selected because of the 
2 Robinson and Coleman (2000) give different figures, but they are stating the numbers in general cluster 
areas, rather than individual towns or local authority areas 
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willingness of local housing providers (whether local authority, housing association or 
both) to allocate properties to Bosnian refugees. Robinson and Coleman (2000) give 
seven criteria that were used for selection of cluster areas and say that the presence of a 
regional refugee council (RRC) was important, as well as the sensitivity and adaptability 
of local authorities and the local voluntary sector, the availability of housing, the 
availability of suitable premises for reception centres, appropriate heathcare provision, 
and the ability to economically sustain a growing and sizeable community. They note that 
there were problems meeting some of these criteria, one of which is the lack of 
information on the location of refugees in Britain. Although it has been estimated that 
85% of refugees are in London (Carey-Wood et al. 1997) very little is known of the 
location of those outside London, and so it was difficult to select cluster areas on this 
basis. The existence of Regional Refugee Councils was known, and so it was possible to 
use their existence as a rough guide, since the existence of a RRC suggests that there 
must be some refugees in the area. Of the other criteria, the availability of housing and 
the willingness of housing providers to make allocations to Bosnians from the 
programme seems to have been the paramount consideration. The fact that many 
reception centres were sited outside of cluster areas suggests that the availability of 
suitable premises to be used as a reception centre was not a major consideration. The lack 
of research into healthcare provision or employment prospects, noted by Robinson and 
Coleman, suggests that these criteria were also given lesser importance. Robinson and 
Coleman also found that there was a significant amount of staff hours devoted to housing 
issues, and this was one area in which the Bosnia Project staff carried out research, and 
this suggests that the availability of housing was the most important criteria for selection, 
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although the presence of RRCs may have been decisive in selecting which local 
authorities should be approached. 
The vast majority of Bosnians on the programme were housed in public housing with 
security of tenure, that is rented accommodation provided by the local authority or a 
housing association. Wherever possible the use of property with short leases was avoided, 
although Robinson and Coleman found that many of those settled in London were placed 
in short lease properties due to the shortage of accommodation. The Home Office had 
asked that the refugees be housed in a mixture of tenancy types, that is with some in 
privately rented accommodation as well as using public housing (Robinson & Coleman 
2000). Bosnia Project staff felt that the use of privately rented accommodation should be 
avoided, due to the insecurity of those housed there, since private tenants are usually 
given short-term leases. In addition, social security benefits limit the amount that can be 
paid towards rental of property, and in some areas this meant that only the poorest quality 
private accommodation was affordable to those on benefits. Senior Bosnia Project staff 
were aware that the refugees were theoretically only temporarily in Britain, since they 
had temporary protected status, but felt that finding housing with security of tenure was a 
preferred option. Privately rented accommodation is often only available on leases of six 
to twelve months, and those with short leases would need continuous housing support and 
assistance. This would create a demand for Bosnia Project staff, and would also make the 
situation of the refugees even more insecure than they already were. They therefore 
preferred to find housing with security of tenure and within the local benefits limit, and 
this meant that they strongly encouraged staff to avoid the use of privately rented 
accommodation wherever possible. 
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Robinson and Coleman (2000) found that 90% of refugees that came on the programme 
were settled in one of the cluster areas, which compares favourably with the Ugandan 
programme, for example, where only 38% went to the designated areas. They suggest 
that the relative lack of secondary migration is a reflection of the locations of the cluster 
areas being appropriate and liked by the refugees themselves, and of the lack of a pre- 
existing Bosnian community which could attract refugees to a particular area. In the next 
chapter I discuss secondary migration in more detail, but reach a different conclusion. 
From my own observations and interviews, it seems more likely that the temporary status 
of Bosnian refugees was a significant factor, in that there was little point in relocation if 
one was to return shortly to Bosnia. 
Once housed in accommodation in a cluster area, the refugees were able to look to the 
local mid-term support team for advice and assistance. 
Mid Term Support teams 
Once housed in one of the cluster areas, the refugee became the responsibility of the local 
Mid Term Support teams. A team of workers was established in each region and provided 
a measure of support and advice. Theoretically this support was to be provided for six 
months, though in practice the demand led nature of the service meant that it was difficult 
for individual workers to define their roles and duties. 
The rationale for Mid Term Support work arose from a consideration of the experiences 
of those involved in the Vietnamese programme, and of the differences between the two 
programmes. It was felt that the temporary status of Bosnians would not encourage local 
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agencies and local authorities to offer the same kind of support they had offered to 
Vietnamese refugees. Although the Bosnia Project agencies felt that refugees from 
Bosnia were unlikely to return in the short term, they were not able to guarantee the 
length of the refugees' stay. Consequently, although the agencies of the Bosnia Project 
worked on the assumption that the refugees might be in Britain for good, other agencies 
were able to adopt a different approach. Because the refugees had temporary protection, 
local authorities and voluntary service providers outside the Bosnia Project thought that 
the refugees would soon leave the country, and thus felt they could not justify providing 
special services for them. It was also felt that settlement would be most successful where 
there was either an existing community from which support could be drawn, or some 
form of specialised support. Since there were no established Bosnian communities from 
which support could be drawn, some form of specialised support would therefore be 
necessary to avoid problems of isolation and to hopefully avoid the high levels of 
secondary migration noted amongst Vietnamese (Morrison 1994). 
Mid Term Support was a new development in British refugee policy, and previous 
programmes had not incorporated staff whose role was to assist in the phase between 
leaving the reception centre and developing long-term strategies. Because the policy was 
new there was no existing practice on which to base the new service, and so the service 
was developed from scratch. The Mid Term Support workers carried out a problem 
solving and advocacy service for their clients on a casework basis, that is they worked 
mainly on solving individual problems rather than using a group approach (for example 
negotiating with local authorities or carrying out group training session). It is not clear 
why it was decided to operate the service in this way, but it probably developed as a 
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casework service since this was similar to the services available from local advice 
agencies. Every large town, and many small ones, have a Citizens' Advice Bureau or 
similar agency, which can be approached for assistance. When the first refugees left the 
Bosnia Project reception centres and the mid-term support teams were still being 
discussed, these advice centres were often the only source of support for the refugees, and 
their service was based on clients approaching them on an individual basis and requesting 
assistance with a particular matter. Although the need for interpreting services was 
known, the nature of other problems, which might arise, was a matter of speculation, and 
it seems likely that the casework approach was deemed to be a flexible way of 
responding to the clients needs. 
The mid-term support workers were office based, but would accompany clients to act as 
interpreters and advocates in certain situations. These situations were not clearly stated, 
which meant that the exact nature of the support provided, as with that provided by 
reception centre staff, was dependent to some extent on the number of clients the support 
worker had. The Mid Term Support system was a success in some ways, but the lack of a 
clear definition of Mid Term Support led to some confusion on the part of both clients 
and workers as to the level of service which could be expected. 
An evaluation of the Bosnia Project states: 
"Case-work management in Mid Term Support wasfrequently criticised by clients and 
there ivere a number of areas in which the procedures were not transparent, which made 
the management of client expectations problematic: for example, there lvere no clear 
procedures on needs assessment, the intensity of the intervention or case closure. 
(Compass 1997page 2). 
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There were clearly problems with the management and organisation of mid-term support, 
and senior Bosnia Project staff said to me that many of these problems were the result of 
the speed with which the Bosnia Project was established and the urgent nature of their 
work for most of the Project's lifetime. However, whatever the excuse that can be made, 
the fact remains that for over three years a service was provided that was the subject of a 
large amount of criticism from its clients. In one city, dissatisfaction with the Mid Term 
Support team led to demonstrations which were shown on the local television news. 
Some clients refused to use the services of the Mid Term Support team and instead 
preferred to go to local advice centres, although this option was only available for those 
who were able to speak sufficient English. Despite this being a clear indication of 
dissatisfaction with the Mid Term Support service, it did not appear to lead to any 
changes in the organisation and provision of the service. This suggests that the opinions 
of the service users were either overlooked or not seen as important. 
[A Bosnia Project worker] said that the Home Office expects people to be able to be 
independent after one month, but in her experience six months is a more realistic period. 
The help provided by the Bosnia Project is discretionary, so this period is flexible. [The 
worker] was asked to clarify exactly what are the expectations of the caseworkers in her 
team. Due to the broad nature of casework it is difficult to specify what is/is not the 
responsibility of the caseworker. In general terms, they should deal with issues relating to 
benefits, health, education, grant entitlements of Bosnians and so on. Copies of the 
caseworkerjob description were circulated for the benefit of the other agencies. It was 
felt important to clarify exactly what the caseworker's remit is, to avoid confusion with 
the work of other agencies. [The worker] stressed that the casework with Bosnians should 
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be task limited rather than time limited. Doctors' appointments are at present taking up a 
lot of caseworkers' time, but the most vulnerable clients are being referred to Social 
Services. 
Extract from minutes of a meeting of Bosnian support workers, 19.10.94 
Above is an extract from the minutes of a meeting where the role of the Mid Term 
Support team was discussed. It is clear that the other agencies working with Bosnian 
refugees were unclear as to the role of the Mid Term Support team, and as to what could 
be expected from individual workers. The question was not clearly answered, and instead 
those present were told that anything related to benefits, education and grants could be 
considered part of the Mid Term Support team's remit. However, this is an extremely 
broad remit, and although it makes no reference to employment almost any other issue 
arising in the lives of the refugees could be considered the responsibility of the Bosnia 
Project. In addition, the speaker, who was a senior worker, emphasised the nature of their 
work as being task led and not time limited. This is a different response to that given by 
another senior worker during an interview carried out for this research (and stated 
previously in private), who said that caseworkers were supposed to support clients during 
the first six months, but could give extended support to vulnerable clients. This reflects 
confusion over the nature of Mid Term Support and the length of time it should be 
available for (Compass 1997, Graessle & Gawlinski 1996). The suggestion that 
vulnerable clients were to be referred to social services departments suggests that the 
Bosnia Project was not prioritising work, and instead of identifying vulnerable clients and 
giving them priority, it was identifying them and referring them elsewhere. Defining the 
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service as task led, when there was only limited working time available, also meant that 
caseworkers were more likely to prioritise the work of those who were most insistent, 
rather than those who were more vulnerable. 
The omission of employment from the list of tasks may have been accidental, but in 
practice caseworkers saw the seeking of employment as beyond their remit. In fact, some 
case workers were keen to have their clients avoid registering as unemployed, and 
preferred instead for them to be given some category whereby they no longer had to 
either sign on at the job centre or attend employment interviews. 
[One city's] Bosnians have been freed from signing on every week - we want this 
arrangement for every unemployed Bosnian in the region. Have any other teams come 
across this? 
Taken from Projector, the newsletter of the Bosnia Project, Winter 1994 
The leader of this team of Mid Term Support workers, quoted above, considered it a good 
thing that Bosnians in one city no longer had to sign on to collect benefits and instead had 
benefit books sent to them. However, the fact that they no longer had to register as 
unemployed removed the link between benefits and employment. It gave a message to the 
Bosnians that they were not expected to work, unlike ordinary residents of the city, and 
also removed one of the prime opportunities for finding work, looking at the 
advertisements in a job centre whilst registering fortnightly as unemployed. It also 
reflects a view of Bosnian refugees as victims, and people who are therefore incapable of 
work. This 'victimisation' of refugees should be avoided, since it leads to a failure to see 
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the potential of individual refugees (McFarland & Walsh 1989). However, this was an 
implicit assumption of much of the work with Bosnian refugees. 
Longer-term issues, such as employment, education, and the formation of community 
associations, were not addressed by the caseworkers, and these issues became the 
responsibility of the Community Development workers. 
Community Development Phase 
The community development phase was based on the model established in the latter stage 
of the Vietnamese programme, whereby community development meant facilitating links 
with the host community and local service providers, as well as assisting the members of 
the community to organise themselves as a community. In each regional team, 
development workers were appointed whose role was to assist in the development of 
community groups and to try to develop other sources of support for the refugees once 
the Bosnia Project was wound up. I was told at the time that the Bosnia Project had 
lobbied the Home Office for funding for community development work, and this had 
been successful. The Home Office then invited tenders for the supply of this work, and 
both the Refugee Council and Refugee Action submitted tenders. The Refugee Council 
bid was successful, and they appointed five Community Development Workers. In 
addition to these, Refugee Action worked with the newly formed community 
associations, in order to help with their organisation and funding applications. This was 
the only phase of the project when non-programme Bosnians could receive any form of 
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support from the Bosnia project, as the community associations were intended to serve 
the interests of all Bosnians in a particular area, regardless of status. 
The Bosnia Project agencies actively supported the establishment of Community 
Associations in the cluster areas, with assistance from sympathetic individuals and groups 
in those areas. Initially it was hoped that the community associations would take over 
much of the support work carried out by the Bosnia Project's Mid Term Support workers, 
but few have been able to do this. The formation and functioning of the community 
association is discussed in depth in chapter seven. 
The Community Development workers attempted to create links with existing service 
providers, in order that clients would have a source of support once the Bosnia Project 
ceased to function. The effectiveness of these community development workers is 
difficult to assess, as there were no clear objectives or particular targets that they were 
expected to achieve. The main focus of the work seems to have been on the role of the 
community associations, and during the course of this research I did not discover any 
positive interventions by the Community Development workers that was not connected 
with the community associations. None of the Bosnians I spoke to was aware of work 
carried out by the Community Development workers, although since this aspect of work 
did not involve the refugees directly their actions may have remained hidden. 
Problems with the Programme 
Despite having learnt some lessons from the experiences of the Vietnamese programme, 
the Bosnia Project was not without its flaws. These problems can be divided as arising 
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from two main areas. Firstly, the refugees were given temporary protection. This led to a 
programme which suffered from a lack of planning, short-termism, and the development 
of working practices which did not benefit the refugees. The lack of professional training 
of workers, an effect of the short term nature of the programme, led to individual working 
practices and discrepancies between workers and agencies. Secondly, the refugees were 
assumed to be victims, and this led to their becoming objects of policy and interventions, 
rather than actors within those policies. This in turn lead to their being little or no 
opportunity for the voices of the refugees to be heard within the programme, or within 
policy implementation. 
Lack of co-ordination between agencies 
The programme did not operate in the same way in all areas, and the exact way in which 
it operated depended on which agency was providing the service and the area of the 
country in which the work took place. 
In Dewsbury in Yorkshire, the reception centre and the Mid Term Support team were 
operated by the Refugee Council. Both teams used the same offices, and since the 
reception centre was close to the area in which refugees were being housed, it was easy 
for the refugees to maintain contact with the reception centre staff. BY contrast those who 
arrived at the Oxford reception centre were looked after by the Red Cross, but when they 
were housed they were moved to Coventry, Birmingham, or Hertfordshire. Once housed, 
their Mid Term Support was provided by the Refugee Council. Both of these systems had 
their own advantages and disadvantages. For those in Dewsbury, moving from the 
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reception centre was not particularly difficult. Because they were in an area close to 
where they had been staying they were already familiar with the geography of the area 
and many of the Bosnian people there. Because the two teams of support staff were in the 
same offices, the faces of the Mid Term Support team were already familiar and the 
clients knew exactly where to go to find them. The disadvantage with this, though, was 
that clients expected to receive the same high levels of support that they had been 
receiving from the reception centre. This made it difficult for the Mid Term Support 
team, since in the absence of clear guidance as to what they should and should not do, 
their hand was often forced by the demands of the clients. Staff often found it difficult to 
justify a refusal to carry out a task to clients. Clients also were able to approach reception 
centre staff and ask for assistance, or ask for intervention in order that the Mid Term 
Support team would provide assistance. This meant that the highly dependent relationship 
that developed between staff and clients in the reception centre was maintained after the 
client was housed. For those that moved from the Oxford centre, housing was a long way 
from the centre and return visits could only be made occasionally. Clients quickly 
realised that reception centre staff were unable to be of as much assistance as before, 
simply because they were so far away. When staff were asked to intervene in a client's 
dealings with the Refugee Council's Mid Term Support team, reception centre staff were 
able to say that they had no influence since they worked for a different organisation. This 
meant that the relationship that developed between former residents of Oxford and the 
Mid Term Support teams was not as dependent as that of former residents of Dewsbury. 
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Workers adopting individual practices 
The lack of clearly defined job descriptions and guidelines for working practices meant 
that caseworkers had to decide for themselves exactly what they would or would not do. 
Theoretically Mid Term Support was to be offered to people for the first six months after 
leaving the reception centre, and after that time they should manage on their own or be 
aware of other agencies that could help. The caveat was that the service could continue 
longer for those that were vulnerable. However, there was no definition of vulnerable, 
and workers were told informally that the service should be offered to all those that 
wanted it whilst there was funding to run the service. Many caseworkers were: 
...... flying by the seat of their pants. They it, eren'l sure hoit, to go about it. Only certain 
people knew what the procedures ivere. They learnt by their mistakes, by trial and error. 
Gradually you got standardised team meetings, they'd discuss what 1vas done and holt,. 
Often people ivere working against each other because they didn't know what they ivere 
supposed to do. " (Senior caseivorker quoted in Compass 1997) 
Lack of clear directions as to which tasks they should or should not perform meant that 
staff often developed their own individual working practices, with some refusing to do 
tasks that other workers carried out. 
Case study 
A disabled child had recently moved from a reception centre into permanent 
accommodation. The child needed to be enrolled in a school, and the special school staff 
asked if the mother and the child could visit before the first day in order that they could 
become familiar with the staff and the buildings. I made arrangements for this, and 
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contacted the local Mid Term Support worker in order that he could interpret and explain 
to the mother and child what was going on. He agreed to accompany the family on the 
school visit, but on the day of the visit he was on holiday and another Mid Term Support 
worker was taking over his caseload. This worker accompanied us as arranged, but 
afterwards said that he was very angry that he had been used in this way. He said that he 
was not supposed to interpret for me, only for Bosnia Project clients, and since I had 
arranged the visit I should have arranged an interpreter myself I explained that the other 
worker had agreed to the visit, but he replied that what other members of staff did was 
nothing to do with him. 
This case illustrates the difficulties faced by the staff, the clients, and those outside the 
Bosnia project, in knowing exactly what was the role of the Mid Term Support team 
caseworkers. One member of staff felt that a disabled child visiting a new school should 
be considered part of their caseload, whilst another did not. Some felt that their role was 
to interpret as well as offer advice, whilst others felt that they should not act as 
interpreters for other agencies. 
Caseworkers sometimes took on tasks that should have been the responsibility of other 
agencies. At times this was because of pressure from clients and the lack of clear 
guidelines on working practices meant that they had difficulty refusing. At other times, 
the caseworkers were keen to be seen to be doing something, and so would carry out 
tasks themselves rather than refer the client to someone else. Although this was not 
always problematic, it could create tensions between staff of different agencies, and could 
be counterproductive. 
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Case study 
When I began working with Bosnian refugees I was introduced to the Bosnia Project 
caseworker responsible for the area in which I worked. He was very helpful, and we 
agreed that I should share the room used for casework and take on some of the problems 
that people came with. One of the first clients that I saw wanted to know whether his 
brother would be arriving soon. The Bosnia Project worker explained to me that I needed 
to phone the Red Cross in London, and if they gave no answer then I should phone the 
UNHCR in Zagreb or IOM in Split. Despite making these calls I was unable to give him 
any news. 
Around one month later I was introduced to the Red Cross's refugee worker, whose role 
was to co-ordinate the Red Cross messaging and tracing service for all refugees, and to 
liase with Red Cross Head Office in London concerning family reunion for Bosnian 
refugees on the programme. She was very annoyed when I told her that I had phoned 
these other agencies. I apologised, but told her that I had not been aware that I should not 
contact these people. The Red Cross worker said that they had very strict procedures to 
follow, and attempts to circumvent the procedures were often counterproductive. 
Normally, either Zagreb or Split would contact the Red Cross in London and give them 
information on people who were about to travel to the UK as soon as the information was 
available. London would then contact their local worker, who would inform them of the 
progress. Attempts to circumvent this process were counterproductive, since it sometimes 
resulted in a file being removed from the pile of cases about to be dealt with and being 
replaced lower down the list. 
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This is one example of a caseworker being eager to demonstrate that he is achieving 
something, and also he probably had a genuine desire to help and inform the clients. 
However, his actions were not productive in this case, and instead led to delays in family 
reunion. It was also an unproductive exercise in the sense that there were no known cases 
of family arriving for family reunion without relatives being informed, and the 
caseworker might have saved a lot of time and effort if instead he had reassured the client 
that news would be passed on as soon as it arrived. It also served to increase tensions 
between the workers, who were from different agencies. It is also worth noting that the 
Bosnia Project worker was fully aware of the presence of the Red Cross worker, but 
chose not to inform me of her existence. The reasons for his omission of this information 
was stated at the time to be a lapse of memory, although at the time I found this 
explanation barely credible. 
Seeing the refugees as `victims' 
The length of time the project existed, combined with the generous funding and lack of 
clear guidelines, led to a way of working which promoted dependency among the clients. 
Caseworkers were unsure of when they could refuse to undertake a task, and refusals 
were often based on time constraints rather than a desire to see the clients do things for 
themselves. In the early stages of the programme workers would accompany people on 
driving lessons to interpret. Later, as more people arrived, there was not enough time for 
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them to do this, but they would go with them on the driving test to interpret. 
Caseworkers saw their role as one of helping people, and the way they helped was to do 
things for them. But by doing things for them, they deprived them of the opportunity to 
learn the skills for themselves. For the workers, it was often easier to flill in a form than to 
explain to someone else how to do it, but the legacy of this approach was that when the 
project ended the clients were still in need of substantial support. A senior member of the 
Bosnia Project staff wrote in the project newsletter: 
"The aim remains the empoiverment of clients in order to create seýf-sustaining 
communities but ive must guard against creating dependency on what 1vill he a time- 
limited caseivork service. " (Morrison 1994) 
So there was recognition at a high level within the project that the creation of dependency 
should be avoided. However, at the lower levels in the organisation, where contact with 
clients actually took place, the lack of clear guidelines for practice combined with a weak 
management system in the early stages of the project meant that there was a creation of 
dependency. Because they were unsure of which tasks they should or should not carry 
out, they tended to carry out tasks, which they thought they were capable of, and had the 
time to perform. 
Caseworkers had very little training, and were not taught to carry out tasks in a way that 
would increase the independence of the clients. Consequently, when asked to assist in 
completing a form, they would simply complete the form for the client and then show 
them where to sign. Many of these forms were routine, such as free school meals 
applications, electoral role forms, council tax forms, and so forth. Unsurprisingly, the 
same clients would return one year later needing the same forms filled in again. It would 
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have been better if the caseworkers had assisted the clients, encouraging them to fill in 
the form themselves as much as possible, and giving them a photocopy so that next time 
they would know what to do. This would make the clients more independent, improve 
their self-esteem, and empower them, since it would show that they were capable of 
carrying out such tasks themselves. Instead, the way of working created dependence, 
since the client did not learn how to carry out the task, and doing it for them reinforced 
their lack of skills. 
In the later stages of the programme this was recognised, and there were changes in the 
management and working practices for those clients who were part of the second stage of 
the project, but there was still a tendency to do things for the client rather than to show 
them how to do it themselves. In the short term this takes longer, but is better for the 
client in the long term, especially when a service is only available for a limited time. 
The Bosnia Project should not take all the blame for creating a measure of dependency, 
and staff from the project also blame other factors. These include the temporary 
protection status. But another factor was the involvement of other agencies. In some areas 
a worker was appointed by an organisation outside the Bosnia Project to support Bosnian 
refugees in a particular geographical area. These were sometimes from the local authority 
housing department, the local authority social services department, the health authority or 
a local advice agency. In some cases the Bosnia Project found that as they worked to 
overcome the dependency that had already been created, these newly appointed workers 
would be working in a different direction. A person newly in post would wish to be seen 
to be doing something, and they would encourage a dependent relationship. This led to 
tension between the Bosnia Project and some of these workers. In one area, for example, 
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the Bosnia Project established links with the local Citizens Advice Bureau. The CAB had 
long established guidelines on what tasks it could or could not do, and as the Bosnia 
Project prepared to close down it was agreed that clients who needed ongoing support or 
for whom problems arose at a later date, referrals should be made to the CAB. However 
in the meantime the local authority Social Services department appointed a worker to 
work with the local Bosnian population. This worker stopped the referrals to the CAB 
and took on the casework themselves. The result was the continuance of a dependent 
relationship, as this worker was willing to take on tasks that the CAB would have tried to 
get clients to do for themselves. In another area, a similar situation arose in reverse. The 
worker appointed by the local authority found that attempts to encourage people to do as 
much for themselves as possible were undermined by the Bosnia Project worker's 
willingness to do as much for the clients as possible. 
The workers in the mid-term support teams were called caseworkers, and they carried out 
their role by being based in a particular place and waiting for clients to approach them 
with their problems. They were usually based in offices, although in one area they used a 
large room lent to them by the local Red Cross branch for over a year. This building was 
adequate in some respects, in that it had plenty of seats and clients could make coffee 
whilst waiting their turn. However, there was no separate room in which clients could 
talk to the caseworker in private, and so any issues discussed and the outcome were 
clearly heard by everyone else in the room. This could be excused for a short time, since 
the Bosnia Project was established with very little time for preparation. However, the fact 
that the building was used for over a year suggests that privacy for the clients was not 
given a high priority. 
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Lack of training and professional social work values 
Younger caseworkers especially sometimes found the experiences of their clients during 
the war difficult to cope with. Clients often recounted their experiences, some of which 
were horrific, but there was no counselling available for the caseworkers to enable them 
to deal with this. 
Case study 
A worker from an advice centre explained to me why I should be careful when working 
with one of the caseworkers, and said that he failed to keep some information 
confidential and had a bad attitude towards his clients. To explain what she meant by this, 
she recounted and incident where a benefit claim by a particular client was being 
discussed by the two of them. This client had been subject to extremely severe treatment 
during his imprisonment and as well as physical scars he was impotent as a result. The 
caseworker had said his name, sniggered, and said he was the man that 'can't do it any 
more' 
The reaction of the caseworker was interpreted by the advice worker as a reflection of his 
uncaring attitude. The advice worker felt that he should not have disclosed the man's 
impotence to her, although she was already aware of it, and that his apparent amusement 
was unprofessional and showed poor judgement. To be fair to the caseworker, he was 
fairly young and was possibly laughing from embarrassment rather than because he did 
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not care. However, the lack of psychological support for the caseworkers meant that they 
had to develop a rather hard outlook in order to deal with what they were hearing from 
clients. 
The absence of clear guidelines as to their role and duties meant that many Bosnia Project 
staff had a difficult relationship with their clients. Staff in reception centres were placed 
in a difficult position when they refused a client, especially if a subsequent request to a 
different member of staff elicited the response the client desired. Clients sometimes 
interpreted this as an unwillingness to provide help to them as an individual, rather than 
as a policy decision. Clients were aware of actions taken by staff previously, and a refusal 
to carry out a task which had been done for another client sometimes led to accusations of 
favouritism. Providing a greater level of support to those who were considered vulnerable 
or in greater need could also lead to accusations of favouritism, especially since the 
reason why one family or individual needed more support than another was not always 
clear to the clients. 
As well as being accused of favouritism, staff were at times accused of corruption and 
theft, as was noted in one of the project evaluations (Graessle & Gawlinski 1996). These 
tended to arise as a result of misunderstandings, but they show the lack of communication 
between staff and clients, and also the lack of knowledge some of the staff had of the 
benefits system. Whilst in the reception centres, clients were given an amount of money 
each week with which to buy food. The amount was based on income support rates, but 
reduced slightly as the clients were not asked to pay towards heating, lighting and so 
forth. On moving into permanent accommodation the clients were given income support 
at the rate applicable to all persons in their situation, that is dependant on the number of 
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adults and children in the household. This was often more than they receivcd in the 
reception centre, and led some clients to ask what had happened to the difference. There 
was in fact no missing amount of money, since the payments whilst in the reception 
centres were not income support but a payment direct from the Bosnia Project budget, but 
some clients failed to understand this. 
The move to permanent accommodation was accompanied by an application for a 
Community Care Grant. These are grants made by the Department for Social Security 
intended for income support recipients to purchase items that their normal income 
support will not cover. The grants are discretionary, and the amount an individual is 
awarded is dependant on what they ask for, the DSS's assessment of what they need, the 
amounts which the DSS will make available for different items, and the amount of money 
the office applied to has available in their budget at that time. To this combination of 
factors must be added the fact that many different people in a centre would fill in the 
application forms on behalf of tile clients and would not always include the same items or 
ask for the same amount of money (the DSS will not give more for an item than is 
requested on the form, even if their internal guidelines suggest its cost is higher). The end 
result was that it was extremely unlikely that any two people would receive exactly the 
same amount of grant, even when their circumstances were broadly similar. However, the 
letters from the DSS merely state the amount given and the items it is intended to cover, 
and do not give a detailed breakdown of amounts awarded for different items. As well as 
leading to jealousies between clients, this also at times led to allegations of favouritism 
and corruption. Favouritism was alleged when clients felt that a worker had not tried as 
hard with their application as they had with another, or when they saw that they were not 
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awarded a grant for a particular item when another person was. Clients often failed to 
understand that the staff in the reception centre had no influence over the DSS and hence 
were not responsible for decisions made regarding community care grants. 
When staff tried to explain the reasons for variations in grants, they were often hampered 
by their lack of knowledge of the benefits system. As noted above, many of the staff were 
themselves refugees and had only been in Britain a short time. They were given briefings 
on the benefits system, and were often advised by workers from local advice services and 
law centres, but the benefits system is very complicated and staff sometimes were unable 
to understand why there were variations between the amounts people received. This 
meant that staff sometimes became frustrated, and felt pressured when clients continued 
to question the amounts they received. 
The Bosnia Project held several 'awaydays' for its staff, intended to give staff an 
opportunity to learn of the experiences of staff in other areas and to provide briefings and 
training. At one of these awaydays, staff from a reception centre presented a tableau 
illustrating the typical problems they faced. In this tableau, they showed a member of 
staff assisting two clients with their community care grant applications, and subsequently 
receiving different amounts of money. The clients were shown discussing the amounts 
they received and although both were initially happy the one who received the lower 
amount decided to confront the staff member to find out why. In the second scene, the 
client approached the member of staff angrily, demanding to kno%v where their money is 
and why the staff member treated them less favourably. The staff member explained that 
they did not decide how much money the client received, but an appeal could be made 
against the decision if the client was not happy. In the next scene, the client gets a revised 
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grant, and now has more money than their friend, although they fail to thank the staff 
member for their help. The final scene shows the second client angrily approaching the 
staff member, demanding to know why their friend has more money than them, and 
asking what the staff member has done with their money. 
This tableau was presented as a comedy, and many of those present found it very 
amusing, as it was a fairly accurate reflection of their experiences. I can remember that 
myself and a few others felt very uncomfortable, and felt that the staff were making fun 
of their clients, and also failing to understand the frustrations that clients sometimes felt. 
The fact that this tableau was created and recognised by staff in other reception centres 
shows that this lack of understanding of the benefits system was widespread, and also 
that the staff often failed to explain the system adequately to their clients. 
Differing backgrounds of staff and clients 
The Mid Ten-n Support team caseworkers and the bilingual workers in the reception 
centres came from a variety of backgrounds. In the area I studied for this research all the 
caseworkers were bilingual, although in other areas the caseworkers were sometimes 
British and used interpreters to communicate with clients. As with the reception centre 
staff some were refugees themselves, having left Bosnia in the early stages of the 
conflict, whilst others were from other areas of former Yugoslavia, and others were 
originally from Yugoslavia and had lived in Britain for many years. Staff in the reception 
centres were a mixture of British staff with a background in social work or refugee work, 
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and Serbo-Croat speakers form a variety of backgrounds. The refugee agencies had 
strong anti-d iscrimi nation policies, and employed staff according to their skills and 
abilities rather than their religion, and this was at times a source of conflict and disquiet 
for the residents. The nature of the war in Bosnia meant that ethnicity became extremely 
important, and those who had been held in the Serb-run camps were very wary of those 
who were Bosnian Serbs or from Serbia. Later arrivals had been held in Croat-run camps, 
and were distrustful of Bosnian Croats and anyone from Croatia. In addition, some were 
so insecure as a result of the war that they found it very hard to trust anyone from former 
Yugoslavia who was not a Muslim. These feelings combined to create some difficult 
situations, and some clients were very uncomfortable with the Serbo-Croat speakers. In 
the reception centres, some level of harmony could develop, since clients were usually 
able to see that the staff of all backgrounds behaved in similar ways. However, for clients 
dealing with the Mid Term Support workers, they usually saw these staff in isolation and 
were not able to gauge whether a Muslim member of staff would behave in the same 
way. In the reception centres, arguments that developed over the ethnicity of staff had to 
be resolved, since the clients were resident and the staff continued to be on the premises 
for much of the time. This meant that when disputes arose, British staff or other Serbo- 
Croat speakers could intervene and calm the situation. When the dispute was with a 
member of the Mid Term Support team there was usually no other staff present to either 
support the staff member or to calm the client, and instead the client would refuse to 
work with the Bosnia Project again. 
In all of the disputes that were reported to have arisen over the background of staff, I was 
unable to find an instance where the concerns of the refugees were given precedence over 
- 203 - 
the agencies' equal opportunities policies. All of the refugee agencies involved in the 
Bosnia Project had written equalities policies, and refused to use ethnic or racial criteria 
in their appointments of staff. However, these policies were unable to cope with the 
concerns of people who were recently arrived from a conflict where ethnicity was one of 
the major preoccupations of the protagonists. From the perspective of the agencies, they 
were asserting liberal principles which needed to be upheld. But from the perspective of 
the refugees, their concerns were being ignored and overlooked, and seen as unimportant. 
Failure to learn lessons of other programmes 
Although the Bosnia programme undoubtedly learnt some lessons from earlier 
programmes, some criticisms which were made of those early programmes can also be 
made of the Bosnia programme. Dalglish (1989), writing of the Vietnamese programme, 
suggests that the resettlement programme did not address the issue of employment, which 
directly contributed to the high levels of unemployment noted amongst Vietnamese 
refugees. She suggests that the use of several agencies may have "confused and 
complicated things" (p130). A further major weakness she identified was the lack of 
involvement of local authorities, despite the fact that local authorities were expected to 
provide various services to the refugees. These same three criticisms can be applied to the 
Bosnia programme. The Refugee Council (The Development of a Refugee Settlement 
Policy in the UK 1997) recognises that the question of employment for refugees has 
largely been omitted in programmes to date. The Bosnia programme's cluster areas were 
chosen according to the availability of housing and the willingness of housing providers 
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to accommodate those on the programme. Little, if any, attention was paid to the question 
of the availability of employment, contributing to high levels of unemployment among 
those on the programme. In the first few years of the project, unemployment levels were 
around 90% or higher. As time past some clients moved from benefits into employment, 
but there was little assistance from the Bosnia Project staff for those who wished to find 
work. There was also little encouragement to find work, as efforts were directed to 
maximising welfare benefits. By the end of 1999, most community associations estimated 
that around half to three quarters of their members eligible for work had moved from 
benefits to employment, though this does not include those who had been given disability 
benefits and were therefore no longer considered to be in the labour market. 
Levels and nature of support from existing service providers varied widely between 
areas. In some areas, the housing department was especially helpful, providing support 
and services to tenants beyond their normal role. In other areas, the health authority gave 
support, in still others the social services department. According to senior Bosnia Project 
staff the reason these particular services were so helpful seems to have been the result of 
the expression of interest by particular individuals in positions of influence. Despite 
research on the Vietnamese programme suggesting that greater involvement of local 
authorities would be beneficial (Dalglish 1989), the explicit search for support from local 
service providers did not begin until the later stages of the Bosnia programme, when it 
became clear that the service provided by the programme would soon be withdrawn due 
to the curtailment of government funding. 
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Lack of planning 
One of the lessons of earlier programme which had not been learnt when the Bosnia 
Project was established, was that although each refugee crisis may appear a discrete event 
and unpredictable, refugee crises may always occur. As such there is a need for a level of 
pre-planning, but at that time there existed no contingency plans to be used in the event 
of another refugee crisis (Graessle & Gawlinski 1996). Instead, refugee programmes in 
Britain have been characterised by ad hoquery (Joly 1996b). 
There was also little planning during the course of the programme. This was partly due to 
the urgent nature of the work, with the programme being established only a short time 
before the first arrivals, and partly due to the short term funding leading to short term 
thinking among staff. 
One of the major problems with the Bosnia Project was the use of temporary protected 
status. This was introduced for those on the programme, despite intensive lobbying 
against it by the Refugee Council. It had a tremendous effect on the refugees themselves, 
discussed in more detail in chapter six, but it also affected the agencies that might have 
offered support. Many service providers were reluctant to make provision for Bosnians 
on the programme because they thought that they would shortly be returning to Bosnia. 
This was not because the refugees talked about going back, but because their status 
carried an expectation of return. 
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Return to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Return is a missing aspect of the British programme for refugees from Bosnia 
Herzegovina. Despite being implicit in the conditions under which they were allowed to 
enter the country, there has been no organised programme for return, and no official 
statement as to the expectation of return. The change to indefinite leave to remain for 
those who have been in Britain for more than seven years was carried out without 
explanation, and without a commensurate guarantee that they will be allowed to remain 
permanently. Consequently, the question of return remains pertinent for the refugees on 
the programme. 
As the situation in Bosnia became calmer, some refugees did decide to return. The 
Refugee Council estimates that of the 2,500 who came under the auspices of the 
programme, 250 have returned to Bosnia thus far. This figure includes some medical 
evacuees who returned as soon as they were well enough to do so. The vast majority 
remain in Britain, and remain on short-term visas, although those that have been in 
Britain for seven years are now being issued with indefinite leave to remain. 
There is no organised programme of return for Bosnian refugees, unlike in some other 
European countries, although assisted return is available through IOM for medical 
evacuees. A travel concession was introduced for all refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
whereby they could travel at their own expense to Bosnia and remain there for up to one 
month, but retain the right to return to Britain and resume their previous status. This 
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concession had not been given to other refugees before this, and previously those with 
refugee status who returned to their country of origin were technically no longer refugees. 
The concession was intended to allow a visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina so that refugees 
could see the conditions for themselves and so make an informed decision on return. In 
1996 Edinburgh Aid, an organisation taking convoys of relief to Bosnia, offered to 
transport those wishing to return to Bosnia, along with their belongings. IOM began in 
1997 to pay passages for some refugees wishing to return by air, and recently began 
subsidising journeys made with Edinburgh Aid, although this ended in 1998. The leader 
of one Bosnian association told me that the subsidy was ended because very few people 
were choosing to return. Those travelling to Bosnia for an exploratory visit must pay their 
own travel costs. 
Many people have taken advantage of the travel concession to travel to Bosnia in order to 
visit relatives and find out more about the situation there. Contacts with relatives and 
former friends have allowed them to make their own assessment of the country, though 
very few have chosen to return permanently. Although the war is over, difficulties remain 
in Bosnia, and many people are still not living in the area from which they came. 
Case study 
Munira was forced to leave her home in the Herzegovina region by Croat soldiers. Her 
husband was working away and so avoided being arrested when the other men were 
taken. She left with her children, and eventually arrived in a town in a government- 
controlled area, and was told that there was no one living in a particular home. She went 
there, as there was nowhere else to go, and forced entry to the property. At first 
conditions were difficult, but after a fe%v months her husband found where she was living 
- 208 - 
and joined her there. Throughout the war conditions were difflicult, with shortages of food 
and fuel, and they were reliant to a large extent on food parcels from aid agencies. Now 
that the war is over they remain in the same house. Munira has made some additions to 
the property, such as a wood-burning stove in order to provide some heat, but. the 
property of the former resident is still in the house, and the former resident's name is still 
on the door. When the television broke, instead of replacing it they bought a new one, 
which sits on top of the old one. Munira has a part-time cleaning job, and her husband 
has also been able to find work, but their wages are lo%v and they have been unable to 
save. Munira said that she has never felt able to properly settle, as she always knew that 
the house belonged to someone else. In September 2000, almost seven years after she 
arrived in the house, she was told that the former owners had registered a claim to the 
property, but as yet she does not know what will happen about the claim. She is worried 
as she does not have the spare income to pay rent or the savings with which to buy the 
property. She does not consider that return is an option, as their former home was 
destroyed. If they went back to where they were from, they would have no income, no 
home, and as they would be the only Muslims in a Croat area they would not feel safe. 
Munira and her family are reluctant to move back to where they are from, even though 
the property situation means that their future in their current home is uncertain. Munira 
told me that her parents had returned to the area where they were from, but they were 
able to do so firstly because their home was empty but not totally derelict, and because 
they were old. She said that old people were more likely to be accepted, as they were not 
considered to be a threat. In contrast, younger people could potentially become involved 
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in fighting if the conflict restarted, and so the local population was less likely to accept 
them. Her case also illustrates the continuing uncertainty faced by many displaced 
persons within Bosnia-Herzegovina, who may have been living in a property for many 
years but who have to always be aware that the owners of the property might one day 
return, leaving them homeless. 
Many of those that are internally displaced are living in areas which were unfamiliar to 
them before the war, for example Serbs displaced from Sarajevo can be found in rural 
areas in Republika Srbska, and Muslims from Northern Bosnian villages can be found 
living in their vacated apartments in Sarajevo. Those who are displaced are often 
discriminated against when looking for employment, and often their skills are unsuited to 
the area in which they now live, and they may feel very frustrated by their situation. This 
makes them susceptible to propaganda and manipulation by nationalist politicians, who 
can exploit their fears of minority return and objections that some can return but they are 
unable to. Hostility and opposition to minority retums is often most fiercely expressed by 
those who are themselves internally displaced (Hallergard 1998). 
The importance of Munira's case is firstly that her story is typical of that of displaced 
persons within Bosnia, but also she is the sister of a refugee in Britain. This means that 
her relative in Britain is fully aware of the difficulties faced by those internally displaced 
and the difficulties involved in return. Those who have been displaced and are outside 
Bosnia face additional problems when considering whether to return (Who's Living in My 
House? 1997). The law on return of property has not been especially effective, and there 
are variations in the way it has been implemented and the procedures to be followed in 
different parts of the country (Phuong 2000). For those outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is 
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often difficult to make a claim, and they often are not in possession of documents which 
would provide proof of pre-war ownership. Even if they overcome these difficulties and 
are able to find somewhere to live, they often face discrimination when seeking 
employment. Both aid workers and Bosnian citizens told me that when jobs became 
available that there was a hierarchy of allocation. At the top were former soldiers, who 
were given favourable treatment because of their role in the war. Next came the people 
who were not in the army but are local to the area. After them, came the internally 
displaced, and behind them were those who had returned from abroad, who were thought 
by many to have spent several years living in relative luxury. Many people who were 
displaced from the Prijcdor, Kozerac and Banja Luka areas of Bosnia are now living in 
Una Sana. Refugees in Britain who have visited their family who are now in Una Sana 
say that there is a degree of discrimination against people who are not from the Una Sana 
canton, including poorer public services and problems with work and travel. 
In addition, for many of those outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, they left when the country 
was newly formed. They spent the largest part of their life as a citizen of Yugoslavia, 
resident in the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if they return it is to a country that 
they have not lived in before, and often to an area where they have not lived before. Their 
pre-war mode of living is no longer possible, since whereas before they lived in a multi- 
ethnic state, the Bosnia of today is made up of a patchwork of mainly mono-ethnic 
districts. Everything about their old way of life would be different, from their neighbours 
through their employment to the coins in their pocket. 
The result is that the number of returns to Bosnia-Herzegovina has been very low, and 
UNLICR estimate that between 1996 and June 2001 376,000 refugees have returned to 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 385,000 internally displaced persons have returned to the area 
they were from. These figures may appear large, but at the end of the war there were 
around a million each of refugees and internally displaced persons. Of the internally 
displaced, almost half returned to their homes in 1996 in the period after the Dayton 
Agreement, and the number returning in subsequent years has been much lower. The 
figure for refugee returns includes over 180,000 who had been in Germany, and most of 
these were not fully voluntary returns. In the first six months of 2001 there were only 
around 8,000 refugees who returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and only a handful of these 
had been staying in Britain (UNHCR 200 1). 
Conclusion 
The Bosnia Project, Britain's programme for refugees from Bosnia-l-lerzegovina, 
contained several features which distinguish it from previous refugee programmes. It 
was, though, an evolution of policy, rather than a wholly new set of policies. However 
although some of the changes were intended to benefit the refugees, the refugees 
themselves only appeared as objects or victims, and rarely were able to make informed 
free choices or have their opinions listened to. 
Selection for membership of the programme was via an opaque process administered by 
UNFICR, and the refugees had very little choice as to which country they travelled. 
Although once they were on the programme they could nominate dependants and other 
family members that they wished to join them, there were constantly changing criteria for 
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acceptance of nominations, and these criteria were never fully revealed. Consequently the 
refugees had little control over who was on the programme and which friends and 
relatives they were able to have with them. 
The decision to establish a programme was made at a time when Britain's attitude 
towards asylum seekers and refugees was the subject of much political discussion, and 
legislation was being formulated which was intended to discourage asylum seekers. 
UNHCR had recognised that many governments in Europe were questioning refugee 
protection, and supported the introduction of temporary protection measures in order to 
secure safety for the people who had been detained in camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
British government therefore agreed to establish a programme, but insisted that those on 
the programme have 
. 
temporary protection rather than refugee status. This was a 
departure for British policy, since Ugandan refugees had mostly been British passport 
holders, and Vietnamese refugees were given refugee status on arrival, so both those 
groups had a measure of security as to their future. In contrast, refugees from Bosnia 
were admitted temporarily, and had no idea of the length of their stay. They were also 
made aware that the length of their stay would not be their own decision alone, since the 
British government had the right to return them to Bosnia-Herzegovina when it felt it was 
safe to do so. 
The temporary status of the refugees affected many aspects of the programme. Because 
the refugees were supposed to be a temporary phenomenon, funding was initially only 
available for short periods of time, and the refugee agencies had to constantly return to 
the Home Office for extensions. The way the programme was funded, and the urgent 
nature of the work, meant that there was little time or opportunity for planning or 
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evaluation of practices. The short-term nature of the funding created difficulties with 
staffing, and often staff would leave at the point where they were becoming experienced, 
in order to gain more secure employment. The short term funding and the hurried way in 
which the Project was developed meant that there was little time to develop processes and 
systems, and little thought given to the arrangements for new services. There was very 
little central planning, and different agencies had different working practices for the same 
service. Consequently issues such as the creation of dependency were not considered 
until towards the end of the programme. 
Although some of the senior Bosnia Project staff had been involved with the Vietnamese 
programme, many of the reception centrc staff from that programme had gone on to work 
in other areas, and were not recruited into the Bosnia Project's reception centres. 
Consequently many of the lessons learnt in the reception centre phase of the Vietnamese 
programme were not passed on the Bosnia Project reception centre staff. This meant that 
issues such as dependency and client independence were not given consideration at the 
outset, and were given attention later as a result of problems that arose from working 
practices. Reception centre staff were in many ways reinventing the wheel of reception 
policies, since there had been similar experiences in the Vietnamese programme's 
reception centres. 
The lack of an established Bosnian population in Britain meant that recruitment of staff 
was difficult, and there were very few trained interpreters at the time that the Project 
started. The bi-lingual staff that were recruited were from a variety of backgrounds, but 
the ethnicised nature of the conflict in Bosnia meant that many of the refugees were 
mistrustful of the bi-lingual staff and unhappy with their presence. Although it is 
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important for refugee agencies to support equal opportunities policies, this does suggest 
that policies need to be sensitive to the needs of the clients. 
Mid Term Support was a new policy feature, and arose in part because experience with 
Vietnamese refugees showed that some level of support was necessary after leaving the 
reception centre. Although a welcome development, Mid Term Support suffered from the 
lack of clear guidelines as to the expectations of the service. Refugees had no way of 
expressing their dissatisfaction with the service that was offered or the way Mid Term 
Support operated, except by not availing themselves of the service, and even when they 
made demonstrations they had little or no effect on the operation of the service. Lack of 
staff guidance also meant that working practices were allowed to develop which created 
dependency, and so made it harder for the refugees to live independently. The use of 
caseworkers implied an individualised response to problems and issues that arose, and 
did not encourage the introduction of group services or the use of outside support 
services. 
The policy of using cluster areas instead of dispersal in small numbers throughout the 
country was introduced because of the perceived failure of dispersal for Vietnamese 
refugees. The policy has been deemed a success by the refugee agencies because of the 
relative lack of secondary migration among Bosnian refugees on the programme. 
However, the policy failed to incorporate employment issues, which was also a criticism 
made of the Vietnamese programme. This suggests that although some lessons were 
learned from experiences of the Vietnamese programme, not all the criticisms were 
considered in the creation of the Bosnia Project. In addition, the use of cluster areas did 
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not increase the choices for the refugees, but merely meant that greater numbers were 
placed in the same area. 
Return is the missing link of the Bosnia Project. Although the refugees had temporary 
protection and thus were expected to return, no programme for return was ever 
introduced. All refugees were free to return at any time, and medical evacuees could have 
their passage paid by IOM, but there was never any official announcement that it was 
safe to do so. Nor was there an announcement that since return was difficult for many, a 
change to a more permanent status would be made for the refugees. Instead, they 
remained on temporary protection status, despite remaining in Britain for many years. 
This sent conflicting messages to the refugees, since on the one hand they had only a 
temporary right to be in Britain, but on the other hand no arrangements were being made 
to return them and they were given long-term housing. 
In chapter seven I consider the effect of the policies of the Bosnia Project, especially the 
policies on community development, on the refugees as a group. I turn now to the effect 
of the policies on the individual refugees. They were treated within the Bosnia Project as 
objects of policy, rather than as social actors or individuals with voices and opinions. 
This has in turn affected the way that the refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina live their 
lives in Britain. In the next chapter, I examine the effect that this has had, and also the 
effects of the conflict in Bosnia and the expectation of return. 
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Chapter 6: The refugees as individuals 
Introduction 
This chapter looks at the decisions made about the lives of the refugees, who made those 
decisions and what choices the refugees had. I include some case studies for illustration, 
chosen because they are typical of the experiences that were recounted to me, and 
demonstrate some aspects of the experiences that many people had. 
I begin by looking at the refugees' perspectives of the war, and how they understand the 
conflict that took place, and then look at the processes involved in coming to Britain, and 
the extent to which they chose to travel here. Next I examine the effects of temporary 
protection on the refugees, and the relationship between this status and employment and 
learning English. I then look at the experience of the Bosnia Project from the perspective 
of the refugees, looking at what they thought of the project and the effect of the Project 
on the refugees. Finally I look at the way that Bosnian refugees are settling in Britain. 
Some have been in Britain for more than seven years, and I wanted to find out whether 
they were making long term plans to remain or whether their thoughts were geared 
towards questions of return. In each case, I am trying to find the extent of free choice in 
their decisions, and the amount of control they had over the events in their lives. It will 
become clear from the following discussion that there was in fact very little free choice, 
and the refugees had almost no control over what happened to them from the time that the 
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war started. They were largely disempowered, and control over the events of their lives 
rested with someone else or was dependant on events beyond their control. This 
manifests itself in different ways, and I examine the effects that this lack of control has 
had. All were to some extent caught up in a structure which disempowered them, and 
responded to this in different ways. Some people became angry with the Bosnia Project, 
and their rebellion against the Project workers acted as an impetus for action. Others 
seemed to be unable to act independently, and instead responded to their 
disempowerment by apparently being unable or unwilling to make positive decisions 
about their lives when the opportunity arose. This in turn led to the phenomenon that 
initially prompted this study, the situation where the majority of Bosnians seemed to be 
waiting for something to happen. 
Don't talk about the war 
For all the informants, and many of the Bosnian refugee population, memories of the war 
are still fresh. Despite being questioned up to seven years after leaving their country and 
almost eight years since the outbreak of hostilities, minute details of their day to day 
existence during the conflict could be recalled. Such was the immediacy of these 
memories that many would begin talking about what had happened to them without direct 
questioning. The impression obtained is that these memories and experiences of war are 
what have determined the future course of their lives, and one cannot comprehend their 
situation now without understanding their history. 
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The exact causes of the war can be debated, and are discussed in detail in the chapter on 
the conflict in Bosnia. The relationship between the conflict and Bosnians as a group is 
discussed in the next chapter, but in this chapter I am trying to understand the relationship 
between the conflict and individuals. An interesting question, perhaps, is whether 
anybody saw it coming. With hindsight, one can point to the role of the media in Bosnia 
and Serbia and its use of propaganda, or the rise of ethnically or nationally based parties, 
but to what extent were ordinary people prepared for or expecting war? People offered 
conflicting reports of how the war began and why, but were agreed on one thing - they 
did not believe that whatwas going on in their country would result in war. Even when 
fighting started in other areas, they believed they would be safe because they had always 
got on with their neighbours. People's perceptions and understanding of the conflict is 
important, as it is the conflict which has created their situation as refugees. 
"The ivar was a big shock to me, I never thought I would see those things in my countl),. 
Even now I can't understand why these things start. " Vahida. 
Vahida lived in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, and despite the fact that a war had broken 
out in both Slovenia and Croatia after they declared independence from Yugoslavia, she 
did not believe that the same would happen in Bosnia. Though she had lived through the 
pre war period and the early stage of the war in Sarajevo, reading reports in the 
newspapers and hearing the discussions of politicians on the television, the outbreak of 
the war came as a shock to her. As she says, she still cannot understand why the war 
started or why it continued for so long. This meant that when the war did start, she was 
not mentally prepared for it, and although she had voted for Bosnia's independence 
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Vahida Nvas shocked at both the outbreak of the conflict and the ferocity of the fighting. 
Samed makes similar comments: 
" When the fighting started we all thought our village would be OK, because we never 
had any problems with the Serbs. By April you couldn't just go into the town you had to 
show the [ID] card .... The radio and TV were allfilled with the Serbs andfighting, and 
still we say 'Oh, it won't come'. " Samed 
Looking back on the months leading up to the war, Samed thinks that perhaps he should 
have seen the war coming, but admits that he didn't, and neither did most of the other 
people in his village. Although he lived in a village that was predominantly Muslim, he 
had friends who were Serbs, and had never experienced any problems connected with 
religion. In fact, everyone I spoke to claimed friendships with people of other religious 
backgrounds. 
"Before the ivar I hadfriends that were Serbs. One man was a very goodftiend, he came 
in my house and I came in his house. [later, speaking of time in concentration camp] 
.. that Serb ftiend, he came and brought me food. " Suhro 
The presence of close friendships with non-Muslims added to the confusion as to the 
meaning of the conflict. As I discuss in the chapter on the origins of the conflict, Muslims 
did not live their lives separate from those of Croats and Serbs, instead they were woven 
together by work, friendship, and sometimes marriage and kinship. To suddenly be 
singled out for treatment based on a category of identity that had not been important 
before was difficult to understand. 
Saying that they thought their village would be safe, because the people there had never 
had any trouble with Serbs, suggests that people felt that there had to be some personal 
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reasons for the conflict. They seem to have thought that other places where the conflict 
had already broken out had somehow provoked their Serb neighbours, and hence 
prompted the fighting. Since they themselves had done nothing to provoke their 
neighbours and had always been on good terms, then logically their neighbours would not 
turn on them. To an observer this may seem like a naYve attitude, and perhaps it was, but 
it indicates how little the average person understood of what was going on around them. 
Even after the fighting had started, they thought what was going on was locally based, 
driven by personal motives, and led by people that could be reasoned with. Instead, when 
the fighting finally came to the village it emerged that it was not angry neighbours they 
were dealing with but professional soldiers following orders given many miles away. 
This realisation meant that the war was a double shock. First, they had not expected war 
to happen, but then when it did they found that they were targeted not for any particular 
action they had taken, but because of who they were. The war and their involvement in it 
was therefore outside their control, and although they could try to affect the outcome by 
defending their villages, they were not in a position to dictate the course that the war 
took. The arrival of the war in their village meant that they were targets because they 
were Muslim, and not because they had offended their neighbours. At the same time, 
though, they had not developed and had no commitment to a specifically Muslim project. 
When their villages came under attack, it came as a surprise, even if the next village had 
been attacked the day before. All the people I met during the course of this research 
reported that they never expected the war to reach them, until the day it actually came. 
Those that took up arms did so in order to defend their village when it came under attack, 
and did not launch pre-emptive attacks themselves. 
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The war in some ways came out of the blue, though for some months leading up to the 
start travel between villages and towns in Northern Bosnia became more difficult. There 
were roadblocks at some villages, and to travel to nearby towns identity cards had to be 
shown. Rather than seeing this as the prelude to a war, many seem to have interpreted it 
as anxiety arising from the war in Croatia, and an anxiety that would soon pass. 
Friendships between people of different religions were maintained right up to and even 
after the start of the war. 
At the time when Croatia declared independence, many Bosnian Serbs joined reserve 
units in Bosnia and prepared to join the fighting there in order to defend Yugoslavia. But 
there were also Bosnian Croats and Muslims that joined, though in lesser numbers. One 
man estimates that over 90% of Serbs in his area joined, and about 10 to 20% of 
Muslims. His Serb friends urged him to join, but he was reluctant to because he did not 
want to go to war. This suggests that though differences between the different religious 
groups were emerging there was still very little to indicate that the next battle would be 
within Bosnia. 
One couple had a child that was taken ill and needed hospital isation. They took him to 
the local hospital and were told to phone the next morning to find out his condition. On 
ringing the next morning, they were told that he was gravely ill, and had been transferred 
to Sarajevo hospital. They were poor, the husband had work to do, and they had another 
small child, so they were unable to travel to Sarajevo immediately, and instead planned to 
travel there the next day. Sadly, the next day was the day that the Post Office was 
bombed in Sarajevo, the war started and travelling to Sarajevo became impossible. The 
mother was reunited with her son eighteen months later, though the father died without 
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ever seeing him again. If the staff at the local hospital suspected that war was about to 
break out, would they have transferred a child to the hospital in Sarajevo without either 
informing the parents or suggesting that they go with him? 
Differences between Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats 
The fighting in Bosnia was portrayed in the media and by many of the protagonist in 
ethnic terms, but there is a question as to the reality of the alleged ethnic differences. Just 
how apparent were the differences between these three groups? For the people I 
interviewed, the differences only became relevant at around the start of the conflict. For 
many, the differences were not apparent before 1990, and even then were not important. 
Contrary to Bringa's findings (Bringa 1995), the people I interviewed said that there was 
no difference in the style of houses used by people of different religions. 
"Ify house ivas one storey, ii, ith two side roof. Most ii, ere two or three storeys. More 
modern houses had tivo side roof, and older houses usually had the four side roof 
Modern houses usually ivere one storey ivilh rooms in the roof, and no cellar. " Ferid 
"No, there ivas no difference in the houses. You couldn't tellfrom the houses. The next 
village ivas all Serbs people, and the only difference was they might have pigs in the 
garden. Muslim people don't keep the pigs, just chickens and coit, s. They sometimes had 
pigs as ivell. But that ivas the only difference. " Eldina 
"You seen picture from my house. That house was built by my father, it ivas old house. 
But people been in the Germany they come back and build neit, house, they build different 
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ii, ay. Some house is old, some house is neu,, that is difference in the houses, not the 
people in them. " Suhro 
So it seems that it was not possible to discern the ethnicity of a house's inhabitants from 
the style of the architecture. How, then, was it possible to tell people apart? There had to 
be some way of distinguishing people in order for the level of violence that occurred to 
take place. Throughout the war, people were deliberately targeted because of their 
ethnicity, so how did the other side know this? 
Informants repeatedly asserted that there were no physical differences between the 
different groups. 
"We all look same, dress same, you can't tellfrom looking. " Zarfia 
"Ifyou see me and myftiends ivalking in the pub you can't say is, hich is Serb or Croat or 
Muslim, ive all same, same colour, samejace, everything. " Same d 
"I can't see any difference between me or Serb man or Croatian man. " Sejo 
Accents were also no guide as to whether an individual was or was not Muslim. People 
have regional accents in Bosnia, and in fact use different words for the same things in the 
Herzegovina region compared to the rest of Bosnia, but all the people in a particular town 
speak with the same accent regardless of religion. In Herzegovina, people use the word 
'kruh' for bread, whereas in the rest of Bosnia they usually say NeW. Someone in 
Herzegovina, which is predominantly Muslim and Croat, would assume that a person 
using the word NeW was Serb, but in the rest of Bosnia saying Web' would not indicate 
anything at all. Language use and accents were regionally based rather than religiously 
based. 
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To explain how the Serb soldiers were able to identify Muslims, theories were proposed 
which may or may not be true, but which rely on the involvement of people from outside 
the area and the use of information held by the authorities. At its inception, the state of 
Yugoslavia recognised the categories of 'Serb' and 'Croat' as nacije- which translates 
roughly as ethnic group or nation. These categories were used in the census. For those 
who were Muslim and living in Bosnia, they had to choose to put themselves into one of 
these categories, or call themselves Yugoslavs. In 1960, the category 'Muslim' was 
added as a nacije. From that date on, Muslims could identify themselves as such in the 
census, but this also meant that the state could identify them. 
"We didn't know then, hut after ive find out. All the Muslim peoples have the same 
number in the same place on their ID cards. We didn't know that. And so they could 
come on the buses and look at the cards, and know who is Muslim and who is Serhs. You 
can't tellfrom the names, because some people have names the same as Serb or Croat 
people. So they couldfind oulfrom the cards. " Eldina 
Although I cannot prove this story to be untrue, I am fairly sure that it is not true. I have 
seen some people's identity cards, and there did not seem to be a common number string 
that could have been used as a code of identification. The importance of this story, 
though, is that people have tried to understand why they were singled out, and one of the 
reasons they have fixed on stories such as this is it does not depend on assigning 
particular characteristics to Muslims. Another reason, and one which applies also to the 
other accounts, is that it suggests some degree of advance planning in order that Muslims 
could be distinguished from others. 
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"That man that questioned me in the camp. I kneiv him before. He ivas in charge in an 
office in our tou, n and he sent peoplefor their military service. He kneit, everything about 
its, he kneiv like ivho is Serb or Croal or Muslim. " Alya 
This account seems to me more credible, since all men had to perform national service 
and at the time of entering would declare their religion in order to receive the appropriate 
ceremony if they happened to be killed. Alija's account again suggests that there was a 
degree of planning involved, in order that the person with access to this information was 
one of the men in charge of the camps. 
"The census used to come andput head of household there and all your property there, 
all counted even ivhich hen and chicken, and they realised hou, quick the Muslim people 
ivas developed and hou, rich they got in feu, years time, and that's it, hy, they realised, 
they took the census and smv, you knoiv, the difference in properi)ý maybe that's it, hy, 
they seized the best opportunity to start some sort of trouble. " Samed 
Samed's account again seems quite plausible, and although simple jealousy may not have 
been the cause of the war the information from the census may well have been used to 
determine which villages were to be targeted and combined with national service 
information would give a lot of information as to where Muslims were likely to be found. 
Whatever the real causes of the war, for the ordinary people the causes were 
incomprehensible. They found themselves caught up in a war, and were involved without 
having been offered an opportunity to decide whether they wanted to be involved or not, 
and on identity criteria which had categorised that without their commitment to that 
identity. 
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Coming to Britain 
When talking about coming to Britain, I asked the Bosnians why they were in Britain and 
not another country. Many had relatives in other countries in Europe, and yet they were 
in Britain with few, if any, close relatives. I wanted to know more about the decision- 
making process that they went through before arriving, and the range of options that were 
open to them. In other words, did they make a positive choice to come to Britain? 
For those who came as part of the programme, there was little or no choice as to which 
country they would go. Whilst in Croatia recovering from their time in concentration 
camps, it was explained to the ex-detainees that they could leave and go to a safe country 
until the war was over. The government in Croatia was also unwilling for refugees that 
had been brought in by the Red Cross to remain indefinitely in Croatia, and was keen for 
as many as possible to be relocated to other countries. This meant that in considering 
their options, remaining in Croatia was not a long term solution as there was no reason to 
assume that they would be allowed to remain there. Many Bosnians had either worked 
abroad themselves or had family that worked abroad, and so they had pre-existing links 
to certain countries. In addition, some were aware that family or friends had already 
escaped the area and were in another European country, so many expressed a desire to go 
to a particular country, usually Germany, Austria or Switzerland. But these countries to 
which they had links were also the countries with the largest populations of refugees from 
the conflict in Yugoslavia and were unwilling to accept many more. After an appeal by 
the UNHCR, places were offered in other European countries. Ex-detainees were told 
that their names could go on a list for a country, and asked which country they preferred. 
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All the people I spoke to said that though they had asked to go to Germany, Austria or 
Switzerland they were told that the lists were full for those countries. Some were then 
given a choice between Britain and Norway or Britain and America, others were told that 
the only place with spaces on the list was Britain. Those who chose Britain did so either 
because it was the only country they had heard of, or because it was closer to Bosnia and 
so it would be easier when the time came to return. I have not yet spoken to anyone who 
made a positive choice to come to Britain. Some had no choice in the matter at all. Others 
were given a very limited choice, and they came to Britain because they felt there was 
nowhere else to go. Most knew very little about Britain, some were only vaguely aware 
that England and Britain were more or less the same place, and that London was a city 
not a country. The decision to leave Croatia was not a decision to go to Britain, it was a 
decision to follow the directions being given by UNHCR and get on a plane taking them 
out of the area of the conflict. Instead of feeling that they were going to somewhere, they 
felt they were getting away. It may have been possible to refuse to leave, and to insist on 
staying in Croatia, but none of those that came on the programme admitted to arguing 
with UNHCR and the Red Cross. They felt that they were dependant on these 
organisations, and since these were the people that had got them out of the camps they 
had to do as they were directed. 
Reception centres 
On arrival in the UK, the allocation of individuals to reception centres was via an opaque 
process. According to information given to me during interviews with Bosnia Project 
- 228 - 
staff, allocations were based on a loose formula taking into account the number of spaces 
in each reception centre and a desire to avoid having too many single men in any one 
centre. In addition, family ties were sometimes taken into consideration, so brothers 
would be sent to the same centre, but this did not always happen. However, only senior 
staff were involved in the discussion of who went where, and the staff at the airports 
meeting the refugees were given lists from which there were no deviations. If the 
allocations process was unclear to the Bosnia Project staff, it was even more unclear to 
the refugees themselves. They had no idea why they were going to one centre and not 
another, but since they had no idea where the different centres were or how long they 
would be staying there, most did not question their allocation. 
One group of men did object to their allocations to different reception centres. Five men, 
three single and two whose wives' whereabouts was at the time unknown, had been held 
in the same camp in Herzegovina and become friends. During their time in the camp they 
helped each other as much as they could, and when released from the camp by the Red 
Cross they stayed together. On arriving in Croatia they were housed in the same holding 
centre, and agreed to go to Britain since they seemed to have no opportunity to go 
elsewhere. They were put on the same plane to travel to Britain, and after they boarded 
they shuffled the other passengers around so that they could sit together. When they got 
off the plane, they heard their names being called and realised they were being put on 
different buses. One of them objected and asked if he could go on a different bus. He was 
told that was not possible, as the other bus wasn't going to the same place. It was at this 
point that the men realised they were being split up, and were being sent to three different 
reception centres. They all then complained, and said they were only going if they all 
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went together. The discussion with Bosnia Project staff became quite heated, but they 
were told there was no possibility of changes, they had to go where they were told. 
Eventually, because everyone was tired and none of the buses could leave, they agreed to 
go where they were told on the understanding that Bosnia Project would try to move 
them as soon as possible so that they could be together. According to the men, it took two 
weeks of angry exchanges before they were reunited. These were the only people I knew 
who had changed reception centre, and their version of events suggests that it took a lot 
of persuasion for the change to happen. A member of staff at the reception centre where 
one of the men spent two weeks remembered the man a year later, when lie passed me a 
list of all their residents and where they had gone. I pointed to the name and said that this 
man was now living in Westham and that his family had recently arrived. The member of 
staff said he remembered the man, and that he had done nothing but complain since he 
arrived and demanded to be moved to be with his friends. This group of five was an 
exception, as everyone else seems to have followed the directions given by the Bosnia 
Project and gone to the reception centre that they were told to go to. As I say in the 
chapter on the Bosnia Project, the reception centre that an individual was sent to was the 
prime determinant of their future housing location. Once within the structure of the 
Project, there was little room for personal choices, and those seeking to change the 
arrangements had to battle with the bureaucracy of the Bosnia Project. 
For those who came to Britain on convoys, there was similarly little choice over where 
they ended up. They had been in a refugee camp in Croatia or Slovenia, when some 
people arrived and offered to take some of them to Britain. The people in the refugee 
camps were then offered a choice to be made in a very short period of time. Should they 
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get on this bus and go with these strangers, or should they stay where they were and hope 
things would get better? Those that came to Britain are those that made the choice to get 
on the bus, but it was not because the bus was going to Britain, it was because the bus 
was taking them out of the refugee camp. Indeed, some got on the buses not knowing 
which country they were being taken to, such was their desire to get to safety. 
On arrival in the UK, convoy refugees were housed wherever their rescuers could find 
places for them. This led to great disparity between groups. Some were housed initially 
with sympathetic British families or in church halls until something more permanent 
could be arranged. Then they were given a place of their own. In some cases this was a 
house or flat rented from a housing association. In other cases they were given privately 
rented accommodation. 
For both groups, then, control over where they lived was largely in the hands of someone 
else and at the whim of someone else. For the individuals themselves, there was little or 
no choice as to where they went, and the processes determining the choices made by 
others were not apparent. However, a crucial difference lies in the stage at which they 
became a refugee. Those on the programme did not in any way chose to become 
refugees, instead they report being put in a situation not of their making. Those from 
Northern Bosnia were involved in fighting defending their village, and then were either 
caught or surrendered to their captors. The decision to surrender was not a positive one, 
as they knew that there was no alternative. All the surrounding area was in the control of 
Serb forces, and there was a choice between surrendering or fighting to death. Many of 
the men from the Herzegovina region did not even become involved in fighting. Most 
were interred in the camps there after being arrested by Croat forces. On the first of July 
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1993, a highly organised process began whereby Muslim men were taken from their 
homes and placed in lorries, then transported to camps. Those who offered any resistance 
were severely beaten. A few days after the men were taken, soldiers went again to their 
homes and ordered any family remaining there to leave, and other people were allocated 
their home. One man's home was very close to the camp that he was interned in. At night 
he could see his balcony, and after a few days he saw a man on his balcony in the 
evening, smoking a cigarette. He knew then that his wife and child were no longer in the 
home, but had no idea whether they were alive or dead. 
For those that came on convoys, they had already made one positive decision about their 
future by deciding to leave. They left their home after hearing reports of fighting or when 
the conflict got closer, and most were not actually involved in the fighting. 
Case study I 
Suhro was released from the camps by the Red Cross and brought to Croatia to recover. 
His wife, who had been taking refuge in Croatia since the men had been arrested, joined 
him in Zagreb. The Red Cross told Suhro that he could be put on a list to go to another 
country, and he asked if he could go to Austria. Suhro was born in Austria, as his father 
had been working there. His father was now of retirement age but had remained in his job 
in Austria when the war started. Suhro, kne%v that his mother, brother, sister and various 
aunts and uncles were in Austria, so he was keen to go there to await the end of the war 
so that he could be with his family. He was told that the list for Austria was full, and that 
if he wanted to leave Croatia he could go to Britain. He was also told that Britain was still 
accepting family members, and since he had an aunt who was disabled who also could 
not go to Austria he decided to put his name on the list for Britain. He and his wife were 
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then given a flat in Westham after their stay in a reception centre, and a few months later 
his aunt joined them. Ile has a cousin also living in Westham, another relative in 
Southam and a few relatives in London. Most of his family are in Austria or have 
returned to Bosnia. 
Suhro, as can be seen from this case study, did not want to come to Britain. He realised 
when in Croatia that it would be almost impossible to join the rest of his family in 
Austria, and travelling to Britain represented the only opportunity to get his wife and aunt 
to a safe place. It was not a positive choice, but instead a decision was forced on him by 
circumstances beyond his control - the unwillingness of the Austrian government to 
accept any more refugees, and the willingness of the British government to take some of 
the people released from the camps. Suhro was also aware that the war in Croatia had 
only recently ended, and there was no guarantee that Croatia would remain safe for 
Muslims, so he did not feel that staying in Croatia was a long term option. 
Case study 2 
Ferid was brought by the Red Cross to Croatia. He left the accommodation they had 
provided to stay with his brother in Zagreb. He knew he couldn't stay long with his 
brother as there was not enough room. His wife and two children were already there, 
having made their way to Croatia after Ferid was arrested. The Red Cross told him he 
could go on the list for America but he didn't want it because America was too far away. 
He was told that many countries were already full and didn't want any more refugees. 
Then the next time he saw the Red Cross they told him that there were places on the list 
for Britain. He decided to take that, but says that if he had the choice he would have gone 
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to Austria where he had a sister or Germany where he had several relatives. His wife's 
family were mainly in Holland, and he would have liked to go there also. He has family 
now in America, Bosnia, Croatia, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, but in Britain he has 
just one brother, who arrived after Ferid. There are a few people here that he knows by 
sight from before the war, but no friends or relatives other than his brother. He was told 
nothing before he came. At the airport people started calling out names. A woman called 
out his name and said 'he is for Rugby. ' Ferid heard her, and replied 'No, I am too old for 
Rugby! ' Then the woman explained to him that Rugby was a place he would go to in 
England. 
Again Ferid's decision to come to Britain was not a positive decision. He had been 
presented with three options - to go to America, where he knew no one and which was a 
long way from Bosnia, to go to Britain, where he also knew no one but which was at least 
in the same continent, or to stay where he was, in a country that did not want him living 
in the house of a relative who didn't have room or resources enough to support all Ferid's 
family. 
Ferid's account of his arrival, and his misunderstanding of the meaning of 'Rugby', 
shows three things. Firstly, Ferid had very little knowledge about Britain before he 
arrived here, and was not aware that rugby was a town as well as a game. Secondly, he 
had not been given very much information before he arrived. Someone had made a 
decision as to which reception centre he would be sent to, but this was not discussed with 
him before he arrived and he was given no pre-arrival briefing on what to expect. Finally, 
if his account is correct, the people there were talking about him rather than to him. When 
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he recounted this story to me, it was clear that from his perspective the conversation that 
was going on was being conducted between Bosnia Project employees, and he was 
listening rather than being spoken to. 
Case study 3 
Zarfa's husband, Senad, was working as a chef in Slovenia when the war in Bosnia 
started. When it looked to Zarfa as though her village would be attacked soon, she 
decided not to stay there any longer. She loaded her children and a few possessions into 
the car and set out to drive to join her husband. She got to Slovenia, but there was a road 
block stopping any more refugees from travelling into Ljubljana. The soldiers there told 
her she could not go into the city, and directed her instead to a refugee camp. Once there, 
she phoned her husband to tell him where she was. He left his work to go to see ho%v she 
and the children were, and stayed with them in the refugee camp. A few weeks later a bus 
arrived, and the people on it offered to take some people to Britain. Other buses had 
arrived, and other people had left. The family decided that conditions were not very good 
at the camp, and decided to take the next bus they were offered a place on. This was a bus 
organised by a former social worker from the north of England, and all the people were 
taken to the north of England initially. They were given rooms in the homes of English 
people until permanent accommodation could be found for them. The former social 
worker had links with a senior staff member of a housing association, and this association 
had been offered temporary use of some homes in the Midlands. These were offered to 
the family, as well as six other families. Zarfa and Senad accepted, as they found it 
difficult living in someone else's house. 
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They have learned that their house has been badly damaged, and that it is now within the 
Serb controlled part of Bosnia. The parents of Zarfa, whose home was about two 
kilometres away from the family's home, are still in their house. Though it was damaged 
during the war they have been able to repair their home. 
Zarfa, in contrast to the other two cases mentioned here, made a positive choice to leave 
her home. She knew that the war was coming, she was scared, and she decided not to risk 
staying in her village because it was too close to a predominantly Serb area. She chose to 
go to Slovenia because that is where her husband was working, though by the time she 
arrived Slovenia had stopped allowing refugees into the towns and was sending them to 
camps instead. , 
The rest of her story, though, shows that later on her family was presented with a very 
limited range of choices, though the choice was not as stark as for Ferid and Suhro. There 
was no one to tell her that they had to go somewhere because their host country didn't 
want them, or to say that other countries were full, but it was clear that there was no 
organisation behind the arrival of the buses, and so no guarantee that waiting would result 
in more options. 
Religion 
The majority of people that came on the programme defined themselves as Muslim, but 
this is not an unproblematic definition. There is an image that is prevalent in Britain of 
how a Muslim should be, based on the habits and practices of those Muslims who draw 
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their origins from Pakistan and India. This image is of women who cover their hair and 
dress in long clothes, and with a notion of Islam as a way of life, incorporated into every 
aspect of behaviour. Unlike British Christians, British Muslims are thought to pray 
regularly and attend mosques. They are considered devout, even fundamentalist. Indeed, 
the predominant image is one of fundamentalism. 
This is in contrast to how Islam was practised in Yugoslavia. The regime in Yugoslavia 
was Communist from 1944 until the country's collapse, and though it permitted religious 
worship it was not strongly encouraged. The country embarked on a programme of 
modernisation, and along with modernisation of industry and agriculture, there was 
encouragement for the modernisation of the people as well, and towards the separation of 
religion from the rest of society. Religion was a private act, and thus it was not proper to 
be overtly religious or to display strong religious imagery when in public. Muslims in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina were not a minority, and certainly not an oppressed minority. Hence 
they had not developed a committed project to defend or protect their religious identity. 
Networks and boundaries of social action were not well defined, either in public or in the 
private domain. 
In Britain, church and state are not separated in the same way that they were in 
Yugoslavia, but ordinary society is predominantly secular. Religion is largely a private 
matter, but public space is given to religion in some spheres. In education, religious 
education involves the teaching of many faiths, not just Christianity, and pupils are taught 
about the way different religions are practiced. When Bosnians arrived in Britain, they 
arrived in a country that already had a strong Muslim community. Most Bosnians that 
came on the programme were also Muslims, but the perception they had of themselves 
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was different to that initially held by the majority society. Because there was an existing 
Muslim population with a strong religious tradition, it was assumed by both the majority 
society and other Muslims that Bosnian Muslims would be broadly similar to British 
Mýslims. However, Bosnian Muslims had a different perception of themselves, and were 
keen to point to the ways in which they were different to British Muslims. 
"We are not like those 11uslimsfrom Pakistan, ive are modern. " Eldina 
This is a quote from an interview in Yorkshire, but it could have been taken from almost 
any interview where religion was discussed. Bosnian Muslims considered themselves to 
be modern, and considered British Muslims as very different from themselves. This 
difference is important in understanding the level of support that Bosnian Muslims would 
receive from British Muslims. 
Initially it was expected by the Refugee Council, local support groups and indeed most 
people working with Bosnians, that housing Bosnians in areas where there already 
existed a Muslim population would be beneficial. The rationale behind this thinking was 
that ther e would be cultural and behavioural similarities between both groups of 
Muslims, and so those British Muslims would be able to offer support and advice. In 
practice, though British Muslims often did offer help initially, this was often rejected 
after a short- time. The 'help' offered by British Muslims was based on the fact that they 
perceived Bosnian Muslims to be the same, and to have the same religious beliefs and 
practises. But for Bosnian Muslims, what they were being offered appeared not help, but 
direction and guidance. 
In many cases, the first support that was offered was directions to halal butchers. For 
British Muslims, eating meat that has been butchered in line with halal guidelines is 
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extremely important. But in Yugoslavia, many Muslims did not eat halal food. Halal 
butchers were rare, and many of the people I interviewed had never bought halal meat 
until they came to Britain. Instead they understood eating halal as meaning they should 
not eat pork, and did not consider the way that the animal was killed was of great 
importance. When they tried to tell their neighbours that they could buy meat cheaper at 
the local supermarket, they were met with shock and disgust. 
"My neighbour tell me, you no eat halal you go to hell. I tell hiln in the camp I ate 
anything. We were all starving men. If we don't eat we die, and if they give me pork I eat 
pork. " (Samed) 
Samed was angry at his neighbour's attitude, and insulted at their suggestion that God 
would punish him for not eating halal food. He had been held for a long time in the 
camps run by Serbs, and had been glad of whatever food he was able to get. He told me 
that his father had always told him that a sin is not what you put in your mouth, but what 
comes out of it. In other words, eating something that perhaps you shouldn't eat does not 
offend God, instead it is your behaviour and what you say to others which is important. 
"The Muslims here are different. Bosnian Muslims are European Muslims, it, e are it, hite, 
it, e dress in European clothes. Old ivomen it, ear headscarves, not young it, omen. 
(Vahida) 
As well as food, the question of dress was another area where friction occurred. In 
Bosnia, there were not the same strictures on women's clothes that exist in Pakistan and 
some other Muslim countries. Although women would cover their hair when they went to 
the mosque, it was rare for younger women to wear scarves in other places, and styles of 
dress were similar to those in Britain. However, British Muslims expected Bosnian 
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Muslim women to dress the same as they did, wearing a headscarf when outside, and 
wearing long skirts and long sleeved tops. Bosnian women did not agree to this, and this 
eaus6d disagreements between Bosnians and British Muslims. 
Case study 4 
Samed and Fata were both in their late twenties, and had a daughter. Samed had been 
working as a wood cutter, as although he had completed a year at university his family 
couldn't afford for him to complete his studies. Fata had been working in an office until 
just before their daughter was born, and would have gone back to work if the war had not 
intervened. One day, a few weeks after moving into a house in C, they received a visit 
from one of their neighbours. This man had visited them often, and each time he brought 
something that might help them, such as clothes for their daughter or kitchen equipment 
his wife no longer needed. On this occasion he brought a piece of cloth and some threads. 
He told Samed it was for his wife, so that she could embroider a scarf and cover her hair. 
They both told him that Fata did not cover her hair, and so would not need the scarf. The 
neighbour replied that as a Muslim she should cover her hair, and an argument ensued. 
Eventually the neighbour left with the cloth and needles, and never returned. Recounting 
this event, Samed told me that his wife did as she wanted. Not even he could tell her to 
wear a scarf, so why should this man dictate what she could or could not wear? Fata told 
me that she was insulted by the offer, and that only old women cover their hair. 
British Muslims found it difficult to accept that someone from another country could call 
themselves Muslim, and yet behave in a way th at was so different to themselves. This 
made Bosnian Muslims angry, as they felt that what was being questioned was not just 
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their behaviour, but whether they were really Muslim. For people who had been 
imprisoned and maltreated precisely because they were Muslim, this was one of the 
biggest insults that could be made. 
Case study 5 
Many people, including myself, made assumptions about the behaviour of Bosnian 
Muslims. One day I was walking along a street when I saw a young Bosnian woman who 
had recently had a baby. I stopped to say hello and admire the baby, and I noticed that 
Mina was wearing a headscarf, tied in the Muslim way, that is going under the chin and 
tied behind. I assumed that the scarf was symbolic, and since she has recently got married 
and had a baby this was a way of showing her modesty and unavailability. The idea 
intrigued me, since I knew that though her new mother-in-law wore a scarf, I had always 
found Mina to be very modern, and she always dressed in fashionable clothes. A few 
days later I visited her at home, and after coffee and a general conversation, I asked her 
why she had been wearing the scarf. She asked why I was asking, and I said it was 
because I was wondering if now she was married she was being more religious and 
covering her hair was a symbol of this. Her reaction was laughter. "It was a cold day and 
the wind was blowing. I put on the scarf because my head was cold. " 
I include this example to show that it was not just British Muslims that had expectations 
as to the behaviour of Muslims. My enquiry was not met with the same anger as that of 
Samed's neighbour, probably because I was not trying to insist that Mina should wear a 
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scarf. In contrast, Samed's neighbour said that Samed's wife should cover her hair, and 
that Samed should make her do so. 
For people who had been targeted for persecution because of their religion, this 
questioning of their religious practices was extremely hurtful. An aspect of their identity, 
their religious background, assumed enormous importance when the war began, since it 
was the reason for their imprisonment and their involvement in the war. They had already 
attacked for being Muslim, and now they were being criticised for not being proper 
Muslims, and at times it was suggested that perhaps they were not Muslim at all. The 
result of this questioning and suggestions as to the correct manner of behaviour was that 
the vast majority of Bosnians reacted angrily and broke off close links with British 
Muslims. Some relationships were maintained, but very few close friendships. 
As they got to know their neighbours, Bosnian Muslims also found that there were 
various superstitions held by British Muslims which they did not hold. Well meaning 
British Muslims would try to tell them that a particular practice was good or bad, and 
claim that this was what all Muslims believed. But the British Muslims often did not 
recognise that religions can be practiced in different ways in different countries, and still 
be the same religion. They were trying to impose a model of Islam based upon traditional 
practices in Pakistan on a group of people from a different background. 
As the two groups got to know each other more, more areas of disagreement became 
apparent. Among British Muslims, it is common for marriages to take place between 
relatives, and the marriage of cousins is accepted. For Bosnian Muslims, this is a 
disgraceful practice. In Bosnia, there was a strong notion that marriage should never 
occur between people who were related, however distantly. This even extended as far as 
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strong societal disapproval of the marriage of two people with the same surname. One 
couple I was acquainted with had the same surname before marriage, and though I did not 
raise their names, other Bosnians that I interviewed used them as an example. It was 
common knowledge that their surnames were the same before marriage as both mothers- 
in-law were living in the same area, and of course they too shared a surname. Several 
people spoke of their disgust at the notion of marriage of cousins, but took great pains to 
point out that this couple were not related even distantly. Another Bosnian couple had 
married despite being distantly related, with the uncle of one having married the cousin 
of the other. This was considered a subject not to be discussed, and a matter of 
embarrassment for the couple. I was told about it after some neighbours fell out, and it 
was told as gossip, implying that the people were bad people because they had married. 
"In Iran they can have tivo wives or more. Muslim in Bosnia can't do that, they can't 
have two ivives. Muslim in Bosnia is different. They [Iranians] can marry family. If I 
marry someone the same name as me I will get killed Maybe not killed but it is very bad 
for me. Even if not cousin, iffitst relative from long way back, still I can't marry them. 
They marryfamily. One man I know, his son marry his brother daughter. I can't do that, 
no way. Bosnia people think this is wrong. " Suhro 
When a Bosnian talks of their family, they often refer to cousins as brothers and sisters. 
The children of their father's brother are considered to be almost siblings. When learning 
English, they are taught that in English the word for that relationship is cousin, but this 
use of language is important if one is to understand their reaction to being told that for 
British Muslims marriage of cousins is acceptable. Not only is it not acceptable for 
Bosnian Muslims, it is akin to incest. When asked the difference between themselves and 
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British Muslims, the most common reply was that "We are modem, they are not", or "we 
are European", but then most went on to say "They marry cousins. " This was not stated 
as a matter of fact, it was said with incredulity or disgust. 
For those Bosnians who actively practiced their religion, other differences soon became 
apparent. For Bosnian Muslims, mosques had separate seating for men and women, 
usually with the women sitting at the back of the room and men at the front. But for 
British Muslims, although women could go to the mosque if they wished, in practice 
attendance at mosques is predominantly male. For Bosnian Muslim women, this meant 
that the very act of worship that they had traditionally practised was now being called 
into question. Very few people actually said that they went to the mosque at all, either 
before or after coming to Britain. I was told stories about a Bosnian man who never went 
to the mosque in Bosnia, but since arriving in Britain had become extremely religious. 
This man, it was alleged, now prayed and went to the mosque regularly, and made his 
wife wear a scarf and long clothes. I never met this man, or found out his name, though 
his existence was reported to me by several different people from different towns. Those 
who spoke of him said they had seen him, but did not know his name or anything else 
about him. It is possible the man does not exist, that he is the Bosnian equivalent of an 
urban myth, but whenever he was spoken of it was in tones of disgust. He was in some 
ways a symbol of what the others did not want to become, and he was referred to in order 
to show that they had chosen not to go down that route. For Bosnian Muslims, religion 
was only a part of their life, and being Muslim was only one aspect of their identity. The 
way they lived their lives and practiced their religion was their own choice, and one of 
the few areas where they retained control. Their refusal to conform to British Muslim 
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expectations was a way of asserting their independence, establishing a measure of self- 
esteem and establishing that in this area of life they had the power to decide on their 
actions. 
For some of those Bosnians who did not arrive as part of the programme, the issue of 
how their religion was practised was even more of an issue. Of those that came to Britain 
on convoys, some were brought by Muslim individuals or groups who were acting to 
support what they considered to be their religious kin. For some of the Bosnians, the 
relationship quickly deteriorated. To begin with, they were housed in properties owned 
by Muslims. These properties were often poorly maintained and overcrowded, but 
initially it was difficult to complain. Next the Bosnians found themselves being criticised 
for their dress habits. Women who did not wear scarves and long clothes were told they 
were going against God's wishes and behaving immodestly. There was constant pressure 
to behave in the same way as British Muslims. In some cases, the hosts retained keys to 
the properties in which the Bosnian families were housed, and started going into people's 
homes to ensure they were behaving properly. They would remove what they considered 
to be un-Islamic, such as photographs and pictures on the wall. In one town a letter was 
sent anonymously to all the Bosnian families, severely criticising their behaviour and 
attitude towards traditional Islamic practices. 
Bosnians in England, Bosnians or beggars? 
The behaviour of Bosnian people in B is generally very good. They are very kind, good 
and welcome. 
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Now you are in England, where you are safe. Everybody has money, food clothes and 
houses. The same as schools, college, general education and healthcare. 
Also you don't have money problems. Even if you can't live like kings, you live in very 
good conditions, like many people in England, and much better than people in Bosnia, 
Slovenia, Croatia, Germany and also Austria. The exception to this is people who live 
with relations. Some people who have come to England are behaving like they are here 
on holiday, and often forget what has happened in Bosnia and what is still happening in 
Bosnia. 
Some of these people use their refugee status to get money from ftiends and people in 
England. Also they use every chance to get helpfrom different communities, but this help 
could do much more for Bosnian people. Everybody who visits you tries to get you 
television videos and radio equipment. Ifyourftiends or neighhours offer you their old 
television, video orfurniture that you need, it isnt a mistake to accept this. But you must 
never askfor these things. 6r another person offers you food or money you don't have to 
accept this. You have your own money from the Government, it isn't millions but its 
enough to live on. You don't pay rentfor your houses where you live. ffyou get money or 
fibodfrom a shop orfriends say to them that they should give this to [an Islamic charity] 
for your people who stay. in Bosnia because you have eveo, thing and you don't need 
more. I beg you, please don'tfall so low, as Bosnians in England, with your behaviour as 
beggars. If you have problems with fitrniture, hewing, water etc please contact [the 
Islamic charity]. 
Family orftiends? 
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Everybody is accommodated now in their house. There is one negative problem lve 
expected. Billsfor electricity, gas and water are to share between people who live in the 
house. You must always remember that you are in this country because you couldn't stay 
in Bosnia. You are all strong. 
You must always remember that you are Muslim, andyou must learn to live together with 
your Muslim brothers and sisters. ff outsiders see that Muslims cannot live together how 
then can ive all connect together to fight together against the Cheiniks. Ifyou go back to 
your house it is very possible that all houses and cities will have been destroyed. But if 
you stayed there it would have been dangerous. So you must be grateful to [the charity] 
who brought you here and accommodatedyou in England. They gave you houses, money, 
doctors, schools and what is most important ISLAM. You must respect everybody in your 
house and don't argue with them, call ), ourself onfaith in Islam. 
Praying 
From now, everyone must regularly visit to the mosque. ffyou don't do thisyou must ask 
yourseýf why? 
How can you expect a good end to this tragedy in Bosniafor yourfainilies and relations 
and how then can you expect them to be alive and safe ifyou only believe in the force of 
the Bosnian people and the UN. 
All of you must know that one trite real Muslim Xhýahedin is worth ten non-Muslim 
soldiers. It is notjust a phrase or a proverb we get used to in the propaganda, it is afact. 
A trite real Muslim is not one of the people who drink alcohol before they go tojight. It is 
not a real man who believes in Communism, Capitalism, or Nationalism or the Bosnian 
flag. Ifuslims are men who believe in Allah and hisfoundalion ofpeace. Bosnian people 
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will never have success if they fight for things other than Islam. Only Islam can control 
Bosnian people in Bosnia. The West sees Islam as a barbarian and old fashioned 
medieval religion whoseforce must be over other people. 
Today there are 1.2 million Muslims in the world. But just I or 2 countries practice 
Islamic law. This is why so many Muslim people have troubles. 
Ifyou want to follow and listen Islam then you must follow and listen, but if you don't 
follow and listen you cannot askfor help from Allah. ffyou live in a Muslim countly you 
mustfollow the laws of that government, that is the same ifyou lived in another country. 
You must accept this even the West see its as un-citizens. Muslims are the people who 
have the smallest number of murders, kidnappings of children, alcoholics, drug addicts, 
basically any crime. Because you must see Islam not like teachings ftom Islam, reading 
Koran, leaching about Mohamined and leaching about peace on hisfoundation. 
Muslims 
Every Muslim must believe in these things: 
Believe in GodAllah 
Believe in Gods angels 
Believe in God's books 
Believe in God's prophets 
Believe in God'sjudgement day 
Believe ýn God definitely. 
Ifyou don't believe in all these things you are not Muslim. Most important thing in Islam 
is to believe in Islam and pray. There exists just one God and ifyou think that someone 
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can save you or help you or give you good or bad luck then you are saying there is 
something more than God and that is a big sin. 
Ifyou think that something other than God can save your neck arms or legs you are a 
sinner. Allah says heforgives everything ifyou don't have this sin. 
ff you wear a necklace and you believe in this necklace it is a sin. Christians wear 
necklace with a symbol of the cross, they believe in the bible, Muslims don't wear 
necklaces and believe only in Allah. Therefore don't believe or listen to Christians. Ifyou 
want more information about anything in this letter contact [address of Islamic charity] 
(Letter sent by Islamic charity to convoy Bosnians in A early 1993, translated on behatf 
of a housing association) 
The implication of the letter was that Bosnian should try to be good Muslims, and should 
be grateful to those that had helped by bringing them over here. It provoked anger instead 
of a desire to learn more about Islam, and resentment that they were being told what to 
believe and how to behave. Gradually, as they found out more about Britain and their 
entitlements, the people housed by these groups moved away from the people who had 
b rought them and many started up again. In most cases they went to another town, though 
in B there was a housing association which was sympathetic and some were able to move 
within B into housing association property. They often broke off contact with the group 
that had brought them to Britain, and this is one of the reasons that information on 
convoy Bosnians is hard to obtain. 
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Temporary protection 
The status that refugees on the programme were given on arrival seems to have been the 
single most important factor creating their disempowerment. The letter each person was 
given by the Home Office stated explicitly that they would be expected to return to 
Bosnia once the Government thought it was safe to do so. It acted as a permanent 
reminder or the uncertainty of their situation, and the uncertainty affected their entry into 
employment and to education. 
This document was originally valid for six months, then renewed annually, then given for 
up to four years at a time. Though the wording on the letter was changed after a few years 
the document still did not give them the right to remain or rule out their return and this 
led to uncertainty about the future. After the Dayton agreement, countries such as 
Germany announced that they would commence returning refugees to Bosnia. The 
question of whether they would go back to Bosnia was then not a question for the 
individual alone, it was also a question for the government, since if the Government 
decided they should go then they would have to return. Similarly the decision to remain 
in Britain was not a decision for them alone, since it depended on the Government giving 
them permission to remain. 
"Our visa, itfinish in 2000. ... When itfinish I don't know. We will go back or something 
-else. If they give us four more years then we decide after 2000.1 know I haven't got a 
place there, but ifpresident here says I have to go then Igo. " Senada 
"My visa is temporary visa still. It means nothing. [Ve are here now but tomorrow maybe 
you can't be here. " Ferid 
- 250 - 
The lack of permanent status means that these refugees were uncertain about their future. 
During the time of this research they did not have indefinite leave to remain, and their 
visas had to be sent to the Home Office periodically for renewal. Although as far as the 
Home Office was concerned this was automatic, for the refugees each renewal 
represented a source of anxiety. There were no cases that I became aware of where a visa 
was not renewed, but the Bosnians themselves seemed to believe that each individual visa 
renewal application would be considered separately, and that there could therefore be no 
certainty as to the outcome of the application. 
In addition to anxiety caused by renewals, Bosnians on the programme were faced with 
the fact that the papers giving them permission to be in Britain only gave them 
permission for a limited time. Because of the clause stipulating that they would be 
expected to return when it was safe, they were aware that the visa could be withdrawn at 
any time. As Ferid says, although on one day they might be legally in Britain, the next 
day the government could decide that it was safe and order them to return. Ferid was 
therefore always uncertain about his future, and never sure that he would still be living in 
Britain the next day. Senada felt that her future lay with the government too. She realised 
that if the 'president' said that she had to go back to Bosnia, then she would be forced to 
go whether she wanted to or not. This lack of certainty about the future affected. many 
aspects of their lives. Referring to a 'president' in Britain also indicates a lack of 
integration and a lack of knowledge about the basic structure of Britain. 
"Many people have wasted seven years here wailingfor something to happen to them or 
decide about their lives. All the time they are thinking they ivant to stay here but might 
have to go back. Some go black working [whilsi claiming benefits] to get money to go 
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back with. They are not interested in learning anything. Theyjust try to get some money 
for going back. That is all because of their status. " Maida 
Because they were uncertain about their future, decisions that would affect their future 
were difficult to make. The biggest decision about their future, that is the choice as to 
which country they would live in, was in the hands of the British government. The 
refugees themselves had no power to decide to stay in Britain, because their status was 
temporary. In order to decide to remain, they had to first be given some form of 
permanent status. Maida talks of people having wasted seven years whilst they waited for 
something to happen. That 'something' was a decision as to whether they could or could 
not remain permanently in Britain. 
"My visa now is finished. It was sent away but it didn't come back yet. Sometimes I am 
worried about status. I have no house now. I worry about where I will go. It is problem if 
they sayyou have to go back to other house. Someone else is in my house now. " Asim 
Temporary protection meant that the refugees had no power over their future, they were 
dependant on the decisions of the government as to whether they could or could not 
remain. Though all refugees might be expected to have anxieties, this was an added 
source of anxiety for Bosnians on the programme. It meant that for now they were safe, 
but there were no guarantees about tomorrow. 
The granting of temporary protection on arrival encouraged the Bosnians to believe that 
they would soon be returning to Bosnia. This had several effects on their initial 
settlement in Britain, especially in the areas of learning English, looking for work, and 
changing their place of settlement. They could not be certain whether they would be 
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forced to remain in Bosnia or allowed to stay in Britain and so were unwilling to make 
long-term plans in case outside forces changed their circumstances. 
"ILR [indefinite leave to remain] would make me more secure. It is insecure still now, 9 
months visa left, evetyone says will gel ILR but in 9 months what will happen? 
Psychologically, it would be more secure. It is not goodfor Bosnian people kepifor seven 
years not knowing what will happen. " Almaz, in late 1999. 
1 visited one family on the day that forms had arrived to apply for indefinite leave to 
remain. They were very anxious, and asked me to check all the details and read all the 
instructions, to ensure it was done correctly. Though they did not know of anyone who 
had applied for ILR after being in Britain seven years who had been refused, they did not 
believe that ILR would be automatic. They repeatedly asked what I thought would 
happen if ILR was refused, and how long it would take to hear from the Home Office 
about their application. 
" Temporary protection mattered a lot. At first people had six month visas, and thought 
then would go back. No one wanted to learn any English or buy anythingfor their house. 
Even when it was renewed, they thought they would he sent back. It wasn't anythingfirm. 
Everyone ivas thinking it, hen their visa expires you ivill send thein back. " LejIa 
Temporary protection affected how they lived their lives, a nd affected decisions such as 
how to spend money and whether to try to learn English. For many people, there seemed 
to be little point in trying to learn English if they were going to be sent back to Bosnia, 
and what money they had instead of spending it on their home they preferred to save in 
case they needed to buy goods for their return. One man has a garage full of gardening 
tools bought cheaply at car boot sales, and stored in case he is sent back to Bosnia. 
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Those who came outside of the programme were not given temporary protection. Some 
had to wait a long time for a decision on their application, sometimes three or four years, 
but were eventually given refugee status or exceptional leave to remain. Whilst awaiting 
a decision on their application they were uncertain as to the outcome, and faced some of 
the same insecurity that programme Bosnians faced. However, unlike programme 
Bosnians the decision on their application was dependant to some extent on the 
information that they gave, rather than on the government's assessment of the risk 
involved in returning them. They also had legal advisors handling their applications, and 
so had someone with whom they could discuss the progress of their applications. All of 
the non-programme Bosnians I spoke to during this research had received a decision on 
their case by the end of 1996, whilst those on the programme remained on temporary 
protection until they had been in Britain for seven years, although indefinite leave to 
remain was granted from late 1999 onwards to those who had been in Britain seven years. 
Convoy Bosnians therefore had a clearer idea about their future, and knew that it was 
extremely unlikely that they would be rcturned. 
Learning English 
The vast majority of Bosnians on the programme spoke no English before they arrived. A 
few had learnt English at school, but for many of those on the programme, their first 
opportunity to learn English was whilst in the reception centre. At one reception centre, 
English tutors from a nearby further education college came into the centre and gave 
lessons. On leaving the centre, they were given the opportunity to continue the lessons at 
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the college, and transport was provided to enable them to attend classes. These classes 
were initially well attended, but some expressed dissatisfaction, and said the classes were 
being used as a social occasion, an opportunity to meet with others, rather than as a 
learning experience. 
"Some ivent to lessons just to see other Bosnians. Some people go therefor ftiendship. 
They go by bits and have time forspeaking. " Izet 
English classes were available at several locations throughout most of the settlement 
areas, but some chose not to attend. Levels of literacy varied widely within the group, 
with some educated to degree level and others barely able to write their own name, so 
there were immense problems for anyone trying to teach them as a group. However, an 
added problem was that many felt that there was little point in learning English as they 
would soon be returning to Bosnia. Because the Bosnia Project workers would interpret 
at almost all important occasions, English was only really needed by those who wished to 
work, or those who sought to distance themselves from the Bosnia Project. 
As time went on more people decided to enter English classes, and others picked up 
English from their neighbours, children and the television. Some people were bored and 
needed to do something to occupy themselves, and chose to go to English classes. All of 
the children, and those who arrived as children, are now fluent or virtually fluent in 
English. Standards vary among the rest of the population, and though more now have a 
working knowledge of English there is still a large minority of people of working age 
whose knowledge of English is rudimentary. 
For those who were not part of the programme, there was little or no access to 
interpreters, and so the need to learn English was much greater. Their greater security of 
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status combined with the lack of support organisations meant that they thought there was 
a point to learning English. Many of the convoy Bosnians enrolled in English classes 
soon after arriving, and a few were able as a result to find work with the Bosnia Project 
as caseworkers and interpreters. It is difficult to draw any conclusions as to the effect 
temporary protection and the provision of interpreters on the levels of English of the 
individuals, because the groups are so different. However, it does seem that those who 
came on the programme had far less reason to learn English than those who were not part 
of the programme. 
Employment 
Although all the men below retirement age and many of the women on the Programme 
had been in work in Bosnia, none were in work when I first began working with 
Bosnians. There was no employment advice or employment scheme incorporated into the 
Bosnia Project, which was also the case with other refugee programmes in Britain. 
Instead, emphasis was placed on ensuring that Bosnians had access to the full range of 
welfare benefits. For Bosnians who thought that they would shortly be returning to 
Bosnia, this meant that initially there was little or no incentive to find work, since with 
poor English skills and no British qualifications, they could only expect to obtain poorly 
paid work. One might have expected that as time went on, more would find work, and 
this indeed happened, but the movement towards paid employment was very slow. One 
of the reasons for this is the skills that most Bosnians had were either not transferable to 
jobs in Britain, or required a level of English which they did not have. But the reason that 
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the refugees themselves gave was that the temporary nature of their stay meant that there 
was little point in looking for work. 
"Problem is just you haven't any fiaure, you don't sure about that. From today till 
tomorroul. Ifyou start working here and tomorroiv they say you have to go it 1vill be, oh, 
you can't takejob. " Izet 
"If I take that job, I don't know hou, long I uIll stay here. Maybe is too late, I do the 
training and then go back. So it, hy should I do the training? " Medina 
They are aware that training will often be necessary in order to get British qualifications 
and to learn skills that are relevant, but they se no reason why they should make the 
e ffo rt. 
Case study 6 
Vahida came with her son and daughter after her son was admitted to the Medevac 
programme. Her husband was able to join her a year later. Ever since she arrived, she has 
thought that she might have to go back soon, and so her and her husband have not tried to 
find proper work and have remained on benefits. Vahida has been working part time as a 
cleaner, but he husband, who was a computer programmer in Bosnia, has not tried to look 
for work. He hasn't tried any training courses either, as they don't see what the point is if 
they may not be able to finish the training. Vahida says that it is difficult to get a job if 
you don't know if you are staying here or not. When their visas are renewed, they will 
see if they get ILR, and if so then they will think they are staying and look for work, but 
for now they stay on benefit. 
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Case study 7 
Suhro has been on several training courses, and enjoyed them, and is now a qualified 
painter and decorator. He has not worked at all, though, and is currently unemployed. 
Suhro said that he did the courses because they might help him find work when he goes 
back to Bosnia, but he doesn't think he will be able to find work here. People here 
wouldn't employ him because he may not be here long, and so there is no point in 
applying forjobs. 
For both Vahida and Suhro, there seems to be little point in applying for work, and they 
believe that they would not be given a job even if they did apply, because employers 
want people who will stay. They remain unemployed as a direct result of their temporary 
status, and not because of their lack of skills or qualifications. 
In common with other refugees, there are high levels of unemployment, but Bosnians 
rarely complain that they are unable to find work, instead they say that there is no point in 
looking for work, as they don't know how long they will be in Britain for. Those that go 
into employment have made a conscious decision to no longer be unemployed, or have 
been forced to take work by the benefits agency. The First to move into employment were 
single men, who were initially targeted by programmes aimed at getting the long term 
unemployed back into work. Vahid was sent on a training course in engineering by the 
Department of Social Security, though he had worked in Bosnia as an electrician. After 
the course finished, the DSS threatened to withdraw his benefits unless he actively looked 
for work, and the local job centre helped him to find a job in a factory near where he was 
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living. His friend Damir found himself in a similar situation. He was told to go on a 
training course by the DSS, and afterwards found a job. Amir was a friend of both of 
these, and suddenly found that the two people he spent most of his time with were now 
working. They had more money than him, and much less free time, so when the DSS told 
him to go for training he was not surprised. He too is now working, though not as a 
carpenter, his trade in Bosnia. For single people, there is little risk involved in taking 
employment. They are only concerned with their own needs, and have no one else 
depending on them. For those who are married, though, especially if they have children, a 
move from benefits to low paid work can result in them being temporarily poorer, as the 
side benefits of income support are withdrawn. These side benefits include free school 
meals, uniform grants, free prescriptions and free dental care. Unfortunately their poor 
English skills and lack of equivalent qualifications meant that low paid work was the only 
type of work available for most of the refugees. This was not the deciding factor in their 
unemployment, though. A common feature of the vast majority of Bosnians from the 
programme was that they made no attempt to seek employment. They had no idea how to 
apply for a job in Britain, they did not understand the beriefits system, and their prospects 
were not good, but these can be considered as excuses rather than reasons. Most did not 
try to find work, and the reason was mainly that they thought there was no point in 
looking. 
The decision to find employment was not a positive choice taken freely by these three 
men, but instead was prompted by a welfare system that threatened to withdraw benefits 
if they did not actively look for work. However the end result was that they were more 
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independent, they developed a wider circle of friends, and they had money for a social 
life. 
Many of the men turned to other matters to occupy their time, and most either took over 
shopping for food, or would accompany their wives on food shopping trips. For the 
women, this meant that their social lives were restricted, as they had less time outside the 
home on their own. Their husbands would do the shopping, and feel as though they were 
making a positive contribution to the home, but the women sometimes resented this 
'help'. Although women would sometimes say to me in private that they wished their 
husbands would 'get away from their feet', -they rarely voiced these complaints to their 
husbands. They felt because of the experiences their husbands had during the war and in 
the camps, and the prolonged separation that many had suffered, that it was unfair to 
complain about their husband's presence. 
Unemployment also gave men the time to visit each other for coffee, a Bosnian tradition 
followed by men and women, but which men did more rarely because they were at work. 
Again, they would often accompany their wives and this gave the women less time than 
they would have liked for independent socialising. In addition, it also gave the men more 
time to talk to each other, but as they were doing very little other than shopping and 
going for coffee, the topics of conversation were limited. As a result there was a tendency 
to talk about each other, and as I show in the next chapter this contributed to the rivalries 
and resentments that Bosnians often expressed. 
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Welfare benefits 
Levels of unemployment are difficult to assess. Only one Community Association has 
tried to produce a figure, and they estimate in 1998 of seventy-five people of working 
age, nine were in employment. In all areas, there is a number of people receiving 
disability benefits, and these do not have to be available for work, and their partner can 
sometimes be classed as a carer and so not available for work. There are no figures 
available for the number of the population in receipt of disability benefits. The group in C 
have estimated that ninety per cent of their population is receiving some form of sickness 
benefit, though my knowledge of the group suggests a figure of forty to fifty percent of 
homes with an adult or child receiving additional benefits. The initial focus of work with 
Bosnians was to get their benefits correctly sorted out, and to ensure they received 
everything they were entitled to. This meant that Bosnians quickly became aware that 
there were additional discretionary awards that you could get if you were ill enough. 
Though some of those who claimed the benefits were genuinely ill, not all claimants were 
genuine. In one case, a claim for additional benefit was refused, and with the assistance 
of a local advice centre the case was appealed. On the day the appeal was to be heard, the 
representative from the advice centre was waiting with a representative from the 
Department for Social Security for the Bosnian claimant to arrive. The woman, who had 
claimed great difficulty in walking more than a few steps, could be seen walking unaided 
across the footbridge to the benefits office. This obviously resulted in the claim being 
rejected. The fact that the woman was in pain as she walked was seen as irrelevant, as her 
claim was based on her alleged inability to walk more than a few yards. One man 
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successfully claimed disability benefit on the grounds that his experiences during the war 
made him psychologically unfit for work, but was able to play football regularly. 
Welfare benefits based on sickness and disability gave some Bosnians a greater level of 
income, but also removed the requirement to look for work and sign on fortnightly. 
Workers from both the Bosnia Project and local advice agencies were happy to assist 
with applications, and the applications seemed often to be looked upon sympathetically 
by the benefits agency staff. However, of all those living in C who managed to claim 
sickness or disability payments, I am not aware of one case where the person or their 
partner subsequently found employment. Many of these individuals do not need care 
from their partner, and yet their partner remains at home with them and is not seeking 
work. These benefits have acted as a disincentive to work, since they give a standard of 
income which is acceptable, and removed the obligation to seek work and so removed 
any possible incentives that the benefits agency might otherwise have for encouraging 
them into work. People who are sick or disabled do not count towards the unemployment 
statistics, and so are not a target for back-to-work schemes. It also reinforces the notion 
of Bosnians as victims who are helpless, and so further disempowers them. They are to 
some extent objectified by the system, and are defined by the symptoms of their sickness 
or disability, and are no longer individuals seeking work. They are 'sick', or they are 
'disabled', and are given money according to the degree of that sickness or disability. But 
this money comes with strings attached, and will only continue so long as the sickness 
continues. Sickness benefits therefore contribute to the further disempowerment of 
Bosnian refugees, since by removing the obligation to work it also removes the incentive 
to become independent. 
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Relationship with the Bosnia Project 
As the organisation responsible for their welfare, the Bosnia Project had an enormous 
influence on the lives of its clients. It was the function of the Project to provide initial 
shelter in the form of reception centres when the Bosnians first arrived, to find them 
longer term housing, and to provide initial support and advice. These were the tasks that 
were agreed with the Home Office, but it was the agencies running the project that 
decided how these tasks were carried out. In the chapter on the programme I described 
how these functions were carried out, and in this section I discuss the effect on the 
Bosnians themselves. 
Moving into long term accommodation 
As discussed in the chapter on the Bosnia Project, the reception centre that an individual 
was sent to played a large part in determining the future location of their long-term 
housing. At the time that housing was being allocated, I have already noted in that 
chapter that there was little or no choice as to the location of the housing that was offered. 
On arrival in the UK, most refugees on the programme believed that it would only be a 
short time before they would return home. Some thought that they would stay in the 
reception centre for a while, and then would go home, and so moving into a home of their 
own was not a priority for them. This seems to be the reason why the vast majority did 
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not raise objections to the location of their new home, they thought it was going to be 
temporary, so there was little point in trying to be housed in one city rather than another. 
Housing 
After a stay in a reception centre of up to one year, Bosnians on the programme were 
transferred to long term housing in one of the cluster areas. The mechanism by which 
housing was allocated is discussed in more detail in the chapter on the Bosnia Project, 
whilst here I discuss the views of the refugees on their housing. Secondary migration 
rates were very low, for example of the thirty six families originally housed by the 
programme in Middleham, thirty four were still there in January 2000. However, there 
were a large number of house moves within the cluster areas. 
In the city of Westham, there were seventy-four housing units initially allocated to 
Bosnians from the programme (Kelly 1996). By the end of 2000, there had been thirty- 
nine house moves from the properties that were originally allocated. Six were moved 
because the property owners were renovating and they were transferred to equivalent 
accommodation nearby, but the rest had applied for a move because their circumstances 
had changed or to obtain better quality accommodation, for example with heating or a 
garden. I do not have equivalent information on housing moves in other areas, and there 
is no way of knowing if what happened in Westham also happened in other places. 
However, it is worth considering why those that moved did so and where they moved to. 
The allocations policy in Westham was that Bosnians would not be allocated hard to let 
properties, and this was agreed by both the city council and the housing associations. This 
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was also the desired policy of the Bosnia Project, who had discussed the nature of 
6cluster' areas in early 1993 (Graessle & Gawlinski 1996). There were times when this 
policy was not adhered to, especially towards the end of the programme when the city 
was asked to provide more units than had originally been agreed. 
When the time came to move out of the reception centre into long term housing, Bosnians 
would be given only one offer of housing. The normal proccdure for applicants to local 
authorities or housing associations is that an applicant will be allowed to refuse two 
offers of housing, although refusal of the third offer would result in removal from the 
applications list. Because Bosnians were being offered housing outside the normal 
allocations procedures, these rules did not apply, and instead they were strongly 
encouraged to accept the first property that they were offered. Reception centre staff told 
the relevant housing department who their current residents were and what their housing 
needs were, and the housing department would then make an offer of accommodation 
when a suitable property was available. The area in which they were to be housed was 
usually already decided, and the only aspect of housing that was open for discussion was 
the nature of the property they were to be offered and who was to live in it. These became 
a major source of disagreement and discussion between Bosnians and Bosnia Project 
workers. 
Case study 8 
Mr and Mrs T were a very religious couple, and unlike the others in their reception centre 
they went regularly to the local mosque. They made many friends at the mosque, and told 
the reception centre staff that they did not want to go to a cluster area, they wished to 
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remain in the city where the reception centre was. They were told that this was not 
possible, as that city was not a cluster area and they would not be allowed to apply for 
housing. Instead they were told that they had to accept a property within a cluster area, 
and were taken to look at a flat in Westham. Their son was already living in Westham, 
and they had no other relatives in Britain. But Mr and Mrs T refused to accept the flat, 
and maintained that they would not leave the reception centre unless they were given 
. accommodation 
in the area they wished. The reception centre staff maintained that this 
was not possible, and told them they would become homeless if they did not agree to 
move because the reception centre was closing soon. The dispute was eventually resolved 
when friends from the mosque arranged privately rented accommodation for Mr and Mrs 
T. 
Mr and Mrs T were unusual, since they were actively religious and prayed and attended 
the mosque regularly. At the time they were in the reception centre they were the only 
people who ever attended the mosque, and they became much more friendly with the 
other worshippers than with the other Bosnians in the centre. 
Case study 9 
Mr and Mrs D were not happy at the offer of accommodation they were given. Although 
they were offered a three bedroomed house with a garden in a pleasant area of the city, 
they were unhappy because the house did not have central heating and because it was a 
long walk from the city centre. It was also a long walk to visit the homes of other 
Bosnians. The staff in the reception centre found it hard to understand their complaints, 
as the house had fires and heaters and so would not be cold, and since their children Nvere 
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both over eighteen they were very lucky to have been allocated a house and not a flat. Mr 
and Mrs D said they would not move into the house, and insisted that they be offered 
something else. They felt that they were being treated badly because they had argued 
with reception centre staff over other matters, and were adamant that on this occasion 
they would not back down. The reception centre staff were equally adamant that they had 
to accept this house, and for several days there were arguments over what should happen. 
Eventually senior Bosnia Project staff intervened, and told Mr and Mrs D that they had to 
accept this house or they would have nowhere to go. Because of this ultimatum, they 
agreed to move into the house, but for the next twelve months they complained to 
everyone they could about the house. After they had been in the house twelve months 
they were allowed to apply for a housing transfer, and a few months later they moved to a 
house in a poorer area of the city, but which had central heating and was within easy 
reach of the centre. 
Case study 10 
Amir was a single man in his twenties, and he was offered a high rise flat close to the city 
centre. It was in a block which was hard to let, and which was very unpopular because of 
the high rates of crime and poor quality of the properties. Amir's friends had been housed 
in the same area, but in much better quality accommodation, some in low rise flats and 
some in one bedroom homes. Amir protested, and demanded that an alternative be found. 
The reception centre staff insisted that there was no alternative, and he had to accept this 
flat. As they wanted to avoid too much confrontation they told him that after moving in 
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he could apply for a transfer, and so Amir agreed to accept the flat. After moving in he 
discovered that a transfer could only be applied for after a year, and he was angry at this 
discovery as he had believed he could apply straight away. 
Mr and Mrs T were the only Bosnians that I knew of who from that reception centre who 
had not gone into housing in a cluster area. In order to do so, they had to fight and argue 
with Bosnia Project staff, and were only able to go where they wanted because of help 
from someone outside the Project. Mr and Mrs D, and Amir, objected to the properties 
they were offered, but found themselves powerless to change the situation. In their cases 
they knew that they had no control over the area that they were offered housing, but 
thought that they could influence the decision over which property they were offered. 
This became the focus of much of their attention, and an attempt to assert themselves and 
their views on housing. 
Arguments over housing show that the Bosnians on the programme were not entirely 
passive, and would try to assert their views if they thought there was a chance they would 
be heard. Housing disputes became a focus for resentment, since there was a possibility 
of wresting some control from those who were in charge. I found it hard to sympathise 
with Mr and Mrs D, as the house they had at the time was better than my own, and their 
complaints seemed unjustified. However, it acted to some extent as a diversion for them, 
since whilst they were focussing on their house they didn't think as much about the war 
and its consequences. They were eventually allowed to move to another property which 
matched their requirements, and are happy with the change. One of the reasons they say 
that they are happier is that they were the ones who complained and it was only through 
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their insistence that a transfer was arranged. In this area of their life, they had managed to 
regain a small piece of control. The decision to move had been theirs, and although they 
did not have control over what they were offered they were allowed to express an opinion 
and those opinions were listened to. Amir, too, found that complaining about his home 
gave him some control over his life. Although -he had to wait for a year before he could 
apply for a transfer, on the application he was allowed to say which areas he wanted to 
move to, and he knew he could refuse a property that he felt was unsuitable. Because of 
this, he was able to exercise a limited choice, whereas before he had been presented with 
the option of acceptance or homelessness. The Bosnia Project had disempowered these 
people by taking away all control over where they live. Like some others, though, they 
found that through complaining they could eventually get some of the control back. 
In the allocation of properties to individual families, decision making power was once 
again taken away from the refugees themselves. It was only through great effort and 
sometimes the involvement of others that they were able to exert any influence in this 
area. The only control that they had was to insist that certain family members remained 
together. 
Case study 11 
Djevad arrived in Britain as part of the programme accompanied by his wife and child, as 
well as his parents. He insisted that they all be housed together, as his parents needed his 
support. The reception centre staff told him that there was a shortage of larger houses and 
it would be much better if they agreed to accept separate properties although they would 
be close together. Djevad, and insisted that they only be offered a property big enough for 
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them all. This resulted in a long stay in the reception centre, and several times they were 
asked to reconsider. However, Djevad was related to Asim, who had also been 
accompanied by children and elderly parents. Asim had been asked to accept two 
properties close together, and although the properties were fine in most respects, the 
elderly parents were about one mile from the house allocated to Asim. Because he knew 
what had happened to Asim, and also that Mr and Mrs D were told that they had to accept 
what was offered, Djevad insisted they were all to be housed together. Although this 
resulted in a lengthy stay in the reception centre, a three-bedroom house was eventually 
found for them. 
Djevad gained some control over his situation by insisting that his parents live in the 
same home. This was the first major decision that Djevad had been able to make since the 
start of the war. He had been taken prisoner along with his father in the early stages of the 
conflict, and his wife and mother had fled to Croatia. On being released from the camp 
they were taken by the Red Cross to a camp in Croatia, where they were reunited with 
their wives and Djevad's daughter. In Croatia they were told that there was no possibility 
of returning to their homes at that time, as they were in Serb controlled territory, and also 
they couldn't remain in Croatia. They were offered a place to go to Britain, which they 
accepted because they were not offered any alternatives. On arriving they had been 
allocated to a reception centre, which in turn allocated them to a settlement area. The 
decision as to whether or not he should live with his parents was the first positive 
decision in all that time. Djevad and his family are still living in the same house that they 
were originally allocated. 
-270- 
Place of seftlement 
There has been very little secondary migration of Bosnians from the programme. There 
has been some movement, mostly in order to join close family members who were 
housed in another part of Britain, but in each cluster area the vast majority of the original 
arrivals are still there. This is in contrast to the patterns of settlement of refugees from 
both Vietnam, who were initially dispersed around the country. Within a few years, there 
had been secondary migration on a large scale to a few large cites, mainly Birmingham, 
Manchester and London. In interviews both Bosnia Project and Refugee Action staff said 
that the main reason for the absence of secondary migration was that Bosnians were 
housed in clusters, and the larger numbers in each town compared to the Vietnamese 
programme meant that there were enough people to form a community and so there was 
not the same urge to move to be with others. The notion of whether there was indeed a 
community is discussed in the next chapter, but as well as considerations of community I 
wondered whether there might be another explanation. 
Case study 12 
Ismet had been placed in housing in Westham, but after he had been in Britain for a few 
months he found that his brother was living in another town about eighty miles away. 
Ismet approached Bosnia Project staff to find out how he could arrange to move to join 
his brother. He was told the Bosnia Project couldn't help with moving, and if he moved 
he would no longer be able to get support and assistance from Bosnia Project staff. At 
first Ismet accepted this, as he thought that the war would soon be over and he and his 
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brother would be going back to Bosnia. After a few more months he decided to try again 
to move.. His mother had arrived and had been told she could choose to live with one of 
her sons if she wished, and she had gone to Ismet's brother. Ismet applied for a housing 
transfer with the assistance of a local benefits advice agency, but a year later the transfer 
had still not gone through and he remained in Westham. Ismet finally decided that rather 
than move within Britain he would return to Bosnia and rejoin the army, and he left 
Britain in 1995. 
Ismet's experience shows that moving to another area was not an easy matter. The 
Project tried to avoid using privately rented accommodation wherever possible, and 
instead relied on publicly rented properties. Offers were made in each area to provide a 
certain number of housing units, and once an allocation was made it counted against 
these units even if the tenant subsequently moved out of the area. If an individual moved 
and was given a housing unit in another area, then they would technically have used two 
housing allocations and so reduced the pool available for later arrivals. The Bosnia 
Project was aware of this and so was reluctant to encourage transfers. The benefit system 
also had a role to play, since regulations had recently been introduced which capped the 
amount of housing benefits each category of claimant could receive. This meant that 
some people in privately rented accommodation had to pay part of the rent from their 
ordinary benefits, since their rent was greater than the amount set for their area. This in 
turn discouraged Bosnians from moving, as without help in obtaining public sector 
housing they would be forced to turn to the more expensive private sector. The next 
hurdle was access to information on moving and making arrangements. Bosnia Project 
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staff were not supposed to help with arranging moves, and so they would not assist with 
tasks such as arranging for benefits to be sent to a different address or finding schools for 
children. The relationship between the refugees and the Bosnia Project staff was a highly 
dependent one, and the refugees usually did not know how to do these things for 
thcmselves. A major factor, though, in the lack of secondary migration, was that 
Bosnians on the programme did not think they were in Britain permanently. Ismet told 
me that there were times when he wanted to move in with his brother, even though it 
would be crowded, but felt that he couldn't because the Bosnia Project had told him that 
wasn't allowed. Then other days he thought there was no point in moving, because they 
might all be going back to Bosnia soon anyway, and it would be better to save his money 
for going back rather than spend it on a short term move. 
Case study 13 
Selim was from the Herzegovina region, and was accompanied by his wife and two 
children. Selim had been working as a cook in Croatia for most of his adult life, but was 
at home between jobs when he got caught up in the war. Selim was initially housed in 
Westham, but later moved to London. Selim had several friends in London, and before 
moving he had visited them often. These friends were mainly other Bosnians and 
Croatians who had travelled to Britain on convoys or independently, and most had 
managed to find work in some capacity. Selim became unhappy in Westham, and after 
his daughter quarrelled with some of her friends he told his friends in London that he 
wanted to move. He had already been told by Bosnia Project that it was not possible to 
move to London, and that they would give him no further assistance if he did move. 
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Selim's friends found him a flat to move to in London, and said they would find work for 
him in a restaurant, and so he and his family moved to London. 
Selim was unusual, as he was one of the few who moved out of the city but remained in 
the UK. The factors that made a difference in his case were that firstly he knew some 
people in London who had been friends before the war, and secondly that they were able 
to assist with finding accommodation and work. Most of the people on the project did not 
know many people who were not on the project, and so did not know others who were in 
work. When they looked at people in a different area, they saw other people living their 
lives in a very similar way, and the main difference was the scenery. There needed to be a 
compelling reason to drive a decision to move. There was, for most residents of 
Westham, a feeling of inertia, that is they saw little point in expending energy and time 
on moving if the end result would be the same as they already had. t) 
Case study 14 
Velid and Mehmet are brothers, and arrived together on the programme. They had a short 
stay in a reception centre, and were then given housing in Westham. Their families were 
still in Bosnia, but they expected them to arrive shortly and were allocated houses big 
enough to accommodate the families when they arrived. After they had been in their 
houses a few weeks they discovered that they had another brother in Britain, who had 
been in a different reception centre and had been housed around 100 miles away. They 
were delighted to be reunited, and stayed closely in touch. However, none of the brothers 
moved to be close to each other, and as far as I am aware they did not apply for a housing 
transfer. I asked Velid if he would like to move to be near his brother, and he asked me 
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why he should move? He might move to go to his brother, and then his brother might go 
back to Bosnia and then what good would moving have done? Or his brother's wife 
might find she has family somewhere, and decide they should move to there, and then 
Velid's family would be on their own again. And if his brother moved to be with him and 
Mehmet, he might find that Velid and Mehmet go back to Bosnia soon afterwards, and so 
he would be on his own again. And the other consideration was what would his brother 
do that was different if he moved? Velid said his brother did just like him, watched TV, 
drank coffee, visited friends, and waited for the war to end. If he moved to be with Velid, 
he would just be doing exactly the same thing but in a different place. 
Velid, Mehmet and their brother remain living in two different towns. 
For Velid, there was nothing to be gained by moving. There was no offer of work to look 
forward to, there would be no change in circumstances, the only thing that would be 
different is that he would have been close to his brother, but there was no guarantee that 
his brother would remain there. 
The cases of Velid and Ismet show the importance of temporary protection status to the 
way people lived their lives. Temporary protection status reinforced the notion that return 
to Bosnia would take place soon, and because of this the refugees saw little point in 
making long term plans. Even after a few years of living in Britain, when it was 
increasingly obvious to the refugees that return would be difficult, the continuing 
temporary status reminded them that no matter what their own preferences were the 
British government could decide to send them back to Bosnia, and again this meant that 
long term plans were futile. Decisions which could be delayed until a later date, such as 
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whether to try to move to a different area, tended to be deferred whilst they waited to see 
what happened. Although potentially the refugees could have objected to the areas they 
were housed in and applied to move to somewhere else, they raised little objection. They 
had been effectively disempowered, and it required a significant incentive, such as the 
offer of work and a social network, to overcome this disempowerment and to take a 
positive decision about moving. 
Little information is available on those refugees that came on convoys, but it seems that 
they were far more likely than programme Bosnians to move away from the area in 
which they were first housed. 
Case study 15 
Sajma arrived as part of a convoy arranged by a church group. They were given shelter in 
the homes of local people after arriving in Eastham, and gradually helped to find 
accommodation of their own. According to Sajma, most of the others had moved out of 
the area within eighteen months, most having gone to London. She said the reason they 
went to London was that they thought they could get work there, and they relied on other 
Bosnians there to help them find work and accommodation. She had stayed because her 
husband was not in Britain, although he arrived later on the programme, she had quickly 
found somewhere decent to live, and was keen for her children to avoid further 
upheavals. 
Case study 16 
A convoy of refugees was brought by an Islamic charity group to a Southam. They were 
initially given shelter by local Muslims, and were quickly found rented accommodation 
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in the area. Almost all of these had moved away within eighteen months, and although 
they may have moved to London no one is really sure where they have gone. I asked a 
resident from the programme why these others had left. She told me that when they first 
arrived, these convoy Bosnians were just happy to be alive and away from the conflict. 
After a while, though, they became unhappy at the way they were being treated. They had 
been given privately rented accommodation owned by one or more of the friends of the 
convoy organisers, and this housing was poor quality. In addition, the landlords retained 
keys to the property and would conduct checks every now and again to make sure the 
property was being treated correctly. Arguments soon developed over what the Bosnians 
could and could not do in their homes, with the landlords insisting that they adhered to 
traditional Islamic practices and the Bosnians resenting the interference in their lives. The 
landlords would apparently remove pictures from the wall and replace them with Koranic 
texts, and would become angry if they discovered alcohol in the houses. Because of this, 
the Bosnians decided individually that they would leave, and went without leaving any 
forwarding details. 
Case study 17 
Sejo arrived in Britain on a convoy organised by a church group in the North of England. 
He was originally found accommodation in a northern town, but through the 
communications networks that rapidly developed he heard that there were more Bosnians 
in Northam, and that they were getting a lot more help and better housing. He obtained 
the number of a housing association through another Bosnian in Northam, and asked if 
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they would accommodate him. A few months later he and five other families moved to 
Northam and remain there in housing association properties. 
Those that came on convoys usually had very little to lose by moving to another town. 
They often found themselves on poor quality privately rented accommodation, and any 
move would be unlikely to result in poorer accommodation. If they decided to move to 
another town to join a friend or relative, that person would be able to seek out alternative 
accommodation through a local landlord. They were also aware of the mechanisms for 
finding accommodation, because they had to find their initial homes with limited 
assistance and did not have the resources of the Bosnia Project to fall back on. Those that 
came on the programme found that moving was much more problematic. The vast 
majority of housing used by refugees on the programme was publicly rented, with 
security of tenure. Moves to privately rented accommodation were discouraged, and the 
refugees were told how insecure housing was in the privately rented sector. Moves to 
publicly rented homes in another area were possible, but difficult to arrange. There are 
various schemes for exchanging homes or applying for a transfer between authorities, but 
these require knowledge of the housing system as well as the ability to fill in the forms. It 
was made clear that the assistance from the Bosnia Project was only for those who stayed 
in the town where they were put. Any secondary migration, even to a town where the 
Bosnia Project were operating, would mean that they would no longer be entitled to any 
support from the Bosnia Project. This was a huge disincentive, as the Bosnia Project 
carried out all the support tasks for the families, such as arranging visa renewals, filling 
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in forms, and providing interpreters for medical appointments. In order to move to 
another town, refugees on the prograrnme had to make an enormous effort, and were 
repeatedly warned of the possible dire consequences of moving. The end result was that 
very few refugees from the programme have moved away from the town they were first 
housed in. 
For those that came on convoys, the poor quality housing that they were often living in, 
combined in some cases with disputes over 'correct' behaviour for a Muslim, gave them 
a strong incentive for seeking change. It was often clear to them that moving to another 
area presented opportunities but no great risks, whereas for programme Bosnians a move 
presented no greater opportunities and a degree of risk. 
Returns to Bosnia 
There have been a few returns to Bosnia, but again the vast majority remain in Britain. 
The practical constraints on return to Bosnia are discussed in chapter four on Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, but here I discuss the effect that the question of return has on the 
individuals. The people I have known that have gone back to Bosnia returned because of 
a set of circumstances that were specific to them. 
Case study 18 
Omer arrived in Britain in 1993 with his mother, wife and baby son. The rest of his 
family were in Bosnia and Croatia. lie was the first person from Westham to return to 
Bosnia, and went after his brother told him that even though he could not return to his 
own town, there was a job for him where his brother lived. Both Omer and his wife had 
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worked in factories before the war, and he agreed to return. His brother helped him find 
somewhere to live and a job. A former Bosnia Project worker met him about a year later, 
and said Omer was very happy and working as a policeman. 
Case study 19 
Mersiha came to Britain on the medevac programme, as her son was seriously ill, and 
brought her other two children with her. Her husband died whilst she was in Britain, and 
Mersiha was very distraught for a long time. About a year after her husband's death, her 
father-in-law contacted her and said he had restarted work on the home her husband had 
been building, and if she wanted to go back she would be able to live there. Mersiha then 
asked her sister, who said that it was now safe in their area, schools were open, and many 
people including Mersiha's parents had gone back to their own homes. Mersiha decided 
to return, as it meant she would be with her family and friends and they would be able to 
help with her children 
Case study 20 
Mr K and his eldest son arrived in early 1993 as part of the programme. One and a half 
years later they were joined by Mrs K, their daughter and their youngest son. However 
their middle son was not able to join them, as he had reached the age of seventeen and 
had been drafted into the army. Mrs K had been very upset at leaving her son, but came 
to Britain so that she could see her husband and to make sure her other children were 
safe. As the tide of the war turned in favour of the Bosnian government troops, the area 
where their house stood was returned to government control. It also fell in an area 
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designated as Muslim under the Dayton agreement. Their son in Bosnia sent a 
photograph of himself standing in the garden of their house. Although the house was 
damaged and the doors and windows were all broken, the house was standing. Next to the 
son in the garden was the range cooker, which looters had tried to take but had been 
forced to leave because it was too heavy. Mr K was seriously ill, and had recently had 
treatment for cancer, and the family decided to return to Bosnia so that if he became 
worse he could die in his own home. 
Another family that went to Bosnia to visit relatives called in on the family K, and 
brought back a video. In the video, all seem well, but Mr K's eldest son counsels others 
not to return. He says there is no work, little money, and they would be better off staying 
in England. 
All the people that I know of that have returned had something particular to go to. In each 
case there was little risk involved in the decision, as others in Bosnia were willing and 
able to assist them, and a positive outcome was almost certain. 
Most people that remain say that they would like to go back to Bosnia, but that there are 
various obstacles. Their home may be in an area now controlled by Serbs or Croats, and 
so return to there is not a safe option, or their house may have been destroyed and they 
have no home to go to. Some have telephoned their own number, and the phone has been 
answered, indicating that someone else has taken over their house. However, most seem 
to be waiting for a decision to be taken on whether they can remain in Britain or not, 
before they will commit themselves to one country or the other. They are aware that if 
they return now, they would not have the option of coming back to Britain if it all goes 
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wrong. They also know that no final decision has been taken on whether they can remain 
here, and so they cannot make a decision to remain and so must continue to consider the 
possibility of return. The fact that they know they no longer have a house, or that 
someone else is living in that house, means that the question of return is a source of 
anxiety. The power to decide whether to return does not rest with the refugees 
themselves, but with the British government, who can order them to return, and the 
Bosnian government whose actions will determine if they have anything to go back to. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have looked at the various ways in which Bosnian refugees were 
disempowered as individuals, and the way that control over their lives was taken away 
from the refugees at every stage. To begin, they had no control over the war and find the 
reasons for the conflict difficult to comprehend. From the time the war started, control 
over their destiny lay with other people. They did not make a positive choice to come to 
Britain, or to settle in a particular area of Britain. They were given temporary protection 
which meant that they were safe, but they had no security because they did not know how 
long they would remain in Britain. The decision as to their length of stay was not theirs to 
make, but instead was a government decision, and this in turn affected their attitude 
towards learning English and seeking employment. Temporary protection also meant that 
the question of return was always at the forefront of their minds, and acted as a reminder 
of how little control they had over the course of their own lives. 
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Chapter 7: The refugees as a group 
Introduction 
This section looks at relationships of Bosnian refugees in Britain with other Bosnians and 
with British individuals and organisations. I begin by looking at the networks that 
developed between Bosnian refugees, which began as ways of accessing information but 
have changed over the years. The war in Bosnia created one million Bosnians refugees, 
and a further million were displaced within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Combined with the 
deaths and casualties of the war, this meant that many people lost contact with their 
friends and relatives, and had a desperate need for information on the conflict. Networks 
developed that were new, and not based on previous links, in order that information could 
be shared. As the need for information lessened, these networks became less important, 
but they continued to share information on the situation in Britain and social events. 
Next I look at the relationships Bosnians have with other Bosnians, and patterns of trust 
and friendship. Refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina lived pre-war lives in which there 
were interactions on many levels with people of other religions. Although these religious 
differences were important during the war, they held little importance in the pre-war 
period. Experiences during the war mean that many Bosnians find it difficult to trust 
people of other religions, and prefer to mix only with Bosnian Muslims. However, this is 
a new mode of association, since their pre-war relationships were with people of all 
religions. In addition, some Bosnian Muslims find it difficult to trust other Bosnian 
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Muslims, again because of their experiences during the war. The relationships between 
Bosnians are important for determining whether there is a community in existence or not, 
and what kinds of networks exist. 
Finally I look at the formal structure of Bosnians in Britain, the community associations. 
I examine the origins of these associations, their functioning, and the factors influencing 
their success. These associations have had similar problems, and some have fallen into 
disuse. I examine why the associations were formed, and whose interests they serve. In 
chapter two I developed the concept of a contingent community, one which has a formal 
structure and will appear to conform to expectations of a community, but which has no 
informal community supporting it. In this chapter, I consider whether Bosnian 
community associations may in fact be contingent communities. 
Networks 
When Bosnian refugees first began arriving in Britain, the war was still being fought and 
many people had been separated from their friends and family as they fled. The first 
groups that came, the 'convoy Bosnians', quickly developed an information network. The 
telephone was used to communicate with friends and relatives in other countries, 
including Bosnia when the phone lines were operating, and pieces of information on 
other people could then be passed on. Because of this telephone chain, groups of refugees 
in Britain got to know of the existence of other groups. Some of the convoy organisers 
knew other convoy organisers, and would arrange visits so that the two groups could 
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meet. These occasions were used for socialisation, but also to find out and share news 
about the war and the location of other refugees. 
Bosnians that came on the programme developed similar information networks, and these 
rapidly became linked with those of the convoy Bosnians. Several of the towns and cities 
where Bosnians from the programme were housed were also home to groups of convoy 
Bosnians. The convoy Bosnians were known to support agencies in the area, and so 
members of the two groups could be introduced to each other. This meant that the 
refugees knew quite soon after their arrival who of their family or town was living in 
Britain. News could also spread very quickly both within the UK and within Europe, as 
friends and relatives in Germany, Austria and France had similar information networks, 
and these networks overlapped. 
Families were often divided because of the conflict, and people were often desperate to 
know who was still alive, and where everyone they knew had ended up. First contact was 
often by phone to family who were already known to be outside Bosnia, for example 
brothers or aunts living in Croatia, or those who had been living in Germany or Austria as 
labour migrants. They would share what they knew, and information could be passed on 
about others who had contacted the same person. The person in Britain would then share 
the information with those they knew in Britain, who might then tell someone else 
abroad. In this way, Information was spread quickly through several countries. This 
contact by telephone became tremendously important, and though the resulting phone 
bills were often enormous, great efforts were made to ensure that bills were paid, in order 
that news would always get through. 
-285- 
Whilst the war in Bosnia continued, these phone calls across Europe continued. 
Sometimes this telephone chain got information to people faster than official channels. 
Case study 1 
Amira waited over a year for news of her husband, Fuad. She had come to Britain with 
her son, having been allowed to accompany her parents since as a single mother she was 
classed as vulnerable. After arriving in Britain she was told that her husband had been 
held in the Serb comps, but was now in a refugee camp in Croatia. She applied for her 
husband to join her in Britain as part of the programme, but heard nothing for a long 
time. She became very depressed, and on several occasions neighbours found her sitting 
on the stairs to her flat crying inconsolably. She went to the Red Cross off-ice every week 
trying to get news, and always arrived and left looking extremely sad. Finally, the Red 
Cross in Britain were told that Fuad was being accepted onto the programme and would 
arrive within the next few days. This was immediately conveyed to the local Red Cross 
worker, who was having her weekly advice session that day. Unusually, Amira did not 
appear, and a friend was sent to fetch her. She arrived, but looked happy. The Red Cross 
worker began explaining that her husband would be arriving soon, probably within a 
week. Amira laughed, and told the worker that he was arriving the next day, and would 
she mind if she left now because she wanted to get everything ready for Fuad's arrival. A 
relative in Croatia, who Fuad had been able to call directly, had phoned Amira. 
Personal contact with Bosnians in other countries was much more difficult, and remains 
difficult today. Refugees and asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia did not have 
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freedom of movement, and could only travel to other countries if they could get a visa. 
For several years visas were very difficult to obtain, and visas were often only granted 
when a close relative was seriously ill or had died. Because of the random nature of the 
programme, close family members were often placed in different countries, and because 
travelling to visit each other was almost impossible the phone assumed even greater 
importance. 
Whilst in the reception centres the residents became acquainted with each other, and they 
were also introduced to people staying in other centres, as staff arranged joint social 
events. Reception centre residents were thus able to share information with others in their 
centre, and also those in other centres. They also found out who was in Britain that they 
knew, and were able to establish networks that were maintained after they left the centres. 
For some of those that came on convoys, the group that brought them to Britain remained 
in contact for a long time, and would arrange for visits to other groups of Bosnians that 
they knew of. Again, this was a social occasion, but it was used to circulate information 
about people and the situation in Bosnia. Through these phone calls across Europe, and 
social gatherings of people staying in different areas, links were developed and 
information about life in Britain could be shared as well. 
The people who brought its over did things to bring people together. It was usually in a 
church, a barbecue, party, then in home. Those people, we askfor news, they bring its to 
meet other Bosnians. Sometimes people fell its of [a city]. I have friends in /several 
cities], they told me of [this city]. We had contact and kept in touch. Soon after I visit 
[this city] and see big community, like in [one area] isfiffeenjamilies close together, and 
I see if I can move here. By the end of 1993, we knew each other where is, who is where, 
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we try to find out if people came that you know before. We spent a lot of time on the 
telephone. Information moved around very quickly. I tell you, someone sent me a tape 
from Germany. Within few days, you could hear the same tape in many lowns. Next day, 
someone phone me and say 'oh, you have new tape, can I have copy'. Someone in 
Germany told them that man had sent me tape. " Sejo 
So for those that came on convoys, these links gave them information about other parts of 
the country where conditions were better, or where there were more people, and so 
helped shape decisions about whether they should stay in a particular area or move to 
somewhere else. Some of the bilingual workers recruited by the Bosnia Project were 
themselves refugees, and so information links developed between programme refugees 
and some of the others. 
As the war in Bosnia came to an end, and the flow of refugees dried up, the need for 
sharing information was reduced. This did not lead to the end of the communication 
networks, but it removed their driving force. There was still a sharing of information and 
gossip, but since the issues were less important, no longer centring on who was alive and 
where they were, the drive to pass on information was lessened. The networks that 
developed were maintained to some extent, although their focus changed from sharing 
information on the effects of the war and instead towards sharing information on 
conditions in different parts of Britain and on social events. When there were important 
events, such as elections in Bosnia, or when the sister of a refugee was murdered in 
Bosnia, this networking meant that information was shared and disseminated extremely 
quickly. For social occasions, the presence of a network meant that people in one city 
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would know what was going on in another city, and could ensure that events did not 
clash, and they could also share the musicians. 
These networks that were established were not a replica of the networks that had existed 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the war. Instead, they were a new form of network arising 
from the circumstances in which the refugees found themselves. Pre-war networks were 
based on family relationships, kinship, and neighbours. Networks crossed and re-crossed 
between the different religions, and as shown in chapter four there was very little 
separation of the groups. These post-war networks are different, in that they are trying to 
reconstitute order from the chaos of war. The massive population displacement that 
occurred, and the number of deaths and casualties, meant that there was a desperate need 
for knowledge. They craved knowledge not just of the people they knew, but of the 
whole country. Consequently links were developed, and became a network, between 
people whose only connection was the fact of their country of origin. They did not have 
kinship or friendship links, and although the networks still exist, as the war ended the 
need for information was less desperate. Although some friendships developed through 
the networks, on the whole they were purposive, and did not develop past the level of 
information sharing. 
Bosnian social events 
One of the highlights of the calendar for Bosnians in Britain were the social events. 
Parties would be held in a hail, sometimes a church hall, sometimes a working men's 
club, and might be held to celebrate an important date, such as the end of Bajram, the 
fasting month, or to celebrate New Year, but often they were held for no particular 
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reason. There would be music, and this was always Bosnian music, never English music. 
Alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks would be available, though there was rarely any food. 
The first party organised by Bosnians in Westharn that I attended was held to celebrate 
New Year. A church hall near the centre of the city was used, and about half of the 
Bosnian residents attended. Some felt that they were too old for dancing, a few were not 
interested in attending, but others felt that they could not be seen to be out enjoying 
themselves whilst the war was still going on. In Bosnia the traditional mourning period 
for a close relative is one year, and because for some it was not yet a year since their 
relative was killed they refused to attend. Tables were arranged in long rows on either 
side of the room leaving a large area for dancing, and music was provided by a tape 
player with a large speaker attached. Everyone had been asked to pay a small amount of 
money to attend, and this was used to buy soft drinks, coffee, and beer. Some Bosnian 
food was available, including pies and baklava, and this had been prepared by some of 
the women. Later social events did not have food, and had real musicians as well as taped 
music, but the arrangement of tables and the large dance floor were reproduced at each 
venue. When they were given the use of a room in a working men's club, they stopped 
buying alcohol for the parties and left people to buy their own from the bar, and instead 
provided coffee and soft drinks. 
Parties were attended by people from the town where the party was held and also from 
other towns in the area. One party, where the band was from France and the singer had 
travelled from Bosnia, had people who had travelled up to sixty miles to be there. A 
charge was made at the door to cover the costs of the room and the musicians, but there 
were no claims to be raising money for causes in Bosnia or even funds for the community 
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association. If someone organised a party and it was suspected that they would personally 
profit from that, then many people would refuse to go. The organisers had to keep a fine 
line between charging enough to cover costs and charging so much that people accused 
them of exploitation. These parties sometimes were organised by the community 
association, and sometimes by individuals working outside the community association. 
The vast majority of Bosnians attending were Muslim, though I never attended a totally 
Muslim event. There were always some Bosnian Croats and/or Bosnian Serbs present. 
This is especially true of Middleham, where the proportion of non-Muslims was higher 
than other areas, and all Bosnians in the area would attend parties held in Middleham. 
One informant told me: 
"In [Middleham] I saw all people I never smv before. I said to myfriend who is that, who 
is that. She told me, and that man he had Serbs names, and then she told me here we all 
are together. And there ivas no problem there, just everyone make part), same as parly 
here. " 
Although the party might be some distance away, it was rare for there to be organised 
transport. In the early years of the parties, those with cars would congregate at someone's 
house, fill up all the cars with everyone who wanted to go, and then the cars would set off 
in convoy. They would return the same way, and the journey would be almost part of the 
event. In later years, though, it has become more rare for this to happen. People still 
sometimes travel together in groups, but these are groups of relatives or friends usually 
consisting of two, or at most three, cars. This is partly because they no longer need to 
follow someone to find their way to the venue. In the early years in Britain, few Bosnians 
knew their way around the country, and it was difficult to locate venues in a strange city 
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at night time, and this was one reason for travelling together. Later, as people became 
more familiar with the country, those that had cars knew the way to the usual venues and 
were able to travel on their own. As more learrit to drive and bought their own cars there 
was also less need to depend on others for transport, and travelling in ones own car gave 
an opportunity to show to people in another area that one had bought and could afford to 
run a car. 
These parties were closely modelled on the parties held weekly in every Bosnian town 
and village. Some of those that have gone back to Bosnia have taken video cameras and 
filmed the parties they have gone to. They look very similar, except the ones in Bosnia 
have more young people at them and are more crowded. The reason for more young 
people is partly that the older people in Bosnia don't feel the need to go to these parties as 
much. They have a circle of friends or relatives that they are close to, plus they can go for 
coffee to the homes of others, whereas for those in Britain their social circle is much 
smaller. Without these parties, the number of Bosnians that they speak to would be 
severely restricted. 
These parties are an attempt to recreate an aspect of Bosnian social life. The fact that in 
Britain the parties are likely to have more older people than the parties in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina is a reflection of the reduced social circles for most people. Bosnians in 
Britain are not isolated in the real sense, since there are other people available to socialise 
with if they choose to. However, they remain isolated in a practical sense because they 
have not formed close links with the people that now live near them. Attending parties 
enables them to see and mix with other people from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and possibly to 
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meet friends that have been settled in other parts of the country, but without making a 
commitment to friendship with new people. 
Women particularly enjoyed these events because it gave them the opportunity to dance. 
Both men and women do traditional Bosnian dancing, but women were always the first to 
dance and always danced in greater numbers. Because dancing is done in a circle, there 
was no need for a partner, and single women were able to participate fully in the dancing. 
Women always wore their best clothes, and the men were very smartly dressed. For 
younger women, best clothes meant the most fashionable clothes they had, and this often 
meant extremely short skirts. One young woman became the focus of much attention 
when she began dancing, as her skirt was so short it left little to the imagination. Her aunt 
laughed when she saw everyone looking, and her mother ran up and held a jacket up 
behind the daughter as she danced, though she laughed as she did this. 
Children went with their parents, and although some parents of small babies took them 
home early, most children stayed with their parents until quite late. For the children it 
was an opportunity to speak in Bosnian if they wished, although as time went by children 
often would speak either English or a mixture of English and Bosnian to each other. It 
also represented an opportunity to absorb Bosnian culture, as outside of these social 
events they were mixing with English children most of the time. They would run around 
the dance floor, or play under and around the tables, and sometimes they joined in the 
dancing with their mothers. 
There were subtle divisions apparent in the seating arrangements and although the tables 
were in long rows people sat in groups. People who had come on the Medevac 
programme tended to sit together, regardless of which town they were from originally or 
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where they now lived. Most of these were from Sarajevo or one of the other major cities 
of Bosnia, and came at the same time. They remained in touch with each other, and 
because many were still receiving treatment they were often dependant on support from 
others, especially if the patient was a child. Those on the Medevac programme, because 
they were accepted because of their illness or injuries, were even less likely than those on 
the main programme to have any friends or relatives in Britain, and so could not rely on 
family members for support or assistance with childcare. Another group of tables would 
have many of the people from Herzegovina, another would have members of an extended 
family. When there was a group of people visiting from another town, individuals would 
sit with any relatives that might be there, but the rest of the group would sit together. 
Some people would go around all the tables and mix with everyone, but others would 
remain with the group they were sitting with and did not speak to people at other tables. 
In many cases, the seating arrangements were dependant on factors from before the war, 
with people sitting with others from the same part of Bosnia, or with their relatives, or 
with friends from before the war. Some sat with people that they did not know before, but 
these were usually people who knew very few people from before the war and had few 
relatives in this country. It was common to see at one table a group of people who had 
come to Britain on the Medevac programme. These people had not known each other 
before the war, and were not all Muslim, but they met when they first arrived and shared 
some common features. They were mostly from Sarajevo, and had no other friends or 
relatives in Britain. Because they found themselves in similar situations, and often needed 
help with caring and hospital visits, they tended to be friendly with each other. At another 
table would be a group of people who were from Herzegovina, who may not have known 
-294- 
each other before tile war but were drawn together by their shared background. At a third 
table would be members of an extended family spanning three generations. Although 
most people had few relatives in Britain, this extended family had been concentrated in 
an area of Bosnia where most of the men were taken to camps, and they were fortunate to 
all have arrived in the same country. This suggested that although the social events were 
an opportunity to socialise and make new friends, for many people new friendships had 
not developed. 
Friendships 
Most Bosnians, whether they came on the programme or on convoys, had fe%v friends and 
relatives in Britain when they first arrived. Their social networks had been severely 
disrupted by the war, and could not be recreated in Britain because the members of those 
networks were spread all over Europe. Instead, they had to create new networks and 
make new friends, and through the reception centres, the social events and the 
information network they soon got to know other Bosnians in Britain. The friendships 
that developed were often very important for women, since they helped to overcome 
feelings of isolation and provided a support network. Women sometimes found it difficult 
to cope with children, especially if they had no male partner to offer support, and those 
without relatives initially found that they had no one they could turn to for help with 
childcare when they were ill or if they needed some time on their own. Friendships Nvere 
also important for men, although they were much less likely than women to say that they 
felt isolated or needed support. 
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Case study 2 
Azernina was widowed during the war, and arrived in Britain as part of the programme 
after being classed as vulnerable. She brought with her a son of thirteen, another of seven, 
and a baby boy of' one year, who had been born after his father was killed. She was 
related to another family in the city, but was housed several miles from them. Nura 
arrived in Britain with her husband, who had been in the camps, and her son from her 
first marriage who was eight years old. Soon after arriving in Britain she gave birth to 
another boy. Her husband left her whilst they were staying in the reception centre, and he 
returned to Bosnia. 
Nura and Azemina had not been in the same reception centre and did not know each other 
before arriving in Westham. They were both housed initially in flats about half a mile 
apart, and met at organised social events. After finding that they lived near to each other 
and had no relatives to support them, they agreed to meet regularly so that they could 
take it in turns to mind each other's children and so get some time to themselves. Their 
youngest children were given places at a local nursery, and they sometimes collected or 
dropped off the other's child. They also began to exchange children's clothes, as their 
children were similar ages. 
After two years in their flats, both women were offered transfers to houses, and 
coincidentally they were offered houses in the same street. They are now very good 
friends and as well as helping with each other's children they attend social events 
together. 
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Case study 3 
Sehrija came to Britain on the programme with her daughter, aged three, as a dependant 
of her brother. Her husband was missing, presumed dead, after having been imprisoned in 
one of the camps. When she left the reception centre she chose not to live in the same city 
as her brother, since she thought he would make her look after him as well as her 
daughter. She was given a house in Westharn close to that of a man that she had become 
friendly with in the reception centre. This man lived with his parents, and his parents also 
became friendly with Sehrija. Although Sehrija could not openly have a relationship with 
this man, since there was a possibility that her husband was still alive, they became close, 
and he would help with work that needed to be done in her house and would sometimes 
take her daughter to nursery, and later to school. His parents would also look after the 
daughter at times, so that Sehrija could go shopping or visit friends on her own. 
Even though friendship patterns and support networks were shattered by the war, new 
friendships and networks developed, and helped to overcome the sense of isolation that 
many people felt. However, although these friendships might have been close, Bosnians 
in Britain have a much smaller circle of friends than they had in Bosnia, and often they 
said that their closest friends in Britain were those who they had been friends with before 
the war. There was often a reluctance to become too friendly with others, since those 
friendships were unlikely to persist after returning to Bosnia. 
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Case study, 4 
Damir has one cousin in the same town, who he visits occasionally, and there are about 
ten other people that he knew before the war but he considers only one as a close friend. 
When Damir's wife, Lejla, found out she was pregnant, I was the second person she told. 
I asked her who else knew, as she asked me not to tell anyone. She replied that she had 
no close friends here, and so far had only told family in Bosnia about the pregnancy. She 
would tell other Bosnians eventually, but there was no one that she was close to that she 
wanted to tell. 
Case study 5 
Nada said that she had no friends here. She had come as a medical evacuee, and was very 
popular. She had three small children, and often when I visited her there would be other 
Bosnians visiting. Many of tlýese lived several miles away from Nada and so visiting her 
required extra effort, either a walk of around five miles, or two bus journeys. Yet when 
Nada discussed friends and family, she said these people in Britain were not real friends, 
all her real friends were in Bosnia. The neighbours [there were five other Bosnian 
families nearby] were just neighbours, not like the ones in Bosnia. In Bosnia she had real 
neighbours, ones that knew her and her family for a long time. She also said that she was 
from Central Bosnia, not like the others, and wanted to be with people from Central 
Bosnia. 
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Both Nada and Lejla reported feeling isolated, and said that friends here were not the 
same as the friends they had in Bosnia. Interestingly, they were neighbours, and spent a 
lot of time in each other's homes and would look after each other's children, and they 
seemed to get on very well. However, both missed the relationships that they had before 
the war, and in a way were mourning the loss of their previous friendships. They did not 
wish to concede that any friendships they now had were as good as those they had before 
the war. They were both also aware that they might return to Bosnia, and knew that if 
they did return they would not see any of the friends they made in Britain again. Because 
they might return, and had no idea how soon that return might be, they had no motivation 
to build new friendships. They would develop links with other Bosnians, and would be 
friendly with others, but they were reluctant to let new friendships develop. 
Sometimes Bosnians were reluctant to let close friendships develop because they felt they 
could not trust other Bosnians. They believed that others would betray their trust, or 
would talk about them when they were not there. 
Case study 6 
Medina's parents did not want her to have any boyfriends, and so whenever she was 
friendly with a boy she made sure that her parents did not know about it. Medina said that 
she had very few friends, and often you might think that someone is your friend but really 
they are not. She had been friends with Suada, and thought they were very good friends, 
but was no longer friends with her because she had gone to Medina's father and told him 
all about her boyfriend. Medina said that all the Bosnians in Britain are like that, they 
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pretend to be your friend to your face, but behind your back they talk about you and say 
bad things about you. 
Medina was reluctant to become close friends with others as a result of this betrayal of 
her trust, and instead relied on members of her family and the few people that she knew 
from before the war for friendship. Others said that they were reluctant to become close 
friends with people they met in Britain because they didn't want to be talked about. 
Case study 7 
Damir says that he keeps away from most Bosnian people. He was offered a house 
transfer to an area where there were a lot of Bosnians, but turned it down, and instead 
lives about two miles from the nearest Bosnian family. He goes to the social events 
usually, with his wife and daughters, but the only houses he visits are those of his cousin 
and two men who were friends before the war. He knows other people, but doesn't visit 
their homes. 
Damir has chosen to keep himself apart from most of the other Bosnians, and although he 
will socialise with them he does not consider the others as friends. For Bosnians that 
came on the programme like Damir, their friendship patterns were affected by three 
factors. Firstly, their old friendships and support networks had been disrupted by the war. 
This resulted in friends and relatives being scattered, and although they were sometimes 
able to keep in touch they often could not meet as they were living in different countries. 
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Secondly, they were always aware that they might be returned to Bosnia soon, and any 
close friendships that they made in Britain would be disrupted by their return. Finally, 
their experiences during and after the war meant that they often found it difficult to trust 
others, and so many became reluctant to accept people as friends if they had not been 
friends before the war. 
Whilst relationships have often been maintained between former neighbours, there does 
not seem to have been equivalent relationships between new neighbours. In one street of 
ten or twelve houses, there were at one time four Bosnian families. Families A and B 
were related, the husbands were brothers, and the two families had lived close to each 
other in Bosnia. The brothers had been in the camps together, and their wives had been 
refugees together in Bosnia. They remained very close, and they and their children were 
very friendly towards each other. The relationship with family C was very different. They 
had not known families A and B in Bosnia, though as they were from the same area they 
did know some of the same people. Originally only the men of the three families were in 
Britain, and their wives and children joined them a considerable time later (around 
eighteen months). The three men formed a close relationship, as they were in the same 
situation of not knowing where their families were or how they were. They sometimes 
cooked together, and when one was ill the others would help them. When one was 
depressed, the others would try to raise their spirits. When their families arrived, there 
was a change in the relationship. The three families at first got on very well, but afler a 
few months arguments began. These increased until in the end family C was not speaking 
to A and B, despite living between their houses. Family D had come to know all three 
families since arriving in the city, and stayed out of the argument, remaining friends with 
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all three. The family lived about a mile away, and all three families visited for coffee. 
After about two years in their house, family D was told that their house was in need of 
substantial repairs, and the housing association arranged for them to move to another 
property. They were given a house in the same street as A, B and C. Family D expressed 
reservations about the move to me, as they felt they did not want to be so close to the 
other families. Their feeling was that if people were too close, the family would have no 
privacy. The other families would see who was visiting them, and this could lead to 
jealousies. 
Helping each other 
It was widely expected that once they were in a cluster area, the Bosnians would begin to 
help each other, and this happened to some extent, for example some Bosnians learnt 
English quite quickly and were able to act as interpreters for others. However observation 
of who was providing help to whom showed that this help was often only given to a 
limited number of people, and many people did not feel that they were under any 
obligation to help others. 
"People go to see each other, b it/ it is not for heIpjust to see. " Sead 
"Bosnian people is like this. You do something goodfor them, they is happy. Next time if 
you say I can't go, or I am busy, it's like you never (lid anythingfor them, they get angly 
and say bad things about you. Maybe you go eveiytitne, ten titnes, eleven litnes, then on 
i)velfth time you say no, or you say yes and it turns out wrong, they don't get the benefit 
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or whatever, they hate you then. I can't ivork with these people. Too many times the), do 
this, noiv Igojust it, ith [inyftiends]. " Mina 
Mina's story was repeated many times by different people, and it seems that this is the 
'Bosnian way'. It seems that it doesn't matter what you have done for someone in the 
past, if you let them down once they are angry and take it personally. Not everyone was 
like this, but enough people were to disillusion many of the people who tried to help 
everyone, regardless of whether they were a friend, family, or an acquaintance. 
Divisions between Bosnians 
Conversations and observations over several years indicated that there were many 
divisions between Bosnians, and these mainly related to factors before and during the 
war. All Bosnians that I spoke to had been friends with people of other religions before 
the war, but many felt that this was no longer possible. Although they may have been 
willing to agree that not all Serbs or Croats had been their enemy during the war, they 
often found it hard to trust any that they did not know well. For most Bosnians, their 
friends after the war were predominantly Muslim, though there were also divisions based 
on regional, educational and employment background, and between those from the towns 
and those from the villages. Experiences during the war meant that many Bosnians felt 
unable to trust other Bosnians, even if they were from the same religious background, and 
made it harder to develop new friendships. A major factor in hindering the development 
of new friendships was the effect of temporary protection. As well as discouraging new 
friendships because of the ever-present risk of return to Bosnia, temporary protection 
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affected the way that their everyday lives were led. The high levels of unemployment 
noted in the last chapter gave people a lot of free time, and little with which to occupy 
themselves, and resulted in limited topics of conversation. This in turn led to gossiping 
and jealousies, and caused many developing friendships to become broken. 
Divisions between Muslims, Serbs and Croats 
All the Bosnians that I met reported that they had friends from other backgrounds before 
the war, but during the course of the war many of these friendships were broken. Some of 
the Bosnians had lived in very small villages inhabited only by Muslims, but most lived 
in towns and villages that were mixed. Schools were mixed, and those that worked 
outside the home had colleagues of different backgrounds. Many of these friendships 
were maintained up until the beginning of the war, and a fe%v lasted longer than that, 
although most say that they have lost touch with their old friends. Some reported that 
their friends had tried to help them, but there was often little that their friends could do. 
Case study 8 
Vahid had worked as a teacher in a secondary school, and still had some photographs 
taken before the war. He showed me a photo of the staff taken on a sunny day about a 
year before the war started. They are all standing together, smiling, some with their arms 
around a colleague's shoulder. Vahid said that many of them had been friends outside 
school, and visited each other's homes and sometimes had holidays together. Once the 
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war started, some of the teachers had joined the fighting, and he pointed to each face in 
turn, saying "dead, cetnik, cetnik, dead, Germany, ustase, cetnik 3,... " 
Vahid found it difficult to understand what had happened when the war started these 
people who had been friends and colleagues suddenly became enemies, joined one side or 
another dependant on their religion. Until then, they had all been friends and religion had 
not been important. 
Case study 9 
Amir says that he can no longer be a friend with Serbs. Before the war he had some 
friends that were Serbs, one man was a good friend and they often visited each other's 
home. s. When the fighting started in his area this friend was not involved. When Amir 
was caught and sent to Omarska camp he was treated very badly. The guards were all 
Serbs, and when he was first at the camp he was put in a large room with a lot of other 
people, and it was three days before they got any food or water. The prisoners were 
sometimes sent out to cut wood for fuel, and because there was a shortage of petrol for 
the lorries they were made to carry the wood back to the camp. One day when he was out 
cutting wood his Serb friend appeared, and persuaded the guard to let him give Amir 
some food and clothes. Amir says that some of the guards weren't as bad as others, but he 
feels now that he can't trust any Serbs. If he saw his friend again then perhaps they could 
be friends, but it would not be like before. He feels that other Serb people could have 
' Cetniks were Serbian fighters opposed to the occupation of Yugoslavia during the Second World War. 
Ustase were the fascist Croatian fighters during the Second World War responsible for many atrocities. 
Both terms were used to describe Serb nationalist and Croatian nationalist fighters respectively in the 
Bosnian war. 
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done bad things during the war, and so he cannot trust them. Their presence also reminds 
him of the camps and the experiences there were so bad that he does not want to think 
about them, and so he tries to avoid Serb people. 
Despite their experiences of the war, many Bosnians retained a belief that all religious 
groups had a place in Bosnia, and that one should not label all people of one group as 
either bad or good. 
"... even when I talks they say how come you got that sort of atfilude, they heat yoll hard 
they done very had things and kept you in the camp, but you cant say if one pet-volt or 
two persons or even ten persons did it to me that the million of the people are had, ff one 
Bosnians among the 260 done had to you you can't say I am had as well. He'V had, 
everybody bad. It depends on the person. " Sained 
Samed believed that he should be willing to accept all people, but despite professing to 
hold no grudge against all Serb people he found it hard to treat them equally. Whenever 
he met a Bosnian Serb he felt that he should treat them fairly until lie found Out they had 
done something wrong, but in practice he held himself back, and did not invite Bosnian 
Serbs into his house. The trauma that he had experienced during the war remained with 
him, and he was unable to trust those that were Serb in case they turned on him again. 
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Divisions between Muslims 
As shown in chapter four, there was little history in Bosnia-Flerzegovina of separate 
Muslim organisation, and there was no feeling of community before the war. There was 
little history of united Muslim activities, and little group identification. The outbreak of 
war made divisions between Muslims more apparent. One man reported that when 
refugees arrived in his village many people refused to help them. It did not matter to the 
people of his village that they were all Muslims, they were concerned to protect their own 
property and did not wish to provoke attacks on themselves. This meant that refugees 
were left on the streets, whilst many people in the village had rooms in their homes, 
which they could have offered to them. 
"Some people came, some expelled from front line. They came to villages with the 
families. Our people had houses with room for somebody else, that's the way we build, 
for anybody to come, he can sleep. When that people come, most just on road, with 
nowhere to go, because the people in my village thought war would come if we took those 
otherpeople. Ifyou don't like your own people, theres no way youd like o1herpeople. A 
man had a cellar, good shelter, with metal door. He locked it nornlalljý Ile had his 
mother living in the house and the mother she would stick to whatever he said When the 
Serbs start to bomb its I said I need to get into the shelter and she said no, he might 
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blame me. She said he's got all his tools in there. I broke in, she knows is war, she won't 
help me. " Samed 
Another described when refugees began arriving in her town in large numbers. Various 
aid agencies began operating there, making sure that the refugees had shelter and food. 
But Sanella said that no one looked at the people in the town, they were getting no aid, 
and sometimes they had less food than the refugees. So people from the town didn't do 
much to help the refugees, and they led fairly separate lives. 
These experiences meant that Bosnians were aware that other Muslims would not always 
help them, and believed that they would not always be able to rely on them for support. 
For those that had been in the camps, this was even more apparent. The guards in the 
camp encouraged inmates to report each other, and some betrayed others in order to get 
better treatment for themselves. They also sometimes betrayed others to save their own 
lives, and acted out of desperation. The result was that after the war those that had been 
in the camps often felt that they could not trust others, as they had seen too many people 
injured and killed as a result of informants. 
Case study 10 
In the camp Mase was put in a shed which initially contained about 270 people. Every 
night, some people were taken away to be tortured, and some were killed. After a fe%v 
months [he could not be accurate with the time] there were III of them left alive. 
Sometimes the people taken out at night were chosen randomly, and were those who 
were closest to the door. Other times, names were read out from a list, and if your name 
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was called you had to go with them. Trying to pretend you weren't there resulted in 
further torture, so most people went when their name was called. Some of the names on 
the lists were people already known to the Serbs as important people, but this informant 
says that most people in the camp died because of treachery. Many people betrayed 
others, and many gave names of others in order to try to avoid torture or death for 
themselves. The Serbs killed some people who they felt had wronged them, but most, 
according to this informant, were just people that another inmate had accused of 
wrongdoing. For this informant, one of the reasons that he agreed to come to Britain was 
that he thought there would be few Bosnians here, and so there might be people he could 
trust. He found it very hard to trust other Bosnians because of the experience of betrayal 
in the camps. 
Case study 11 
Suvad, who had hidden in the woods for several days before finally being forced to 
surrender, said that after he arrived at the camp he had denied that he had been involved 
in fighting. Then one of the other inmates reported to a guard that Suvad had been 
involved in fighting, and the guards took Suvad outside and beat him badly. He was only 
seventeen at the time, and before this man reported him the guards had been prepared to 
believe that he had hidden because he was scared of the fighting. 
Case study 12 
Nermin, held in a Croat run camp, reported similar instances of betrayal. In the camp 
where he was held, conditions were very bad for him, but there was another section of the 
-309- 
camp in which the treatment was far worse. In this section were held what he called 
political prisoners, but there were instances where people in the section he was in would 
report other inmates to the people running the camp, accusing them of political or 
military activity prior to their arrest. The accused would then be transferred to the section 
for political prisoners, or tortured and abused in front of everyone else. The informant 
would be rewarded with slightly better treatment or extra food. 
For many of the men who had been in the camps, their experiences of betrayal meant that 
they found it hard to trust other Bosnians even if they were Muslims. Whilst they knew 
the behaviour of their friends and relatives, they could not be so sure of those that they 
did not know before the war, and so found it difficult to make close friendships. There 
were stories within the group, told to me when there were no other Bosnians around, that 
some of the people I knew had betrayed others whilst in the camps. Those that said this 
would not give names, but were adamant that they could never trust this man or men. 
Suspicion of others also extended in some cases to suspicion of the Bosnian government. 
Amir said that when in the camp, the guards told him that their leaders had offered to 
release prisoners for twenty five kilos of flour per person. There were around three 
thousand prisoners in the camp, but the government refused. Amir doesn't kno%v if this 
was true, but he feels that it is true. Fie feels that no one thought they were worth twenty 
five kilos of flour, and that is not much for a life. 
For those who -weren't in the camps, the feelings of mistrust can be difficult to 
understand. Most of the Bosnians that came on the convoys had only experienced the 
beginning of the war and few had been in the camps, and so they did not have the same 
direct experiences of betrayals and breaches of trust. Although it is difficult to Seneralise 
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because those that came on convoys had a wide range of experiences, they were 
sometimes much more willing to trust others and less likely to reffise all contact with 
non-Muslims. 
Case study 13 
Mirko was a Bosnian Serb from Sarajevo, and before the war had taught at a university. 
He spoke good English, and was given a job working for the department, which sent 
interpreters into schools. He spent one day at a school, but the next day the parents of the 
Bosnian children said that they would not send their children again if this man remained 
as their teacher. The department agreed to withdraw him from that school, but due to a 
shortage of interpreters they were reluctant to lose his services. 
Instead he was sent to another school where there were three Bosnian children. The 
parents were consulted in advance, and asked if they had any objection. They said that 
they would see what he was like, but if he was good for their children then they would 
accept him, although they would not promise that they would become friends. Mirko got 
on very well with these parents and remains friendly with them even though their 
children have not needed language support for some years. The parents at the first school 
were all from the programme, those at the second school were from a convoy. 
The families at the first school were all from the programme, and although their 
experiences of the war were not identical, they shared a mistrust of non-Muslims as a 
result of the war. The family at the second school were not from the programme and were 
from a different area of Bosnia. They had left Bosnia-Herzegovina at a very early stage in 
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the conflict, soon after fighting began, and saw very little fighting themselves. Although 
they were from an area where the conflict was predominantly between Serbs and 
Muslims, and their house was now in territory controlled by Serbs, they did not have the 
same degree of mistrust. They felt that if someone wanted to help them or their children, 
they would give them a chance, whatever their background. Although the other families 
agreed with this in principle, their experiences during the war made it difficult to put into 
practice. 
Being from different towns is also important to the refugees themselves. Because they are 
from different towns, they do not feel that they are obliged to each other, and they are 
aware of differences arising from the different towns of origin. 
"We are allfrom different towns. In the beginning we are happ)) to be together, bill later 
ive see differences. Some can put them aside, but some cannot. - Sejo 
"You see, peoplefrom K, they is different. I can never have fi-iendsfroin there. They is all 
farmers, theyjust think about tractors. All their children go out of the school as soon as 
they can get out. " Medina 
Traditional prejudices about the different regions of Bosnia were not removed by the war, 
and people still maintained a loyalty to their own district and often looked down on those 
from other areas. People from one area might be considered as badly educated, and only 
interested in farming, whilst from another they might be thought of as ill mannered or 
more likely to engage in crime. 
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As well as seeing difference between towns, there is a regional divide. People from 
Northern Bosnia tend to see those from Herzegovina as 'snobs', who look down their 
noses at them. People from Herzegovina tend to see those from Northern and central 
Bosnia as peasants, implying they are lazy and stupid. Interestingly, these stereotypical 
views, though not universally held, apply to everyone from those regions, not to any one 
particular religious group. 
Relationships between programme Bosnians and convoy Bosnians were not always good 
on an individual basis. Though convoy Bosnians will undoubtedly have suffered before 
and during their flight, some of the programme Bosnians resented the fact that those who 
had, in their view, run away were getting treated the same as them. 
Case study 14 
Jasmina had left Sarajevo as the dependant of a medical evacuee, was resentful of another 
woman from Sarajevo who lived nearby. Amira had left Sarajevo soon after the fighting 
started with her husband and children. They made their way to Slovenia and ended up in 
a refugee camp. Whilst in this camp a bus arrived offering to take people to Britain. They 
decided to join the people on this bus, and came to Britain. After spending a few weeks 
lodging in the home of an English family they were offered a house by a housing 
association. They left Sarajevo with what they could carry, and by the time they arrived 
in Britain had only a few possessions. When the daughter of Amira, who was around 14 
years old, began attending school she was frequently asked about the war, and would tell 
teachers of some of her experiences. 
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The family of Jasmina had spent a year living under siege in Sarajevo, and had only been 
able to leave because a member of the family was seriously ill. They were only allowed 
to take one small suitcase each, and the journey to the airport was hazardous as it took 
them across the front line. A ceasefire was negotiated in order for the evacuees to travel, 
but the journey from the hospital to the airport, and the flight through 'enemy' controlled 
airspace, must have been incredibly frightening. After a stay in hospital, the family were 
placed in a house close to Amira. The two families initially appeared to me to be getting 
on well. One day, though, Jasmina was talking about the family she had left behind, when 
suddenly she started talking about the daughter of Amira. She became very angry, and 
asked what right this girl had to talk about the war, when she had seen none of it. The 
whole family, according to Jasmina, had run away as soon as there was any fighting. 
They knew nothing of the suffering of those who had stayed in Sarajevo, the terror of 
snipers, random shellings, or the lack of food, fuel, and water. In short, Jasmina felt that 
her family had suffered far more, and yet Amira's family were being treated in the same 
way by most people, and had been given refugee status. 
Case study 15 
Three adult siblings were overjoyed when their parents finally managed to join them in 
Britain. The two brothers had been in the concentration camps, but their father had been 
able to get away. Their parents were given permission to join them in Britain as part of 
the quota on the basis that they were close relatives, at a time when close relatives could 
still be issued visas. However they were unable to leave Bosnia until the war ended, as 
they were in govern m ent-control I ed territory. When they arrived, both were in fairly good 
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health and both were overweight. This was in stark contrast to the conditions of the 
people who came from the camps, who despite several weeks or months of decent 
nutrition were still slim, if not skinny. Again the relations between this family and others 
on the surface remained friendly, but on several occasions when the family were not 
there, resentment was expressed. One man asked me if I thought it was fair that this man, 
who had a good life through the war, should have been allowed to come to Britain. The 
proof of his good life, for this man, was the fact that this man was fat, and that he had not 
been in the camps. 
"I know people that comefrom the house to the house, they can enjoy, it's nice country to 
live, if anybody offered me before ivar and say wo uld yo it like to go to Britain for the 
holiday to live there one, nvo years, I would have accepted, vety nice, everything isfree, 
youjust can sit and enjoy yoitrseýf " Samed 
Resentment of others was not confined to the question of whether or not 'they had 
experienced the camps or the full effects of the war. Because some families had been able 
to bring out more relatives than others, the extent of ones' family became another source. 
Those who were in Britain with no relatives other than their spouse and young children 
were often jealous of those who had parents, grandparents, uncles, aunts, brothers and 
sisters. The reasons for the presence of some extended families are complex, and mainly 
a matter of good fortune. The extended families lived in close proximity, in the centre of 
the region from where the camp inmates were drawn, and most (if not all) the males had 
been in the camps. Because of this, when the camps were emptied and the residents 
moved to Croatia, they knew where most of the other family members were. Because 
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they remained together, it was easier to try to ensure they ended up in the same country. 
They also knew which of their sisters had been widowed, and were able to apply for her 
to join them on the programme as a vulnerable person. The family then were housed in 
the same city, and most of them were a short distance away from each other. Because of 
the opaqueness of the allocation system, the reason why they were able to do this is 
unclear. For several people who were unable to have their extended family with them, 
this situation was unfair and unjust. They wanted to know why their father could not get a 
visa. They wanted to know why their older children could not get a visa. And, in 
moments when they were feeling very bitter, they asked what underhand methods that 
family had used to get preferential treatment. From my perspective, it was a happy 
coincidence that some extended families were able to remain together. From their 
perspective, it was another example of an unjust system conspiring against them 
personally. 
Gossip and jealousies 
Because most Bosnian refugees were neither working nor in training schemes, they had a 
lot of spare time which needed to be filled. For many people, time was spent visiting 
others for coffee, but during these visits the conversations were often limited, as neither 
party had done anything since they last met. For many, the only things to talk about were 
the war, their life in Bosnia, their life in Britain, and other Bosnians. Since memories of 
the war were very painful, and the person they were visiting often did not know the 
other's family and friends from before the war, these topics were often avoided. This left 
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only two topics of conversation, their life in Britain and other Bosnians, and it was easy 
for information sharing to slide into gossiping. However, the person talked about often 
heard that they had been talked about, and this would then cause arguments. 
Case study 16 
Ismet arrived in Britain with his parents when he was sixteen. He had been engaged to be 
married to Hatemina, a girl from the next village, but they became separated during the 
war. He later traced her through the Red Cross, and found that she was living in France. 
As he thought that he would never see her again he started seeing other girls. When he 
was eighteen the girl contacted him to ask if they were still engaged. Ismet replied that 
they were, if she could get to Britain they would be married. About six months later the 
girl and her mother were able to travel to Britain for a holiday on one week visas, and 
during that week Ismet and Haternina were married. Haternina remained in Britain at the 
end of the week, and her mother returned to France. They were happy to be together, but 
Hatemina started to hear stories about the girlfriends Ismet had whilst she was in France, 
and this caused some arguments between them. Ismet found that the source of these 
stories were friends of his who had been talking about him when visiting others for 
coffee, and is no longer friends with these people 
Bosnian etiquette demands that if you are visited by someone for coffee, you should visit 
them in return. Whilst in another's house you are their guest, and must be treated with 
respect. Visit too often, and you can become accused of taking advantage of another's 
hospitality, and also of considering yourself better than others. This last accusation was 
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one that I had particular difficulty in understanding, although several people tried to 
explain. It seems that if you visit another person too frequently, you are implying that you 
are good enough for their hospitality, but by not waiting for reciprocal visits you are 
suggesting that they are not good enough to receive your hospitality. You are then open 
to accusations that you are putting yourself above others, and therefore looking down on 
them. In each town there were a limited number of Bosnian families, each with a lot of 
free time, and in the first few years there were many disputes based on visits for coffee. 
Although these rarely involved arguments, they did lead to gossip and talking about 
others when they weren't there, and as a result many people curtailed their social visits 
and limited them to people that they considered good friends. 
Case study 17 
Emira was widowed during the war, and came to Britain as a vulnerable person with her 
daughter. There were a few other Bosnian families in the district where she was housed, 
but most were two bus journeys away. Because of the time involved in travelling, Emira 
would visit several households in a day when she went out visiting, and would sometimes 
call again on people she had seen only a few days before. Emira was from a city and had 
always worked full time, and as she was from a different region of Bosnia to most of the 
others she was less familiar with the etiquette involved in visiting. Eventually she heard 
that other people were talking about her, saying that she was putting herself over the 
others, and was upset by this. Some of her Bosnian neighbours explained that it was 
because she visited too often, and so Emira reduced the number of visits she made even 
though this meant that she had a vastly reduced social life as a result. 
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Bosnian Community Associations 
By 1999, Bosnian community associations had been formally constituted and were in 
existence in at least ten towns and cities in Britain. Representatives of five of these 
associations were questioned for this study, and their replies along with my findings from 
participant observation and documentary evidence form the basis of this section. I am 
using as a definition of community association, a group which calls itself a community 
association, which claims to attempt to meet the needs of the Bosnian population in its 
area, and which has a written constitution. The associations, which I examined, were all 
outside of London, but cover a large area. I have called them Northam, Southam, 
Eastham, Westham and Middleham for the purposes of this study. 
Origins of community associations 
Community organisations existed in Bosnia, but took a different form to those in Britain. 
There were no ethnic minority associations, though during the 1980s political parties 
began to diverge along national lines. Some areas had Islamic associations, whose nature 
is discussed in more detail in the chapter on Bosnia, but many of those interviewed said 
that there was none in their area. Yugoslavia was a state socialist country, and there was 
little scope for formally constituted voluntary action. The exception to this was 
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involvement in youth groups and trade union activity, though these were closely linked to 
the state. 
The vast majority of Bosnian refugees in Britain were not actively involved in politics in 
Bosnia, and most were only involved in the periphery of their trade union, if one existed. 
The majority therefore had little or no experience of independent organisation or of 
voluntary activity, and the notion of a community association was something that had to 
be explained to them by the Bosnia Project and other interested parties. The originators 
of the associations also learnt by example, since in every town and city in Britain there 
are community associations of some form. Bosnians were able to see that there were 
Bangladeshi community associations, West Indian community association, and 
associations linked to mosques and temples. These received funds from local authorities 
and charities, and were able to take action in support of their members. This, then, is how 
they learned about community associations, from being told by groups such as the Bosnia 
Project, Refugee Action, and local advice agencies, and from being shown what other 
groups in their area were doing. These organisations were also aware that once the 
Bosnia Project ended there would be no provision aimed specifically at Bosnians. 
However, Bosnians were likely to have needs such as for interpreting, counselling, and 
advice, and the only way to obtain funding for these kinds of activities is through the 
formation of a community association. In Britain general needs are met by central and 
local government service provision. Community associations are able to obtain funding 
from both these and from other sources in order to meet the specific needs of their 
members. As discussed in chapter two, refugee community associations are a formal 
construction aimed at meeting a specific policy objective. Refugee agencies are aware of 
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the benefits that accrue to associations, and that without this formal construction the 
various sources of finance and services cannot be accessed. Encouragement to form 
associations reflects these agencies' awareness of British social policy, rather than a 
desire of the refugees themselves. 
I begin by giving a description of the way the associations were formed in five areas, and 
then make an analysis of those associations. 
Westham Bosnian Community Association 
In Westham, the first refugees to arrive were convoy Bosnians. These were placed in 
Westham by a housing association which had a handful of short term properties available. 
The majority of people from that convoy were housed in a different city around seventy 
miles away. The group was fairly small, consisting of five families, and at first got most 
of the support and assistance that they needed from the local law advice centre. Workers 
at this centre also gave extra assistance, helping them find language classes and finding 
schools for the children. Later the city agreed to accept Bosnians from the programme, 
and to make a certain number of properties available. As they began to arrive, the Bosnia 
Project allocated a worker to the city for one day per week, though additional visits were 
made for doctors' appointments and some social security problems. Many of the 
Bosnians became dissatisfied with the service Bosnia Project Nvas offering, and there 
were several problems caused by the inexperience of Bosnia Project workers leading to 
poor advice being given. This in turn led to increased demand for the services of the law 
centre, where many of the problems were resolved. The law centre was not funded to 
assist with many of the problems the Bosnians were facing, and had little to spare to pay 
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interpreters. Some Bosnians who spoke a little English acted as volunteer interpreters, but 
they found that they were spending a lot of their time on work for which they received no 
recompense. Workers at the law centre advised them that their best course of action 
would be to form a community association. Once formed, the group could apply for funds 
and would then be able to pay people itself for interpreting and for other forms of 
assistance. 
A meeting was arranged for all Bosnians, organised by the law centre, the reception 
centre, and Bosnia Project. At this meeting, the concept of a community association was 
explained and it was agreed that an association should be created. A man who had been 
acting as a volunteer for the law centre was appointed president. Refugee Action then got 
involved, and again their draft constitution was used as a basis for that of the community 
association. Later the city council became involved, and a representative of the council 
entered into negotiations with several other groups in the city, to try to Find the Bosnian 
association some premises from which to base their activities. Through this representative 
the association was given the use of an office close to the city centre, and the council 
arranged that the rental would be much lower than was usual for the area. 
Northham Community association 
As in Eastham and Westham, the first Bosnians to arrive in Northam were convoy 
Bosnians. Several groups were brought to Northam, some by well meaning professional 
people, some by Muslim groups seeking to assist fellow Muslims. Those brought by 
Christian and charity groups were housed initially with the group's supporters, then 
assisted to find rented accommodation. Much of this was provided by a housing 
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association, whose staff had personal links to organisers; of a convoy. Those unable to 
find housing from the housing association or local authority turned to the private sector. 
From the time that the first refugees were offered housing, housing association staff 
became involved in other aspects of their support. Staff helped to organise places in 
schools for children, and sorted out problems with benefit claims. A furniture store was 
established in order that newly arrived refugees would have access to furniture for their 
new homes. The housing association had a history of actively supporting community 
groups, and suggested that the best way forward for the Bosnians would be to form their 
own community association. This association could then take over many of the roles that 
the housing association staff had been undertaking voluntarily, and act as a unifying force 
for the group. The housing association encouraged the refuges to form a group, helping 
them to organise meetings and offering a room which could be used for meetings and 
social events. The housing association were supported in this by a social worker who had 
been assisting Bosnians in the city since they first arrived, and who also had a history of 
involvement in community groups and community action. Despite this support, the 
association in Northam was at first slow to action. 
As refugees from the programme moved into Northam, workers from the Bosnia Project 
arrived to assist them. The service that they offered is described in detail earlier, and 
while the staff were well intentioned problems soon arose. There was resentment that 
those who were not on the programme were refused assistance and advice, even when 
they were close relatives of someone on the programme. There was resentment from 
some of those on the programme that the Bosnia Project workers seemed to be offering a 
better service to some than to others, and though the workers claimed this was on the 
-323- 
basis of need some of the clients disputed this. Because of the tension this generated, 
Bosnia Project staff began to feel intimidated. The 'Bosnian way' when there is a conflict 
is to be very loud, rather aggressive, and to assert oneself, and this was very hard for 
many of the staff to deal with, especially as they were often young and with little 
experience of handling difficult situations. Because they felt intimidated, the office that 
they were working from ended its open door policy and instead introduced a service 
hatch. All clients were to be dealt with via this hatch, though a few were allowed into the 
office. This served to increase the anger of those who were already disaffected with the 
Bosnia Project, and led to demonstrations and a sit-in at the offices. One man commented 
that the hatch was like that used for animals, and they felt they were being treated like 
animals because of this. Eventually, a group decided that since the Bosnia Project was not 
going to change, they would no longer have anything to do with it. This proved to be the 
catalyst for the community association, and the leaders of the protest became the leaders 
of the association, along with some convoy Bosnians. A man who was involved in the 
protest and the subsequent community association says that in a way they should thank 
the Bosnia Project, because it was their anger at them that forced the formation of the 
association. The constitution was not devised by the Bosnians, as advisers from the 
housing association, social services, and later Refugee Action, gave them ideas and 
explained the format of a constitution, and ensured that it was written in such a way that 
the group would be able to register as a charity. 
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Southam Community association 
The town of Southam used to have several convoy Bosnian families. Most of these were 
brought by an Islamic group, and were housed in overcrowded and substandard 
accommodation. Stories are rife in the area of how these people were mistreated by the 
group that brought them, but I was unable to verify the allegations because most have 
now moved away from the area. I was not able to ascertain where they had moved to. 
Programme Bosnians housed in Southam remained in close contact with the reception 
centre and its staff, as the Mid Term Support team operated from the same building as the 
reception centre. This led to a high degree of dependency, and the workers at the 
reception centre and Bosnia Project recognised that the group was likely to have 
problems when the support of the Bosnia Project was withdrawn. Because of this the 
group was strongly encouraged by the Bosnia Project and the reception centre to form a 
community association, in order that they could support each other. As the Bosnia Project 
was wound down, members of the Mid Term Support team organised meetings to explain 
what was happening, and to point out that once the project finished they would have no 
obvious source of support. The association was formed shortly before the project 
finished, and staff from Bosnia Project helped the association to make funding 
applications. Some of these were successful, and the association was able to rent an office 
and employ a worker. 
"We were kind of pushed into it. We thought it was a great idea, but it wasn't our idea, 
they told us what we can do and can have, and there was a lot of training on 
management. " 
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Middleham Community association 
The group in Middleharn has slightly different origins, in that there were no convoy 
Bosnians in the town. They were the first Bosnians there. They were also all from the 
same reception centre, and so were familiar with each other before they were housed in 
the town. In Middleharn there are thirty-four families and single people, making a 
population of around one hundred and twenty people. They began arriving in Britain in 
December 1995, and from May 1996 began moving into homes in Middleham. As the 
Bosnia Project was in its second phase, it was clear to Bosnia Project staff that the project 
would soon cease to exist, so the residents in Middleham were strongly encouraged from 
the beginning to start an association in order to support each other. It was explained to 
them that the Bosnia Project would be finishing soon, and that there would be no other 
workers who would help them. If they still needed support, then that support would have 
to come from each other. The association began operating in October 1996, and the city 
council and Refugee Action provided organisational support. 
In each of these cases, the idea for a community association has come from someone who 
is not Bosnian. In effect, the Bosnians in those areas were presented with a notion, that of 
a formal community association, and a model to follow, that of other community 
associations in the area. It was explained that if the association matched a particular 
pattern, then there was money available in order to let them carry out the activities that 
they wanted to carry out. 
Knowledge on the existence of community associations was spread through the 
information networks that had developed, and areas where there was no Bosnia Project 
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input heard about them. In some cases, they also tried to establish community 
associations, with the help of local voluntary service councils or other NGOs. 
Eastham Community Association 
For one group of refugees in Eastham, the originator of the community association has a 
clear memory of when the idea was suggested to her. There are around one hundred 
Bosnians living in Eastham. In September 1992 thirty-three Bosnians arrived as part of a 
convoy. Most of those on the convoy had left Bosnia before fighting began in their area, 
but a few had husbands and other relatives held in the Serbian concentration camps. The 
convoy had been organised by a church group, and a coach had arrived at a refugee camp 
in Croatia offering to take a busload of people to Britain. The majority of those that came 
on the convoy have now left Eastham and settled in London. Those that remain are those 
that had relatives who came as part of the programme. From February 1993 briwards, 
relatives of those remaining in Eastham began to arrive in Britain as part of the 
programme. As they wished to rejoin their families, they went straight to Eastharn and 
did not spend time in a reception centre. As Eastharn was not one of the Bosnia Project's 
designated cluster areas, there were no caseworkers or Mid Term Support workers in the 
area, and those that arrived in Eastham had to find help wherever they could. 
Semira, a woman who had arrived as part of the convoy and whose relatives began 
arriving in Eastham, felt that she should do something to help those that were arriving. 
She urged the Bosnia Project to begin sending a caseworker in order to help with 
organising housing and benefits, but they would not do so. As she had begun learning 
English, she took on some of this work herself, with assistance from another woman who 
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had arrived from Yugoslavia several years before and acted as an interpreter. This role 
began to take up more and more of her time, and expense was involved, as she had to 
travel to assist people and make phone calls. She had heard that other people in the area 
did voluntary work, and went to the council's voluntary services unit to find out if she 
could get any assistance from them. A woman there told her that what she needed to do 
was start a community association, register as a charity, and apply for money to do 
things. She might even get enough so that she could get paid for the work she was doing. 
Semira was part of the informal information network, and had heard that other groups of 
Bosnians were doing something similar, so she arranged for a meeting to be held for all 
Bosnians in the area. She proposed that an association be started, and the people at the 
meeting agreed and made her president. The association officially started in September 
1996, after assistance from the voluntary services unit and Refugee Action. These two 
groups showed the association how to write a constitution, how to organise meetings, and 
how to keep records. The constitution was based closely on the draft constitution that 
Refugee Action has developed for community associations. 
Legacy of the Bosnia Project 
The way that the Bosnia Project operated created a level of dependency for the refugees. 
As discussed in the chapter on the Bosnia Project, this was partly due to inexperience of 
the staff, partly to the speed with which the project was established, and partly to the lack 
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of a clearly defined role for the staff. This lead to staff being expected to carry out every 
task that they were asked, and the staff were unsure when to refuse. 
The support that clients had was supposed to be time limited, but in practice any person 
that turned up asking for help was accepted. The help that was given may have been well 
intentioned, but often the worker would do things for the client that the clients could have 
learrit to do for themselves. However, showing someone how to fill a form in often takes 
far longer than filling it in yourself, and the combination of inexperience and lack of time 
meant that it was rare for clients to be taught how to carry out a task. This meant that they 
remained dependent on Project staff for assistance, as they never learnt how to do things 
for themselves. 
This dependency has consequences for the community associations and the role they are 
expected to play, since the only model that most of those involved in the association had 
to work on was the Bosnia Project. The Bosnians could see that other organisations gave 
advice and organised events, but they did not have the knowledge of how the 
organisations operated internally, or the way that roles and responsibilities might be 
shared. In contrast, they had a clear image of the workings of the Bosnia Project, which 
was of workers performing most of the tasks that they were asked to perform, with little 
or no input or task sharing on behalf of the ordinary Bosnian. Many felt that the 
association should take over many of the functions that the Project had carried out, 
including form filling and benefit applications. Those running the associations found that 
they were expected to carry out these tasks, and had no experience of working in a way 
that tried to avoid dependency. This meant that a large proportion of the organisers' time 
was taken up with tasks that were not strictly part of their role. One association leader 
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reported that they interpreted for driving tests, and an interview with another leader was 
interrupted several times by Bosnians arriving and asking for help filling in forms. 
The high levels of dependency induced by the Bosnia Project had repercussions not just 
for individuals, but also for the formation of community associations. Because the 
working of the programme did not teach people the skills they needed for independent 
living, once the programme ended there was a need for support from some other area. 
The place most looked to was the organisation that appeared to take over from the Bosnia 
project, the local community association. An important role for all the Community 
associations that emerged was the provision of support, advice and interpreting for the 
groups' members. 
"The other Bosnians often think of me as a caseworker [the job title of the Mid Term 
ýfl. ... 
Done a lot of rent and council tax things recently. They don't know Support team staf 
how it works. With the refugee council everything was sortedfor them, nobody ever fold 
them all the forms. The system was never explained to anybody. They don't understand 
about applying again when moving or if they start work the), know some tax will be taken 
off their wages but they don't understand council tax. The system was never explained. 
Now I try, but sometimes five times you explain council tar, and Ihey still collie zip with 
'but ive never paid it before'. " Ferida, workerfor an association. 
Whatever their stated aims, there is one common feature of the community associations. 
In each case, there is an expectation from the members that the associations' presidents or 
chairmen will carry out a large amount of work voluntarily. In Middleham, where the 
president speaks very little English, the president takes a large number of phone calls 
from the members, asking for advice and asking where they can get information. In other 
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associations where the leader speaks a reasonable amount of English, the leader and some 
of the committee members have been expected to do a large amount of advice work and 
interpreting. This has caused problems for two reasons: firstly, the individuals concerned 
resented the amount of unpaid work they were being asked to do; and secondly refusals 
or bad decisions become a cause of friction. 
In Yugoslavia there were few NGOs, and there is little history of voluntary work. Though 
some people will undoubtedly have carried out work for others without payment, only a 
few of the people I came across had ever been involved in voluntary work. The exception 
to this is assisting neighbours and relatives, with whom there was a feeling of mutual 
obligation. Actions taken to support a relative or neighbour would either be reciprocated 
later, or were seen as repaying them for an earlier action. The upheavals of war disrupted 
the traditional networks of family and neighbours, and thus there were fe%v people who 
felt they had a duty to help others living nearby. 
Association leaders and activists 
In each of the community associations I examined, the leader was someone who either 
had been involved in voluntary work in Bosnia, or whose employment had involved 
managing others and acting independently. In other words, they had some prior 
experience of organising others or working as a volunteer, and were able to draw on these 
experiences. Two of the current leaders speak very little English, another two speak 
excellent English, and in one area someone who spoke no English replaced the original 
leader, who spoke good English. The original leader of the association in Westharn had 
been a volunteer fireman. He was a qualified fire fighter who worked in another town, 
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but whose own town was too small to run its own fire service. He did not have to act as a 
fire fighter in his own town, and was paid a small amount if ever he was called upon to 
work. The president of the community association in Middleharn had been involved in 
projects working with young people and had management skills. lie had also worked for 
a group similar to the Scouts, and organised events such as clean ups of parks and public 
spaces. The president of the group in Eastham had not done any form of voluntary work, 
but had worked in the administration of a hotel, and so was used to organising other 
people and taking responsibility. The original president of the group in Northam had 
worked for the local government in his region as an economist, and had been educated at 
university. He too was experienced in organising others and planning tasks. 
The presence of a person willing to take on the role of leader and carry out most of the 
tasks required was important for the continuance of the associations. One man, whose 
work involved liasing between the different Bosnian associations, said that the reason for 
the collapse of the community association in one city was the absence of a leader. 
" Westham need a leader, this is main reasonfor no association. They need someone it-ho 
ii, ill work hard -I it, orkedfor years bLfore I got thisjob. They don't respect what they've 
got, they ivere organised before, it was not easy, and now they got back to hoit, they ii, ere 
six years ago. " Eldin 
Although those who were activists in the associations mostly had no experience of 
voluntary work, and only some had experience of work which involved managing others, 
they had in common with the leaders of the association a belief in and support for the 
government in Bosnia. 
"Bosnia ivas multi-ethnic. We try to keep like that. " Ashn 
-332- 
Asim strongly supported the Bosnian government, and felt that since he was not able to 
fight on their behalf, he would instead try to keep together the Bosnians where he lived, 
so that when the time came for return they would be prepared for going back. He felt that 
it was important to maintain cultural traditions such as dancing and singing, and also the 
tradition of leading lives which were intertwined with those of other religions. 
"I try to keep ftiendly to help anybody. ... In Bosnia in school all religion was together, 
equal, people start to inarg each other and don't care about religion. .. lVe are in special 
situation here, have to do lot of workfor children. Children need to learn Bosnian way or 
can't be Bosnian. " Sejo 
Sejo felt that it was important for children to learn Bosnian ways, and since he had 
worked with children before he felt it was his duty to become involved in the association. 
lie organised Bosnian classes for children through the association, and arranged for a 
group of Bosnians to visit Bosnia in order to decide if they wanted to return. 
All of these leaders said that they felt as though they did a lot of work, but were not sure 
that the others in the association appreciated the work that they did. The ordinary 
members of the associations often criticised them, questioning where money was being 
spent or expecting them to take on more work than they wished. 
"People expect to do everything for thent. Expect you must do that, go 114th thein and 
translate, doingforms. I stopped because I thought it was enough IiIne for file to he there. 
Was a lot of work, everydayý DSS, paperwork hut not paid. " Ferid 
Despite all the activities that the association undertakes, one association worker says 
there is still criticism from some Bosnians in the area. 
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"A livays some people are against what you are doing.. I don't know if it is all peoples or 
just Bosnian peoples. If it is all people then I think Bosnian people are the worst. Some 
people always find some criticism in it. They will never furn info community but will 
criticise what you do. If they see it is me, they won't come to the ineeling. So I sent other 
people to invite them... that worked better. " Sajina 
Understanding of voluntary work 
The ordinary members of the community associations, and those that chose not to 
become members, often have very high expectations of what the associations can and 
should achieve. When these expectations are not met, there can be a lot of anger and 
resentment, and accusations of fraud or incompetence. 
All of the associations were dependant initially on the willingness of leaders and activists 
to work without pay, although some later obtained funding and were able to offer some of 
them a wage. For most people the concept of voluntary work was alien. Their experience 
of work was that work meant paid work, and they find themselves questioning the 
motives of those who undertake work without pay. For the average Bosnian, who had 
observed the conduct of the war in Bosnia and the way that some people seemed to profit 
from it, it was often difficult to believe that a person would take on work without getting 
any reward for it. They became suspicious, and sometimes believed that the individual 
must have been getting remuneration from somewhere. Their experiences in Bosnian 
society had not exposed them to voluntary work as it exists in Britain, and their 
experiences instead suggested that people are usually motivated by personal gain. 
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Activities of the associations 
The problems that Bosnian refugees faced were similar in all the towns and cities in 
which they lived. The first major difficulty was language skills, as very few had any 
knowledge of English before they arrived. Secondly, they needed assistance with 
claiming benefits, as they had no knowledge of the workings of the British benefits 
system. There was also a need for some form of collective social events, in order to meet 
each other. The first need that the association in Eastham tried to meet was an 
interpreting service. They later realised that they could do more, and began to organise 
social and cultural activities. They now run English classes for those that wish to learn, a 
Bosnian school on Sundays, a gardening project, and a mental health project. This has 
been possible because in January 1997 the group was awarded three years funding from 
the National Lottery. 
For the former president of the association in Westham, the initial aims were to help to 
improve life for Bosnians in the town, and also to help people in Bosnia. But for him an 
important function of an association, and the one he mentioned first, was socialising. 
" We, have no cafi, or place to go to meet other people. ... We need to be all together. 
ive have association ive got centre it, here you have ineelings. The inain thing is place 
it, here people can gel together. " Ferid 
The group in Middleharn formed a cultural troupe, and perform traditional dances in 
traditional dress. This group has travelled to other parts of Britain to perform for other 
associations. The group in Westham also wished to establish a dance and music troupe. 
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An application was made to charities for funding to purchase musical instruments and 
costumes, and one application was successful. Unfortunately, no one was willing to take 
on the task of teaching the dances or organising the troupe. Eventually the money was 
returned to the funders, and the dance group was never started. 
In Northam and Westharn a need was identified for lessons in Bosnian for children 
attending English schools. The refugees had not made a decision on whether to return to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina or not, but they were aware that at any time the decision could be 
made for them by the government, in which case they would be returned regardless of 
their opinions on return. Because of this issues connected to their situation on return, and 
the way their children would cope, were important. Some parents became concerned that 
their children would soon lose the ability to communicate fluently in Bosnian, and some 
were concerned that their children would struggle in Bosnian schools on their return. 
Among the refugee population there were a small number of qualified teachers, and these 
teachers were asked if they would run a Saturday school. In both towns, classes were 
started and children were invited to attend. The classes ran for about eighteen months, 
and then they folded. The classes encountered several problems. The teachers were not 
willing to work for nothing, but the associations had only limited amounts of money that 
they could offer. This led to the teachers being resentful and becoming unwilling to teach. 
Some parents refused to send their children to the classes, arguing that their children 
spoke Bosnian at home and so needed no further instruction. Others argued that they 
might never be able to return to Bosnia, and so there was little point in teaching the 
children something they would never need. Many children were reluctant to attend, as 
they already had to spend five days a week in ordinary school, and resented their free 
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time being curtailed. The numbers attending the classes reduced after the free minibus 
service to transport the children was withdrawn, due to the association being unable to 
afford to continue the service. The introduction of a curriculum designed by the Bosnian 
government further reduced the numbers attending. The official curriculum included time 
set aside for religious instruction, and some parents objected to this. The final blow for 
the Bosnian lessons was the withdrawal of the classroom facilities by the school that was 
being used. There had been complaints that the rooms were being left untidy for several 
weeks, but when graffiti began appearing on the desks the school decided that the rooms 
could no longer be used. A member of the community association's committee had 
visited the lessons to see what was going on, and to try to ask the children to behave 
better. He found that the children were indeed behaving badly, and were leaving rubbish 
lying around, talking instead of listening, and some Bosnian names had been written on 
the desks. He tried to ask the children to behave, but some were very rude to him, and his 
request had no effect. After the school withdrew the classrooms, the Saturday school 
folded and has not thus far been restarted. 
The level of external funding of the associations is a particularly contentious area, with 
there being little correlation between the level of funding and the nature of the 
association. For example, one group with only seventy members was granted E100,000 
by the national Lottery board, whilst another with a much larger membership which is 
better organised and carrying out a far wider range of activities received nothing. 
Areas where there were no programme Bosnians have been much slower to form 
associations, although most areas with a population of convoy Bosnians have either 
started or plan to start an association. It has been particularly difficult to establish and 
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maintain a community association in London, where a group was formed but ran into 
difficulties and funding was withdrawn. The Bosni a Project believes that part of the 
problem was that the Bosnian population is far more spread out than in other areas, and 
that though the group is large compared to the Bosnian population in some other towns 
and cities, it is small in relation to the other refugee and minority groups in London and 
there may be a tendency for them to be overlooked. In other towns convoy Bosnians have 
learnt of the existence of community associations through the information networks, and 
have tried to create their own associations. Although these were not included as part of 
the detailed study of associations, they appear to model themselves closely on the 
existing associations, with an emphasis on advice and interpreting work. 
Wahlbeck (1999), in his study of Kurdish refugees in Britain and Finland, found there 
were differences in the type of community organisations found in the two countries and 
suggests that this is due to the differing amounts of support available to the groups. The 
community associations formed by Kurds in Britain were in an attempt to provide 
support services to members of the group to make up for the lack of support available to 
them. For Kurds in Finland, however, a range of practical support was available to them, 
and the associations they formed were oriented more towards the provision of social and 
cultural activities. This suggests that it is unrealistic to expect any formal community 
associations to have more than a social role during the time when other agencies have 
support systems in place, and this study in part supports Wahlbeck's findings. 
The association formed in Eastham was active earlier than those in other area, and took 
on a role of advising and interpreting whilst the Bosnia Project was still in operation. 
However, this was an area where the Bosnia Project did not operate, and there was very 
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little alternative provision. The groups in Middleham, Westham and Southam were all in 
existence when the Bosnia project was operating, but took on very few tasks and rarely 
carried out functions that would normally have been done by Bosnia project staff. All 
three became much more active after the Project finished, and all three had a population 
which was totally or predominantly drawn from the programme. In contrast, the 
association in Northam did become active whilst the Bosnia Project was operating. 
However, the population in Northam had many more convoy Bosnians than in others, 
accounting for around half of the total Bosnian population, and these convoy Bosnians 
did not have access to Bosnia Project support. A dispute between some Bosnians from 
the programme and Bosnia Project staff led to some choosing to boycott the Project 
provision, and so acted as a catalyst for action for the community association. None of 
the associations that I studied in detail had a predominantly convoy Bosnian population, 
but reports from the association leaders that I have spoken to suggests that in areas where 
there were no programme Bosnians and no Bosnia Project input the formation of a 
community association took place at a much later stage, with some not being constituted 
until 1998, six years after the members arrived in Britain. 
As well as seeming to support Wahlbeck's suggestion on the activities of Community 
associations, the actions of these associations suggests that the Bosnia Project had a very 
large role in the decision to create these associations. The association in Eastham does 
not contradict this theory: the originator of the group there says that it was started as a 
result of a suggestion by a local community advisor, but also because she saw that other 
areas such as Westham and Northam were behaving in this way. 
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Football 
Many of the men were interested in football, both playing and watching. In the early 
stages of the programme one of the Medevac caseworkers recognised this, and decided to 
help organise a football team. He found that there were enough men interested for there 
to be a team in Northam and arranged for a team to be formed and incorporated into the 
local Sunday league. As the Bosnians had recently arrived and had no football kit, he 
applied for a grant towards the cost of purchasing equipment, and this was used to buy 
shirts for the team. The team was relatively successful, and one year came second in a 
trophy competition, and every match was able to boast a full contingent of players and 
plenty of supporters. Other towns also began football teams, and in Westham the team 
played on a Sunday and had a training night once per week that all interested men could 
attend. 
Playing football provided an outlet for many of the men, and through the physical 
exercise they could work off some of their frustrations and anxieties. 
Case study 18 
Meho had been married before the war, but his wife, who was a Bosnian Serb, left him 
when the war began and he has not seen her since. Meho has suffered from depression 
since he arrived, and goes through periods when his anxiety is such that he cannot cat or 
sleep properly. Because of his depression, he was able to obtain sickness benefit and did 
not have to be eligible for work. Even when he was feeling very bad, he joined in the 
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football training, and said that he made himself go because when he was training he 
didn't think about anything else. It helped him forget his problems, just for a short time. 
Meho's football skills were such that he was never part of the team, but like many of the 
men he took part in training. Participation was loosely structured, and there were no 
formal meetings that one had to attend before going to the training sessions, and many of 
the men were happy to take part in those conditions. The football teams can be contrasted 
with the associations that were formed which had a very rigid structure, and of which one 
either was or was not a member depending on whether subscriptions had been paid. The 
committees of the association were chosen mainly because of people's personalities, and 
those that were more forceful were selected. For the football team, footballing skills were 
paramount, and popularity only became an issue if a player was so unpopular that no one 
would pass the ball to them. 
For some of the Bosnian Croats, who sometimes felt excluded or shunned by the 
community associations, their footballing abilities meant that they could be included in 
the football team, and were thus able to develop friendships and overcome some of the 
prejudices against them. 
Case study 19 
Goran had been brought up as a Catholic by his Bosnian Croat father and Muslim mother, 
and came on the programme after being released from the Serb run camps. Fle had been 
to a few meetings of the association, but found that some people were rude to him and 
some questioned his right to have been included in the programme, and whether he had 
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really been in the camps. He was very unhappy at the way he was treated, and stopped 
going to meetings. He was a keen football player, and when the football team started he 
joined in the training session and became a member of the team. Whilst playing, no one 
questioned his background and he felt as though he was being included. He developed 
several friendships as a result of being in the team. 
The football teams were one of the few areas from which women were excluded. There 
was no formal rule that women should not attend training, but as is the case with other 
amateur football teams women do not attend. It was also rare for women to go to watch 
the matches, as they were much less likely to be interested in football. For the men, it 
gave an opportunity to behave as individuals and as men, and to act without reference to 
their past experiences. The vast majority of the men were not working, and relied on 
benefits to support their families. All had lost family members, and had been unable to 
protect their families during the conflict. Some had been subjected to extremely 
degrading treatment during their captivity, and all had been treated as either objects or 
victims by the programme, rather than as autonomous individuals. Through football, they 
were able to assert themselves and be proud of each other's sporting achievements. 
Support in organising the football teams came initially from Bosnia Project staff and 
volunteers who were themselves interested in football, and later from other football teams 
and the league organisers. They were organised separately from the community 
associations, despite areas of overlap and some of the leading players being part of the 
committees of the associations. 
" We organise from the football pitch " Emir 
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Emir said that the football team in his town formed the basis for the community 
association. The team was the first thing that Bosnians did together, and they acted as a 
team and not as individuals. Because he was captain of tile football team, people were 
keen that when the association started he should be on its committee, and through 
organising the team he became confident that he could organise other activities as well. 
However, the people advising the associations seemed to have overlooked the role of 
football in team building and confidence development, and the two were seen as separate 
issues. The team in Westham has folded, as no one was willing to take on the 
management of the team and organise funds to pay for rental of pitches. 
Football was considered by those advising the community associations as outside their 
remit, and so the football teams remained separate from the associations. This was 
perhaps a wasted opportunity, since it was one of the few activities that Bosnians became 
involved in soon after their arrival, and incorporation of football and other social 
activities into the community associations might have made them seem more relevant to 
the ordinary members. 
The importance of the football teams is that it shows that Bosnians can come together in 
an organised way when there is a joint interest. Joly (1996b) suggests that refugee 
associations can be classified according to whether they further like interests or common 
interests. In the case of Bosnian football teams, they are pursuing a like interest, an 
interest which they share but which is not directly connected to the group. Those that take 
part in the football teams do so for their own enjoyment and to further their own interests, 
whereas the Bosnian associations are supposed to further the common interest, the 
interests of the group as a whole. This may help to explain why the football teams were 
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organised with very little assistance, whereas the associations needed a far higher degree 
of external support. 
Religion 
The friction between individual Bosnians and their British Muslim neighbours also 
affected the relationship between Muslim community groups and the Bosnian Community 
associations as they began emerging. It led to Bosnian community associations becoming 
unwilling to take advice and support from British Muslim groups. 
Case study 20 
On one occasion a meeting of a community association was held during the month of 
Ramadan, when traditionally Muslims fast between the hours of dawn and dusk. A 
Bosnian Muslim who had lived in Britain for many years and his friend, who came on 
behalf of a local mosque, attended this meeting. Both these men were fasting, and as the 
meeting was due to start at around dusk they had brought with them dates with which to 
break their fast. Soon after arriving they commented on the number of people smoking, 
implying that one should not smoke when one is fasting. Then they noticed that a few 
people were drinking coffee. They asked these people why they were not fasting, as it 
was not yet time to break their fast. Some ignored them, one man said he couldn't fast as 
he was taking tablets, and then, as the atmosphere became noticeably 1cler, one man told 
then that he had fasted long enough in the camps, and in future he would fast when and if 
he wanted to. Though the atmosphere did improve and relations became warm again and 
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the meeting continued, the Bosnian association did not ask that group for help after the 
meeting and none was offered. 
Of the five associations in this study, none were affiliated to their local mosque, and none 
said that they had regular contact with or support from Muslim groups even though the 
membership was predominantly Muslim. Instead, most of them had received support 
from Christian groups, who did not discuss matters of religion with them and did not try 
to make any demands as to the behaviour of their members, and from non-religious 
associations in their area. 
Despite their religion being the marker for membership of the Bosnian associations, the 
practice of Islam was not a major priority. In fact, Islamic strictures of dress and food as 
followed by many Muslims in Britain were largely ignored by Bosnian Muslims. Because 
they had no strong identity as Muslims in the religious sense Bosnians found it difficult, 
if not impossible, to identify themselves with British Muslims. Those advising and 
supporting Bosnian refugees in Britain had assumed that the presence of other Muslims 
in an area would be beneficial for the Bosnians. However, the Bosnians quickly found 
that they had little in common with these other Muslims, apart from a religion to which 
they were largely indifferent. Islamic associations, when they discovered that most 
Bosnians were not interested in religion, became uninterested in Bosnians. This suggests 
that assumptions of support from people of what is thought to be a similar background 
should not be made without an understanding of the group that needs support. Bosnian 
Muslims did not strongly identify themselves as Muslims before the war, and being 
Muslim was merely one part of their identity. Because of this, they were unable to 
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consider themselves the same as British Muslims purely on the basis of religion, because 
to Bosnians self-identity rested on factors such as family, neighbourhood and region, and 
religion was only a component of their identity. 
Membership of associations 
The association in Middleham is clear about whom their group is for - it is for all 
Bosnians in the town, regardless of background. All religions are represented on the 
committee. The president says that Bosnia was multi ethnic, and they try to keep the 
association multi ethnic. However, the group in Middleham is slightly different to the 
others, in that all the residents came from the programme, and all had stayed together in 
the same reception centre. This meant that they knew each other and knew why they were 
included in the programme. In addition, the president of the group had a clear political 
view of Bosnia as a multi ethnic state, and this political project was in the forefront 
whenever activities were being organised. There are also no convoy Bosnians in the 
town, and the membership consists solely of those that came on the programme. 
Other groups did not have such a clear political project, and although one organiser said 
that they try to make sure everyone is treated equally he but would not discuss how they 
did this. In practice, the hostility that many Bosnian Muslims felt for Bosnian Serbs and 
Croats meant that few non-Muslims felt able to take part in meetings and activities. 
Bosnian Croats who had come as part of the programme were sometimes accepted, but 
Serbs and Croats who did not come on the programme rarely remained members of the 
associations. However, none of the associations sa%v themselves as being only for 
Muslims, even though the vast majority of their members were Muslim, and this meant 
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that there was a divergent attitude towards membership. Officially, the associations were 
open to all those Bosnians who lived in the area and wished to be members. In practice, 
the associations' members were those from the programme, plus Muslims that did not 
come on the programme. 
Case study 21 
When the first open meeting of the Westham Bosnian Community Association was held, 
all Bosnians in the city were invited. A letter was sent to all those on the programme by a 
member of staff at a reception centre, and another member of staff who had come to 
Britain on a convoy informed the non-programme residents. The meeting was well 
attended, with most households sending at least one member. Although the people 
leading the meeting said that the meeting was for all Bosnians, some people present 
voiced objections to some of the non-programme Bosnians that were there. They argued 
that since they were not from the programme, no one could be sure of their role during 
the war, and since they were not Muslim it was possible that they had committed acts 
against Muslims. Others argued that those who were against Muslims were unlikely to try 
to be members of an association that was to be 90% Muslim, and the people who were 
being talked about said they had done nothing to be ashamed of. It was finally agreed that 
these people could be members, but most felt that they were not welcome and did not 
attend any further meetings. 
Membership was open to men and women equally, and all adult members had votes at 
meetings. From the beginnings of the associations there was a consideration that women 
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should be represented on the committee, and a recognition that those women without 
male partners were especially in need of representation. Westham, at one of their first 
meetings, agreed that there should always be at least one woman on the committee of the 
association. In Northam, it was agreed that the committee should include a representative 
of the single mothers, and also of the pensioners. This formal inclusion was important, 
since women often chose not to attend the meetings of the associations. Of the five 
associations studied, one had a female president, and another had a worker for the 
association who was female. 
A Bosnian Community? 
An important question is whether these networks and friendships that exist constitute a 
community. Community has been defined as a form of relationship "characterised by a 
high degree of personal intimacy, emotional depth, moral commitment, social cohesion 
and continuity in time. " (Nisbet 1967). Other definitions of community are possible, but 
an important feature of definitions of community is the notion of the community as a 
form of collective. There is something that the members of the community feel they have 
in common, and which provides a link between members of the community. This 
commonality can take many forms, and may be real or imagined (Jenkins 1996). Because 
of the feeling of interdependence and mutual interest, communities are able to act in 
unison in order to defend the rights of the group. The origin, for those in the community, 
lies within the community itself. "People construct community symbolically, making it a 
resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their identity. " (Cohen 1985 page 
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118). For Cohen, the individual members of a community do not consciously create that 
community, instead the notions of community and interconnectedness are transmitted 
through the group via that groups' culture. 
Refugees from Bosnia had very little to link them together, other than the war. For 
refugees from Bosnia, the experiences of the war are extremely diverse, and are not 
sufficient to create a permanent link between people. The main area of commonality is 
the war, but this is a negative aspect of their lives, rather than a positive one which can be 
celebrated. As can be seen from the description of the war in Bosnia in chapter four even 
the perception of who was the enemy during the conflict depends on the stage in the 
conflict and the geographical location, and the divisions noted above reflect this. In 
addition some refugees left Bosnia before fighting came to their area, whilst others have 
been born since their parents arrived in Britain, and so the war is unlikely to have created 
feelings of long-term unity. 
There is no ethnic community, as Bosnians on the whole maintain that Bosnia should 
remain a mixed country, although as individuals they may wish to avoid mixing with 
people who are not Muslim. All the Bosnians in this study had friends, and some had 
relations, who were not Muslim before the war, and there seems little desire to create a 
new society which would exclude those relationships in the future. Individuals focus on 
the differences between them, rather on their commonality, and divisions based on region 
of origin and experience of the war are continually referred to, making it difficult to 
consider that there is a sufficient degree of social cohesion for a community to exist. 
At the moment there seems to be no community at all. There is an absence of a feeling of 
interconnectedness with the whole group, and instead people feel connected only to a 
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small circle of family and close friends. There are, though, efforts to create a structure 
that can represent all the members of the group, and these structures are the Bosnian 
community associations which have been formed in many towns and cities. These 
associations did not arise independently, and are largely the product of support and 
interventions from agencies working with the group. They rely heavily on the willingness 
of a few individuals, and the availability of grants in order to provide services. As such 
they are not the formal expression of a community, since there is no community to 
formally express. Instead, they are a contingent community, and exist as a recognition of 
British social policy. In Britain, community associations have access to support and 
finance that is not available to individuals, and the only way that Bosnians can access 
these benefits is through forming a community association, despite the absence of a 
community. 
Conclusion 
The war in Bosnia not only ruptured family and friendship networks, it made rebuilding 
those networks more difficult, as many people found it difficult to trust others afterwards. 
Moves towards creating new friendship networks were hampered by the programme, 
though not intentionally. The scattering of individuals throughout Britain and Europe 
meant that many people had few relatives or friends from before the war living near 
them, and instead they needed to make new friends. However, thoughts that they might 
soon return to Bosnia meant that many people did not feel they needed to make lasting 
friendships. When this attitude was combined with the amount of free time that Bosnians 
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had due to their high rates of unemployment, it meant that petty squabbles and jealousies 
were allowed expression, and there was little compunction to strive to maintain 
friendships because these were people one would soon be leaving. The dependency 
created by the operation of the Bosnia Project led to Bosnians often being reliant on 
others for tasks such as interpreting and form-filling, but the absence of kinship and 
friendship networks meant that many Bosnians did not feel group-wide obligations. They 
were willing to help their own friends and family, but became increasingly reluctant to 
help others outside of that circle. There was an expectation that the associations would 
take over much of this work, but the associations' activists and leaders were usually 
unpaid volunteers, and either could not or would not do as much as some members 
expected, and this caused some friction. Ordinary members often valued the associations 
according to what they personally would gain, rather than what Bosnians as a whole 
would gain. 
Some Bosnians have been able to conform to expectations and have been instrumental in 
creating and maintaining the associations. However, there remains no community of 
Bosnians, and the associations can instead be considered as contingent communities, 
whose existence is dependant on the continued efforts of a few individuals and the 
availability of funds which can only be accessed through a formal association. Rather 
than being a formal expression ofan informal community, the associations are a formal 
construction of an ideal, and do not reflect the reality of their members. Bosnians were 
urged to form formal associations, and shown how to go about creating them, but there 
was little consideration of whether there was an informal community that could underpin 
the formal one. There are kinship groups, friends and networks, but there is no 
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community, and no feeling of obligation to others. The associations were formed because 
there was no other way for the group to get support or finance, and instead of reflecting 
the desires of Bosnians, they reflect the expectations of British society. They are another 
example of control being taken away from Bosnians, and thus of disempowering them, 
by presenting them with only one model of behaviour. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
This research focuses on refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina that were given temporary 
protected status in Britain as a result of the conflict in that country between 1992 and 
1995. From the evidence obtained through this research and an examination of existing 
theories on refugees, a hypothesis was developed that these refugees represented a 
different type to the two main types of refugee identified by Joly. 
Joly (1996a, 1996b, 2002 forthcoming-a) argues that to understand refugees in the 
country of exile, it is important to understand their relationship with their country of 
origin. Joly identifies two ideal types, which she calls Odyssean and Rubicon refugees. 
Odyssean refugees had a collective project in the country of origin, and maintain that 
project in the country of exile. Their social organisation in the country of exile will be 
determined according to their homeward orientation, through their return project, and 
they consider their exile to be temporary. Their return project is kept alive through their 
mode of social organisation, through their community associations and through political 
activity. Rubicon refugees either did not have a collective project in the country of origin, 
or they have forsaken their collective project. They do not envisage return to the country 
of origin, and their social organisation is focussed towards the Country of exile, rather 
than the country of origin. This can lead to individuals having a more positive attitude to 
the country of exile, or it can lead to a 'double marginal isation', where the individual 
feels alienated from the country of origin and the country of exile. The outcome for 
Rubicon refugees will be highly dependant on country of exile related factors, especially 
socio-economic factors. Joly argues that communities and associations will be developed 
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and will play an important role in supporting refugee adaptation if the group identified 
itself as a minority within the country of origin. However, if they did not constitute a 
minority in the country of origin then both the formation of a community and the creation 
of associations may be delayed, and may not happen at all. 
Although this typology is valuable, the research contained in this thesis suggests that a 
third type of refugee can be identified. Rather than being a sub-group of Rubicon 
refugees, these are refugees who have no collective project in the country of origin or in 
the country of exile, but whose orientation towards return is uncertain. Instead of 
focussing on their country of exile and developing a return project, or focussing on the 
country of exile and abandoning the return project, instead they are uncertain about 
return, and are waiting for something to happen which will determine their orientation. 
This, I suggest, is the typology that describes the refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina that 
arrived as part of Britain's Bosnia Project. This study therefore constitutes a further 
development of Joly's theory on refugees, expanding and refining the typologies. 
A continual feature of this analysis is that refugees that came on the programme had 
almost no control over the events around them, and their temporary protected status has 
enhanced their insecurity. They had no clear group project in the country of origin, that is 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but this uncertainty and lack of control has prevented them from 
developing a collective project in the country of exile, in Britain. 
The policies around settlement of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina assumed the 
existence of a community, and that associations would act as the mouthpiece for that 
community. There were a number of assumptions made which guided the way that the 
refugees settled in Britain. Firstly, it was assumed that immigrant and ethnic minority 
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groups in Britain form ethnic communities, and these in turn establish formal community 
associations. These associations then play a crucial role in the settlement of labour 
migrants and the integration of labour migrants and minority ethnic groups. They are 
assumed to fulfil the functions that the Bosnia Project fulfilled for the refugees, and 
therefore were used as a model for the Bosnian refugee groups to take over when the 
Project ended. However, the refugees have come to Britain with ideas and experiences, 
which affect their later ability to conform to these expectations. 
Chapter four examined the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the war that took place 
there between 1992 and 1995. This shows that there is no history of separate ethnic group 
formation by Muslims in Bosnia. The identity of Muslims has varied over time and 
between members of the group, with the majority considering themselves Croatian at 
some times, Serbian at other times, and even classing themselves as Yugoslavs for a 
while. The Muslim population has been closely linked to the Catholic and Orthodox 
populations for centuries. Although they sometimes took part in other people's wars on 
different sides, there is no history or fighting between the groups on their own account. 
Instead, they tended to live peacefully together, with a large degree of socialising 
between the groups. Bosnians of the three main religions lived lives that overlapped with 
each other, and their social networks were often linked quite closely. Muslim households 
would have Serb neighbours, and at work they would have colleagues of different 
religions. They went to the same schools, and the rate of marriage between the groups 
was higher than in any other part of Yugoslavia. 
The causes of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina are complex, and cannot be reduced to 
ethnic hatreds. The evidence from the refugees themselves, and from history, is that until 
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shortly before the war started, and in some cases for a time afterwards, the religious 
background or perceived ethnicity of others was not important. When the war began, it 
therefore came as a shock to many people, many of whom confidently predicted that 
although Croatia had descended into violence, the same would never happen in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. The root causes of the war, rather than ethnic rivalries, lie somewhere in 
the economic and political history of Yugoslavia, and in the manipulations of politicians 
and the mass media that they controlled. Yugoslavia developed a distinctive brand of 
socialism which encouraged separate development of the member states of the Yugoslav 
federation. As the economy started to collapse in the 1980s, the leaders of the richer 
states began to resent any redistribution of wealth in the country, since it necessarily 
involved the transfer of wealth away from richer states such as Slovenia and Croatia. The 
states each had their own communist parties, and some of the leaders Sought to increase 
their political power at the expense of the others. The easiest way for them to do this was 
through the encouragement of nationalism, since in most member states there was one 
ethnic group that formed an overall majority, and appeals to nationalism and ethnicity 
provided an easy rallying call. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was no overall majority, and 
although Muslims were the largest single group there were substantial Bosnian Serb and 
Bosnian Croat groups. Nationalist sentiments were slower to take hold in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, and although the population eventually voted to secede from the federation, 
this decision was taken after Slovenia and Croatia had already left, and was a reflection 
more of anxiety about Serbian nationalism in the rest of Yugoslavia, rather than an 
expression of nationalist sympathies. However, the Bosnian Serb population and 
politicians were strongly influenced by the nationalism of Serbs in Serbia, and began 
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turning towards Serbian nationalism in the late 1980s. Tile same happened with Bosnian 
Croats, who were strongly influenced by Croatian nationalism. This process happened 
very rapidly though, and Bosnian Muslims were somewhat left behind in the race to 
nationhood. Although Muslims had lived in Bosnia for centuries, they had not developed 
separately from the other groups. They also had no strong influence from outside the state 
urging them to seek separate development, and although political parties emerged which 
were predominantly Muslim, they did not advocate a separate Muslim state. 
When fighting began in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it became characterised as an ethnic 
conflict. This overlooks the fact that throughout the war the Bosnian government had 
members that were Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb, and the army contained high- 
ranking officers of all three religions. Large cities such as Sarajevo and Tuzla remained 
mixed throughout the war. For the ordinary Bosnian, though, ones' perceived ethnicity 
became extremely important. Those men that were placed in concentration camps in 
Northern Bosnia were there because they were not Serb, those in the camps in 
Herzegovina were there because they were not Croat. For those that were detained, this 
was very difficult to understand. Firstly, they had not been aware of the animosity 
between the groups that was so evident in the camps. Secondly, it meant that everything 
that they thought they knew about their life was suddenly proved wrong. Those that they 
thought were neighbours were suddenly the enemy, and those that had been friends now 
sought to kill them. Finally, it represented the first of many processes which imposed an 
identity on them, and took control over their lives away from the individuals. 
Those inside the camps were there either because they were arrested, or had surrendered 
to superior firepower. They were predominantly Muslim, and had been imprisoned 
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because of this. However, they themselves had not placed great importance on their 
religion, they did not have a strong ethnic identity, and they cannot be considered as 
having any collective project in the country of origin. In addition, policy in the camps run 
by both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats was to kill those that were considered leaders. 
These two facts combined to affect the situation of the refugees later on in the country of 
exile. 
When the existence of the camps became known and Bosnian Serbs were forced to 
release the detainees, some of the men were taken to Croatia for safety. This was not a 
matter of choice but of expediency, since they had to go to a place of safety and one of 
the conditions for their release was that they did not go to combat zones. Once in Croatia, 
many found that it was impossible to return to their home, as policies of ethnic cleansing 
meant that it was not safe to do so. As a result, UNHCR urged governments throughout 
the world to take in some of these refugees, as the government in Croatia was unwilling 
to support them all. 
As discussed in chapter six, the ex-detainces found that the process of selecting which 
country to travel to was not a matter of expressing a choice. Instead, they could express a 
choice but they were offered what was available. None of the refugees that I interviewed 
had said that Britain was their first choice of destination. In fact, most would have 
preferred to go to Germany or Austria, where they had some relatives or friends already. 
Those that came to Britain on the programme reported that they came either because it 
was a choice of going to Britain or an uncertain existence in a refugee camp in Croatia, or 
they had a choice but it was between Britain and a country that was so far away they 
thought that they would never be able to return. Thus control over the choice of country 
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of exile was taken away from the refugees and instead was in the hands of refugee 
assistance organisations. 
Once selected as a member of Britain's quota of refugees, transport was arranged and the 
refugees were brought to Britain. The organisation of the programme is described and the 
Project is analysed in chapter five. The organisation of the programme represents an 
evolution in policy, since it was based upon earlier programmes, but contained new 
aspects. These new aspects such as the use of cluster areas and mid term support were 
introduced in part because of a recognition of the failings of earlier programmes. 
However, there were several criticisms that could be made of the way that the programme 
was implernented, and its effect on the refugees. The refugees had little choice over 
which country they travelled to, and were unable to travel to those countries where there 
were pre-war Bosnian populations and pre-existing links. The programme that 
accommodated them was forrnulated at a time when official attitudes towards refugees 
were being questioned, and this resulted in the programme being formulated with 
temporary protection at its core. This temporary status affected both the refugees and the 
organisation of the programme. 
The programme was formulated as an emergency response to a temporary situation, and 
the way the programme was funded reflected this. Funding was constantly being 
renegotiated in the early stages, and this made it difficult for the agencies involved to 
formulate long-term plans. However, their experience with work among other refugees 
should have led to the introduction of working practices which benefited the refugees in 
the long term. Instead, the way the programme was implemented in both the reception 
centres and in the mid term stage created dependency among the refugees. This 
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dependency meant that the individuals were not equipped with the necessary skills for 
independent living, and instead remained dependant on the Bosnia Project staff. 
The way that the programme was operated left very little space for the opinions of the 
refugees to be heard or recognised. In some cases this led to frustration and anger, in 
others the response was more passive, but the effect was to remove control from the 
refugees and place the direction of their lives in the hands of others. The organisation of 
the programme and the way it was implemented prevented the refugees from developing 
a collective project in exile. However, it also prevented the formulation of ne%v individual 
positive projects, because of the uncertainty of the situation for the refugees. 
The use of cluster areas in the housing of refugees was a ne%v initiative, and the agencies 
involved consider the policy to have been a success because there has been little 
secondary migration. However, as shown in chapter six, the reasons for the lack of 
secondary migration are more complicated than this. In fact, the refugees see little reason 
to move, not because they are happy with where they are, but because they are not yet 
settled in Britain, and they see little reason to relocate within Britain if they are likely to 
return to Bosnia shortly. 
Chapter six also shows that for the individual refugees, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and its aftermath dominate their lives. They often consider it the most important aspect of 
their lives, although the experiences are very painful to recall. This has implications for 
research, since many refuse to participate in research as they assume that researchers will 
be interested in this aspect of their lives. When individuals do talk of their war 
experiences, they seem to have found the reasons for the war almost impossible to 
comprehend. They continually assert that ethnicity was unimportant before the war, and 
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even that they were often unaware of other's ethnic groups. This may not have been 
strictly true, but it is important to the refugees. It illustrates the dissonance between their 
pre-war life and their wartime experiences, when their ethnicity suddenly became 
important. As shown in chapter four, Bosnian Muslims have very little history of separate 
identification and separate organisation. The pre-eminence of ethnicity during the war 
therefore is another example of control over events being taken away from the refugees. 
They did not choose to be separately identified, the separateness was thrust upon them. 
Their assertions are also another indication of the absence of a collective project in the 
country of origin. 
The lack of control over the course of their lives, both during the war and whilst members 
of the programme, affected many aspects of the refugees' lives. It meant that they had no 
incentive for learning English, and little motivation towards seeking employment. They 
were also unable to make a decision on whether to remain or whether to return. 
Remaining in Britain was not their choice, since it depended on the British government, 
and even though some have now moved from temporary protection to indefinite leave to 
remain, they have no guarantees that they can remain permanently. The decision to return 
to Bosnia-Herzegovina is not wholly theirs to make either, and depends on factors within 
Bosnia-Herzegovina that are beyond the refuees' control. If they wish to return to an area 
where they would be part of a minority group, then their safety cannot be guaranteed. If 
they wish to return to an area where they would be part of a majority, the), are still 
dependant on the population in that area accepting their return, and on the availability of 
housing and employment. Consequently, most have deferred making a decision on return 
until some point in the future. When questioned about return, most refugees replied that 
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they might consider in the future returning to where they were from, but expressed no 
desire to return to an area of Bosnia-Herzegovina that they did not live in before, 
regardless of the population in that area. This indicates that Bosnians have not yet 
constructed a collective project towards their country of origin, as their loyalties and 
orientation is towards pre-war family and friends, and pre-war locations, rather than to 
the whole of the Bosnian state. 
Chapter seven looked at the refugees as a group. Although networks developed and 
socialisation takes place between members of the group, I argue that at the moment a 
community cannot be said to exist. Bosnians do not seem to have recreated the networks 
that they had in the country of origin, but neither have they created equivalent new 
networks. Instead, they consider their pre-war relationships as of continuing importance, 
and the networks and friendships that have developed in the country of exile are seen as 
temporary. Despite the absence of a community, Bosnian community associations have 
been formed in every area where Bosnians from the programme were housed. This 
apparent contradiction can be explained by an examination of the history of the 
associations. It is clear that the associations were formed as a result of interventions by 
refugee assistance organisations and other organisations, rather than from the 
spontaneous ideas of the refugees. It was only through the formation of associations that 
Bosnian refugees could obtain any form of assistance directed towards their needs after 
the Bosnia Project had closed. However, these associations continue to struggle, and I 
argue that they represent an attempt to conform to expectations in order to obtain tile 
specific benefits that British society gives to community associations, rather than a 
reflection of the Bosnian community formation. As such they are contingent 
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communities, dependant for their continuance on the allocation of funding and the 
willingness of a small number of individuals to organise and lead the association. The 
associations are a reflection of social policy in Britain, which fails to distinguish between 
refugees and labour migrants or ethnic minorities despite the differences between these 
groups. Assumptions of community formation among ethnic minorities and labour 
migrants form the basis of policy, and the same assumptions are imposed upon refugees. 
I show in this thesis that refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina that came to Britain as part 
of the programme for ex-detainees and vulnerable people represent a third group in Joly's 
typology. They had no collective project in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and instead represent a 
diverse range of experiences and backgrounds. The uncertainty of their situation, caused 
by their temporary protected status, has inhibited the emergence of a new collective 
project and of individual life projects, and they cannot be said to be oriented towards 
either return to Bosnia-Herzegovina or remaining in Britain. There is no real Community 
formation, but community associations have been formed as a direct response to social 
policy in Britain. However, these are contingent communities, not the expression and 
representation of a Bosnian community. They are a reaction to prevailing policies rather 
than an example of refugee initiatives. Refugees from Bosnia-l-lerzegovina have been 
unable to construct a positive project in the country of exile, either towards the country of 
exile or towards the country of origin, because of the constraints around them. These 
constraints include the mode of life in pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, the nature of the 
conflict, the Organisation and implementation of the programme, and the long-term 
policies of British society which make assumptions Of Community. Each of these imposed 
constraints on the refugees' actions and prevented the fon-nulation of any positive 
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individual or group projects. Refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina form a new category in 
Joly's typology, of refugees that had no collective refugees in the country of origin, and 
have not formulated a collective project in the country of exile. They have not maintained 
a return project, and neither have they abandoned it, instead their attitude to return is 
uncertain and they have been unable to make a decision for themselves on whether to 
return or whether to remain. This uncertainty results partly from factors relating to tile 
country of origin, but is also a reflection of policies and practices of British society. 
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Appendix 
Interview guidelines 
How is your family? Ask about relatives/ friends that I know - check in advance who 
they know and who they are related to. 
Where did you live in Bosnia? Ask about type of house, family that were near, friends. 
What job did you do? 
Did you go to the mosque / church often? 
Did you have friends that were not Muslim? (if not Muslim ask if friends that were not 
Catholic/ Orthodox) 
Were you involved in any political parties / trade unions/ voluntary organisations? 
Before the war started, had you travelled outside Bosnia? Outside Yugoslavia? 
I would like to ask you some questions about coming to Britain. How is it that you came 
to Britain and not another country? How was it decided what country you should go to? 
What did you know about Britain before you came? 
Now you are here, do you have any family members nearby? Or friends or neighbours 
from before the war? 
I would like to ask some questions about after you arrived in Britain. What was it like in 
the reception centre? (only ask if programme and went to reception centre) 
How did you come to be living in this house, and in this city? 
Are you happy with this house? 
Once you moved to here, did you have anyone that you could go to for help or advice? 
How did you find out about them? 
Did you have any information on jobs or English lessons? 
Do you or did you go to English lessons? What were they like? 
Have you looked for work since you came? How? Are you working now? 
Do you see other Bosnians at all? Where, and for what reasons? 
Are you involved in the community association? Why? What do you do? 
Was there anything like a community association in Bosnia? 
What is your status in Britain? What does that mean? 
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Are you happy with that status? Why? 
I would like to ask you some questions about Bosnia now. Have you been to Bosnia for a 
visit? Have other people you know? 
Do you think you will go back to Bosnia for good one day? Why? Should people go 
back? 
Did you register to vote in the elections in Bosnia? Did you vote? 
That is all the questions that I wanted to ask. Is there anything that you would like to ask 
me, or anything else you would like to talk about? 
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